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Islam, Secularism, and Middle East Democracy: A Conjoint Analysis

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Islam, Secularism, and Middle East Democracy: A Conjoint Analysis

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Abstract

Although countries with larger Muslim populations are less likely to be democracies, multi-national individual-level studies question whether Muslims are less democratic. Furthermore, the secular-Islamist cleavage has been linked to diverging democratic sentiment. To unpack the relationship between Islam, Islamism, and regime-type preferences, this study employs a conjoint analysis in Egypt and Morocco. Religious and Islamist Muslims demonstrated limited differences in their attitudes toward participatory democracy compared to their less religious and non-Islamist counterparts. They are substantially different, though, in their support for political Islam; namely, Islamists are more likely to support an official religion and including religious leaders in government. This accords with the argument that Islam is not inherently anti-democratic.

Islam has been repeatedly cited as a cause of the lack of democracy in the Middle East. In multi-national comparisons, Muslim populations are associated with less democracy (Rowley & Smith, 2009; Potrafke, 2013) and greater state religious support (Fox & Sandler, 2005; Fox & Flores, 2009). Researchers have blamed “Islam itself,” Muslims’ religious and para-religious beliefs, and religious institutional structures (Rowley & Smith 2009, p. 273; see also Fukuyama 2006; Lewis, 2002). This negative relationship between Muslim populations and democracy, however, is not consistently evident on the individual level. Muslims and Christians do not express different levels of support for democracy (Bratton, 2003; Hofmann, 2004; Rafiqi, 2019). Unlike religious group, religiosity and the “secular-Islamist cleavage” have been linked to popular (anti-)democratic and (anti-)secularist sentiment (Brezna et al., 2011; Ciftci, 2013).

The differences between aggregated population patterns and individual opinion on religious and democratic institutionalization suggest differences in citizens’ view of the political structure more broadly. Regimes, after all, are not *just* the mechanism of choosing the executive. Muslims’ support for “democracy” in these surveys may reflect citizens envisioning an authoritarian or religious regime rather than an elected, secular, or liberal government (Alvarez & Welzel, 2017; Ridge, 2023b). In that case, the relationship between religion, religious values, and democratic attitudes would be obscured by a lack of clarity about the state structure in question. To understand how citizens feel about democracy and how religiosity and ideology contribute to those propensities, researchers must be more specific about the system they want citizens to evaluate.

To convey a broad image of the state and evaluate the relative merits of the many components states have, this study exploits a conjoint experiment in two Middle Eastern countries (Egypt and Morocco) conducted in August 2019 and January 2020.¹ The conjoint describes the state in terms of democracy (elections and political participation), religiosity (role of religion and religious leaders), and economic security (unemployment rates and welfare system efficacy). This experimental structure – including randomization and the holistic regime descriptions – allows for sub-group analyses of citizens’ preferences. Thus, the differences – and similarities – between Muslims and non-Muslims, those who favor political Islam (Islamists) and those who oppose it, are revealed.

By focusing on Egypt and Morocco, the study features two states with different socio-political relationships with Islam. Egypt had decades of militaristic authoritarianism upset during the Arab Spring. Elections temporarily empowered an Islamist party, which was quickly replaced by a military coup. Morocco, a parliamentary monarchy, largely avoided the Arab Spring. After the protests an

Islamist party was elected and held power for a decade. Its king is styled Commander of the Faithful.

The results reveal that the religious sects do not demonstrate major differences in their attitudes toward democratic participation. However, more religious Muslims showed some relatively less democratic propensities than less religious Muslims. Among Egyptians, Muslim, religious, and Islamist respondents placed greater weight on the religious dimension of the state than their non-Muslim, less practicing, and non-Islamist counterparts. This particularly manifests in support of an official religion. Among Moroccans, Muslims are more interested in having an official religion; more religious Moroccans and those who endorse political Islam are more accepting of an official role for religion and an official position for religious leaders. Political Islamists were less invested in the democratic institutions of the state. Nonetheless, the Islamists were *not*, on average, anti-democratic. Across subgroups, democratic participation was well-valued.

Islam, Islamism, and Democracy

Religion has a substantial influence on politics and political behavior around the world. Few regimes fully separate religion from politics (Fox & Flores, 2009), and Islam is the “most common government-endorsed faith” worldwide (Pew, 2017). State-endorsed Islam has public support, if not universal approval. In the 2018 Arab Barometer, 54.5% of respondents thought religion should be private and separate from socio-economic life, and 41.6% disagreed. A third thought that clerics should influence government decisions; 61.1% disagreed. These same survey respondents evince support for “democracy.” 72% agreed that “democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better than other systems,” and only 20.1% disagreed with that statement. These populations offer varying combinations of supporting democracy, opposing democracy, supporting a role for religion in the state, and opposing political Islam. Some MENA residents even include an official role for religious leadership in their idea of “democracy.”² In the World Value Survey (2017-2022), respondents could rate how “essential” having religious authorities interpret the law is to “democracy” from not essential (0) to essential (10). The average score was 5.59 in Egypt, 5.40 in Iraq, 6.04 in Jordan, 4.34 in Lebanon, 6.11 in Libya, and 5.32 in Morocco (Haerpfer et al, 2020). At the popular level, the confluence of Islam, political Islam, and democratic opinion is far from fixed.

Identity

The propensity to support democracy and the incorporation of religion in government can be analyzed based on popular identity, religiosity, and ideology. Abundant literature has attempted to tie Islam to pro- and anti-democratic attitudes. On the anti-democratic side, Islam is depicted as an all-encompassing system “with its own code of morality and doctrine of political and social justice” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 45). It is criticized for failing to separate religion and the state, which scholars argue is inimical to democracy (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 2002; Kedourie, 1994). At the country level, there is a negative correlation between the Muslim population and democratization, which has been taken to substantiate the aforementioned narratives (Rowley & Smith, 2009; Potrafke, 2013). Other scholars have grounded their arguments *for* democracy in Islamic teachings. For a detailed breakdown of the theological arguments advanced for and against democracy, see Ciftci (2021).

Research on individual level attitudes towards democracy has not fully borne out that negative relationship. Some studies have found no denominational differences (Rose, 2002; Rafiqi, 2019) or have even found that Muslims are *more favorably* disposed towards democracy (Hofmann, 2004). Others find that religious minorities in the Middle East (e.g., Christians or Druze) are more or less supportive depending on the context. Minority groups may anticipate gaining or losing socio-political rights or privileges with elections and make an interest-based calculation on democracy (Belge & Karakoç, 2015; Benstead, 2015; Ridge, 2022). These contradictory results do not provide a foundation for anticipating sectarian differences at the *individual* level (H1).

Religiosity

Religion can be distinguished from religiosity. Not all Muslims are devout. Past studies have identified diverging relationships between religiosity and personal democratic attitudes. If religiosity is about traditional values and “negatively related to openness to change and tolerance of differences,” then it would be opposed to democracy, which is “positively linked to openness to change, universalism, and appreciation of diversity” (Rafiqi, 2019, p. 693). Personal piety has been linked to reduced support for democracy in the Arab world, particularly among women (Tessler, 2002). In some Muslim-majority countries, religious behavior has been linked to reduced political participation, although members of religious social organizations are more likely to participate in politics (e.g., join protests) (Sarkissian, 2012a). Religiosity would then be tied to lower democratic preference and less investment in participatory government (H2a). Other researchers have found no relationship between personal religious behavior and

democratic attitudes in the Muslim world (Rose, 2002; Hofmann, 2004; Ciftci, 2010; Ciftci et al., 2019). Belge and Karakoç (2015) find inconsistent relationships between self-identification as religious and attitudes towards authoritarianism. This could indicate a null effect. By contrast, religiosity could increase democratic support under the right conditions. Religious service attendance increases Muslims' support for democracy when they are in the majority sect of their country but increases opposition when they are in the minority sect of a country because communal prayer highlights group identity and group interest considerations (Hoffmann, 2020). In Muslim-majority countries, religiosity could *increase* preferences for democracy (H2b).

Religiosity also could drive attitudes toward the connection between religion and the state. As noted, Islam is a commonly favored religion: “Most Middle Eastern states have developed a peculiar *modus vivendi* between religion and secularism by adopting Islam as a state religion and pursuing secularist policies that suppress the independent organization and political mobilization of religion” (Belge & Karakoç, 2015, p. 285; see also Sarkissian 2012b). Public support for religious involvement beyond that is divided. Devoutness – identifying religion as important and participating in services and prayer – explains “around two-thirds” of the difference in expressed support for religious and political leaders between Christians and Muslims in multi-national studies (Brenzau et al., 2011, p. 680). Thus, it is not a sectarian distinction but a religiosity distinction. Furthermore, Muslims’ religiosity has been linked to supporting states’ enforcing Islamic law and the involvement of religious leaders in politics (Tezcür & Azadarmaki, 2008; Ciftci, 2013). Based on these findings, religious individuals are expected to be more likely to favor integrating religion into the state structure (H2c).³ A counterpoint would be quietist interpretations of Islam, which favor remaining out of politics. Concerns that religion is corrupted by politics would work against religious individuals endorsing a mosque-state connection.

Ideology

In addition to examining religion and religiosity, ideology – attitudes towards religion in politics – is considered. This is the Islamism-secularism cleavage. Islamism “refers [s] to those ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an ‘Islamic order’ – a religious state, shari‘a law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities” (Bayat, 2013, p. 4). Scholars have operationalized Islamism based on the belief that only religious individuals should hold public office, desiring to put clerics into government positions and seeking to enact Islamic law (Ciftci, 2010; Brenzau et al., 2011; Ciftci, 2013; Tessler & Gao,

2005). Beliefs about political Islam arguably condition state structural preferences for both democracy and secularization. The lack of “secular values” is identified as the cause of authoritarian persistence in the Muslim world (Huntington, 1996; Bratton, 2003; Rose, 2003). Fish (2002), on the other hand, argues that Muslim societies are not less secular than non-Muslim communities. He also argues there is “plenty of room for questioning the usual association of secularism with democracy and religiosity with authoritarianism” (Fish, 2002, p. 24). Numerous democracies have official religions (e.g., the United Kingdom). Furthermore, institutionally supporting secularism can be a means of authoritarian persistence. Sarkissian (2012) argues that MENA governments specifically restrict Muslim civil society groups to prevent organizing against the regime. Despite the aforementioned willingness of MENA nationals to include religious leaders’ participation in their conception of *dimuqratiyya*, democracy could be hard to square with offering official status to religious leaders, depending on their roles. Thus, Islamist preferences must be considered alongside attitudes towards democratic institutions themselves to understand political preferences.

Do citizens with different attitudes towards political Islam have different state structural preferences? Functionally, the argument goes, “Islamist values of these individuals may lead to more support for shari’a and less support for democracy” (Ciftci, 2013, p. 783). Islamists – those who think Islam should be integrated into the government – would then be less likely to support democratic institutions (H3a). Previous studies have found inconsistent results with respect to the belief that atheists are unfit for public office or that the country would be better off with religious people in government and attitudes towards (non-)democracy (Tessler, 2002; Ciftci, 2010; Belge & Karakoç, 2015). Inverting it, Tessler and Gao (2005, 91) conclude, “It is clear that support for democracy does not necessarily imply support for secular democracy; rather, those who support democracy disagree about whether or not Islam should play a significant role in political affairs.” In some contexts, support for political Islam is negatively related to democratic interest; in other cases, it is positive, and in others, there is no significant relationship. Ciftci et al. (2019) attribute the differences across contexts to the relative proportion of individuals who favor a role for public Islam or who favor or oppose religious pluralism in their society; those who favor public Islam are not inherently anti-democracy, and those who favor pluralism will be more likely to support democracy. Islamist groups may even anticipate an electoral advantage, which could predispose them to democracy (Livny, 2020). Counter-claimers can also point to the non-democratic practices of several secular (or anti-Islamist) political actors in the Middle East (e.g., banning Islamist parties). This could mean Islamists are more likely to endorse democracy (H3b). These inconsistent patterns, though, could create a null finding. This is Tessler and Gao’s (2005) argument.

A straightforward assumption would be that avowed supporters of political Islam favor creating a formal connection between Islam and the state (H3c). It is possible but not obligatory for elements of political Islam to operate as a syndrome. In that case, those who favor enacting shari'a, having religious individuals holding government office, or taking moral guidance for society from Islam would hold these beliefs in concert. In fact, many studies merge these kinds of questions into indexes (e.g., Ciftci 2013). Ciftci (2013, 784) also finds that "nonsecular" Arab Muslims – those who think that banks should be forbidden to lend at interest and that apostates should be executed – are more likely to agree that "the government should implement only the laws of the shari'a." The parameters could, though, operate independently. For instance, if citizens wanted the state to ban lending at interest but not involve religious political leaders. To assess whether multiple domains of political Islam function equivalently, this proposition can be examined with respect to a variety of indicators. As such, more holistic regime descriptions provide greater nuance to understanding popular opinion. A summary of the included hypotheses is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Hypotheses

	Prediction
H1	Muslims/Non-Muslims do not express different support for democracy
H2a	Religious individuals are less democratic
H2b	Religious individuals are more democratic
H2c	Religious individuals want to integrate religion into the state.
H3a	Islamists are less democratic
H3b	Islamists are more democratic
H3c	Islamists want to integrate religion in the state

Measuring State Structural Preferences

The aforementioned studies lay a lot of groundwork for understanding citizens' democratic and Islamist preference profiles. These studies, however, address either questions about democracy or autocracy in isolation. Ciftci (2013) is an exception in that it asks questions about formalizing Islamic law in parallel to questions about democracy. However, the Arab Barometer questions on which Ciftci relies treat these as separate and separable propositions.

With this question structure, these studies cannot address the relative value citizens place on these features of the state or address any assumptions they are making about whether or not the "democracy" described in the question does or does not include political Islam. Ciftci (2013, 790), for instance, posits that democracy would be more popular in the Arab world if it were not "strictly secular." Ridge (2023b) discusses how Arabic speakers are divided on whether or

not *dimuqratiyya* (the word used for “democracy” in the Arab Barometer) is a secular system. As such, evaluating attitudes towards either democracy or secularism requires describing the state on both dimensions rather than inquiring about preferences for each separately.

Additionally, as citizens are also suspected of evincing instrumental support for democracy – supporting it only because they believe democracy will induce economic success or liberal economic agenda – or opposing it because of the harms it could bring, the state should also be described on this dimension (Benstead, 2015); Ridge (2023a) argues that the instrumental support is more assumed than prevalent. Furthermore, by using the word *dimuqratiyya*, which is often interpreted in economic terms, surveys overestimate support for the *elected government* due to mismeasurement (translation bias) (Ridge, 2023b). This is different from instrumental support for electoral institutions. To understand citizens’ preferences over features like political participation, economic stability, or official religion, then, the state structure should be viewed holistically. That is especially true for understanding the *relative* value of these state structural elements – do these different groups value these items differently compared to each other?

This study thus improves on the previous literature by introducing an experimental format. A conjoint experiment allows researchers to describe the state more fully and to see which factors are contributing to citizen preferences and to what degree. The direct questions cannot readily include multiple elements. The experiment also avoids direct questions about democracy, in which a respondent could misreport his opinions (Kuran, 1998) or evince weak preferences that are over-interpreted as democratic commitment. The conjoint experiment also permits subgroup analyses, demonstrating whether the group's demographic or ideological subgroups engage the conjoint differently. Experimental techniques also improve the causal validity of findings. The experimental cues cannot have caused the answers in the preceding demographic and ideological traits; observational studies, like those cited here, rarely consider the question order on these barometers. In fact, the Islamism and religiosity questions in the Arab Barometer come *after* the regime-type questions, so these studies are conditioned on a post-treatment variable. If these attitudes are unmoved movers, the threat to inference would be reduced, but that is not assured. The experimental design, including having the conjoint be the last set of questions, helps avoid these concerns.

Conjoint analysis has proliferated in MENA politics studies in recent years. Cammett et al. (2021) address the role of ethnicity in attitudes towards clientelism in Lebanon. Conjoint analysis has been used in studies of sectarianism and vote choice in Qatar (Shockley & Gengler, 2020), Qataris’ government funding priorities (Gengler, Shockley, and Ewers 2021), and security policy in Lebanon (Cammett et al, 2022). Conjoint analysis has examined attitudes towards women’s labor force participation in Qatar (Blaydes, Gengler, and Lari 2021) and Jordan (Barnett,

Jamal, and Monroe 2020). Ferwerda and Gest (2020) investigate popular propensity for emigration, and Shamir and Shamir (1995) test Israelis' preference for democracy and Jewish nationalism.

Traditional survey questions could be used to inquire about individuals' preferences (e.g., no elections or multiparty elections) and rank orderings (e.g., elections matter more than a role for religious leaders), but that survey structure separates these inextricably linked elements. The conjoint approach more readily "simulates real-life decision tasks, when people have to trade off features or attributes, one against another" (Shamir & Shamir, 1995, p. 109). The conjoint design also helps reduce intentional bias, such as social desirability bias and cheap talk (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). At the same time, it is "agnostic about how respondents reach their observed decisions" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 3). The respondent makes a choice of bundles and can deceive himself of the reason or have plausible deniability regarding choices he might fear were unpopular, just as voters choosing among platforms in real votes can (Kuran, 1998). The conjoint technique is thus less susceptible than direct questions to the suggestion that respondents will falsely claim to like democracy when they do not.

Conjoint techniques compare favorably to real-world referenda. Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) show that forced choice conjoint studies align with citizens' choices in immigration referenda. While the real world is not a daily plebiscite on democracy, MENA nationals have repeatedly faced the binary choice of a new constitution or the status quo. Thus, voting on a state structural framework – albeit one with clearer economic signals and fewer parameters than a typical constitution – has a clear real-world political reference point.

In this study, two profiles showing six attributes and their randomized levels were presented to the respondents. The attributes related to democracy, religion, and the economy. Each attribute had two or three levels for 216 potential profiles (Table 2).⁴ The two profiles were never identical, though they could share features. Respondents were presented with five pairs of profiles sequentially on separate screens.⁵

Table 2: Conjoint Levels

Elections	There are elections with multiple recognized political parties There are elections with one recognized political party There are no elections
Participation	Many barriers to citizen political participation Some barriers to citizen political participation Few barriers to citizen political participation
Official Religion	There is an official state religion There is no official state religion
Role in Government	The formal role of religious leaders in government No formal role for religious leaders in government
State Services	Good government provision of basic items (i.e. housing and food) to individuals Some government provision of basic items (i.e. housing and food) to individuals Little government provision of basic items (i.e. housing and food) to individuals
Unemployment Rate	High unemployment (14%) Low unemployment (7%)

Opportunities for popular participation in government were included to assess support for democracy (Dahl, 1989; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). This included elections; the options were no elections, elections with only one recognized party, and elections with multiple recognized parties. Respondents also considered the level of barriers a regime might impose for popular participation in politics. Political participation is reasonably common in the Middle East despite government restrictions. In the 2018 Arab Barometer, 20.5% of survey respondents reported participating in a protest in the past three years, and 18.7% had attended a meeting or signed a petition. 43.8% voted in the last election. Citizens who favor a state that includes elections and oppose barriers to popular political participation are supporting democracy. Specifying these elements, rather than using the word *democracy/dimuqratiyya*, as is common in direct questions, reduces the aforementioned measurement problems for that word.

Religion is introduced in two forms. One relates to whether or not the state has an official religion. Egypt recognizes Islam, and Morocco recognizes Maliki Islam in particular. The second is whether or not there would be a formal role for religious leaders in the government. Many democracies have official religions. They are less likely to give government offices to religious leaders, but some do

(e.g., England). Both can pertain to Islamism. Non-Islamists can object to both, though they may object more vociferously to the latter.

In terms of economic outcomes that the government might generate, descriptions of the welfare subsidy system and the level of unemployment were included. State subsidies for personal necessities are common in the Middle East. They are broadly popular (Ridge, 2022). Thus, they are economic outcome metrics that are legible to respondents. The levels of high and low unemployment – specified at 14% and 7%, respectively – are realistic for the Middle East. The unemployment rate in 2019 was 10.76% in Egypt and 9.02% in Morocco. These rates are thus high and low relative to these economic circumstances.

Based on these features, citizens were asked to choose which of the two randomly generated frameworks of state institutional structures they would prefer. To examine the difference in revealed preferences of subsets of the population, the difference in marginal means is employed.⁶ The marginal mean “describes the level of favorability toward profiles that have a particular feature level, ignoring all other features” (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020, 6). A marginal mean above 0.5 indicates that the feature increases the support for a given profile, while a marginal mean below 0.5 means that that feature decreases favorability for that profile. The difference in the marginal means reveals the *relative* favorability or item weight, net of any influence by the other features, across the subgroups. These are included in the manuscript. The marginal means for each subgroup are shown in Appendix A.

Surveys in Egypt and Morocco

Surveys were fielded in Egypt and Morocco to conduct the conjoint experiment through YouGov’s MENA panel.⁷ The Egyptian survey ran in August 2019; it included 1000 Egyptians. The Morocco survey ran in January 2020; it included 991 Moroccans. The surveys had 94% and 86% completion rates, respectively. This panel has been used in other political science studies (Nyhan & Zeitzoff, 2018; Blackman & Jackson, 2019). Respondents were able to take the survey in Arabic or English. 94.6% of Egyptians and 93% of Moroccans took the survey in Arabic. The survey instrument is in Appendix C.

The panel targets representativeness based on age, gender, and region based on census information (YouGov, 2017). Because online surveys require literacy, the sample is more educated than the general population.⁸ An advantage of the online survey method is that it allows the respondents anonymity, which improves response accuracy. The study does not claim the sample statistics are population

statistic. Rather, the study focuses on a conjoint experiment. The findings are based on randomization and subgroup analyses, not national representation. As noted above, the conjoint experiment is able to present holistic regime descriptions, identify relative component weights, and evaluate subgroup differences in emphasis.

This dataset was previously used in Ridge (2023a). That study focuses on the potential need to trade off economic development and deliverables and political participation. While it notes that citizens *generally* favored having an official religion and *generally* opposed a formal role for religion in government, it did not focus on religion. It did not include subgroup analyses of religion, religiosity, or ideology. Thus, this research presents distinct findings about public opinion in Egypt and Morocco.

The countries' regime types and experiences with Islam and Islamists are quite different. Egypt, the largest Arab state, ousted long-term president Hosni Mubarak during the Arab Spring. During his tenure, Islamists, most famously the Muslim Brotherhood, were legally restricted. During the Arab Spring, the anti-government factions struggled to coalesce (Stacher, 2020). The Muslim Brotherhood felt it had been particularly targeted by the regime, which kept its members tight but did not facilitate cross-group coordination (Nugent, 2020). New elections were held, and a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated party won control of the government. A year later, a military coup overthrew the elected government. This was publicly justified by the premise that the Muslim Brotherhood, as Islamists, were undemocratic. Former Field Marshal El-Sisi has retained the presidency since 2014. Islamist groups once again face government restrictions. The constitution permits freedom of religion while making Islam the official religion of the country; several Sunni schools of jurisprudence⁹ operate in Egypt. Egypt has a sizeable Christian minority, largely Coptic Christians. In 2019, Freedom House classified Egypt as Not Free.

Morocco is a parliamentary monarchy, and the king plays an active role in its politics.⁹ Maliki Islam is the official religion; it is seen as a moderate version of Islam. The king is considered the religious head of the country as Commander of the Faithful, and all political parties are expected to recognize his position as such. The parliament is elected. The government acted quickly to diffuse protests during the Arab Spring by offering a new constitution and elections but not substantially changing the regime (Ottaway, 2019); this is consistent with the monarchy's depoliticization of Moroccan politics (Maghraoui, 2002). An Islamist party (PJD) won those new elections and formed a coalition government with non-Islamist parties. In 2020, Freedom House classified Morocco as Partly Free. Although many

studies merge countries for analysis, the countries are analyzed separately to allow for differences.

Demographic and attitudinal questions were used to identify the subgroups, and they were asked in the survey prior to the conjoint experiment. Respondents were asked about their religious affiliation. In Egypt, 90.2% identified as Muslim, 8.9% as Christian, and 0.9% with no religion. In Morocco, 97% identified as Muslim, 0.4% as Christian, 0.1% as something else, and 2.5% with no religion. All analyses about religiosity and religious ideology focus on the Muslim population. To assess religiosity, respondents were asked how often they prayed and how often they read or listened to the Quran. A binary classification distinguishes engaging daily from engaging less frequently (Table 3). Religious participation and support for political Islam are common in both countries. They are not coterminous, though. 2x2s for each metric of religiosity and each metric of support for political Islam have respondents in each square. The opinions are quite varied.

Multiple arenas in which citizens endorse movements or principles that “strive to establish some kind of an ‘Islamic order’” are considered (Bayat, 2007, p. 4). A binary classification distinguishes those who (strongly) agree from those who (strongly) disagree. One asks about religious leaders (not) seeking to influence citizens’ political choices. While most respondents do not want religious leaders to dictate vote choices, they also would support legislating in accordance with Islamic law. A final case that distinguishes citizens’ beliefs about the religious permissibility of democracy – is electing a government acceptable under Islamic teachings. Recall that some scholars and theologians have argued that it is, while others have argued that it is not. In both countries, the majority believe that it is acceptable.

Table 3: Religiosity and Ideology Population Shares

Indicator	Egypt		Morocco	
	Daily	Less Often	Daily	Less Often
Pray*	71.7%	28.3%	76.3%	23.7%
Read or Listen to the Qur’an*	39.6%	60.4%	27.5%	72.5%
	Islamist	Non-Islamist	Islamist	Non-Islamist
Religious leaders like imams and priests should not interfere in voters’ decisions in elections*	13.4%	86.6%	21.1%	78.9%
The government should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law	86.5%	13.5%	82.4%	17.6%
Electing governments is acceptable under the teachings of Islam*	85.5%	14.5%	66.0%	34.0%

* Different across countries (p<0.05)


Results and Discussion

Identity

Despite the concerns that Muslims are, as a group, less likely to support democracy, that is not shown here (Appendix A). They were not significantly different in their attitudes towards elections. Moreover, Muslim Egyptians were more concerned about barriers to political participation. Non-Muslims opposed the official religion. The groups were not significantly different in Morocco, but the smaller share of non-Muslims is an empirical challenge. While this is largely consistent with H1's expectation of no difference, it could also buttress Hoffman's (2020) argument about groups supporting democracy when they are in the majority. Minorities may fear the tyranny of the majority (Ridge, 2022a). This possibility merits future research.

Religiosity

For differences based on religiosity, those who pray daily are compared to those who do not (Figure 1). In Egypt, both groups prefer a regime with multiparty elections, whereas they disfavor having no elections. Both groups prefer fewer barriers to political participation. However, the less religious place more weight on the presence of multi-party elections ($p < 0.10$). Those who pray favor having an official religion while keeping religious leaders out of government; those who do not pray daily also favor an official religion, but their choice places less weight on the role of religious leaders in government. The difference approaches significance with respect to an official religion such that more religious individuals are more likely to favor a religion-state link ($p < 0.10$).

Figure 1: Praying Daily v. Not Praying Daily


In Morocco, there are fewer significant differences between these groups. In Morocco, both those who pray daily and those who do not prefer a regime with multiparty elections and disfavor having no elections; those who pray daily also disfavor a regime with single-party elections. Those who pray prefer fewer barriers to political participation, while those who do not pray daily place less weight on this feature in their choice of states. The differences approach significance such that religious individuals are more democratically inclined ($p < 0.10$). Both groups prefer an official religion, but they are less favorable toward having an official role for religion in government. These results favor H2a and H2c.

Religiosity is also assessed with respect to reading or listening to the Qur'an daily or not (Figure 2). In Egypt, both groups prefer a regime with multiparty elections, whereas they disfavor having no elections. Both groups prefer fewer barriers to political participation. They also both prefer having an official religion while keeping religious leaders out of government. The differences between these groups are not generally significant. The exception is tolerance for states without elections; those who engage with the Qur'an daily are more tolerant of the absence

of elections. In this respect, the more religious Egyptian Muslims are demonstrating less democratic commitment.

In Morocco, there are significant differences between these groups, especially with respect to religion and the state. Both groups prefer a regime with multiparty elections, whereas they disfavor having no elections and prefer fewer barriers to political participation. Both those who engage with the Qur'an daily and those who do not are more likely to favor having an official religion and disfavor not having one; the presence or absence of official roles for religious leaders does not weigh heavily in the choice of the more religious, whereas the less religious prefer no role for religious leaders in the government. The differences in the marginal means on these dimensions are statistically significant. Those who engage with the holy text daily are less interested in a state with no official religion, and they are more open to a formal role for religious leaders in the regime. These results favor H2a and H2c.


Figure 2: Reading or Listening to the Qur'an Daily or Not




Ideology

Next, the responses are analyzed along the (non-)Islamist cleavage and attitudes towards political Islam. Firstly, the question of whether or not to enact laws in accordance with shari'a is considered (Figure 3). In Egypt, both those who would enact Islamic law and those who would not prefer states with multiparty elections and disfavor states without elections. Those who would enact Islamic law prefer states with fewer barriers to political participation. Those who would enact Islamic law are more likely to support a state with an official religion, while those who do not support making laws in accordance with shari'a do not substantially weigh the presence or absence of an official religion in their choice. Neither group favors, on average, a formal role for religious leaders. The differences between these groups are significant. Those who favor enacting Islamic law place significantly more weight on having an official religion, and they are more tolerant of including religious leaders in the government.

In Morocco, both groups prefer states with multiparty elections and disfavor states with single-party elections or no elections; both groups prefer states with fewer barriers to political participation. The non-Islamists reveal more concern about restrictions on participation ($p < 0.10$) and are more negative about single-party election systems ($p < 0.10$). Those who would enact Islamic law are more likely to support a state with an official religion, while those who do not support making laws in accordance with shari'a do not substantially weigh the presence or absence of an official religion in their choice. Both groups, on average, prefer not to include religious leaders in government. The differences are significant. Those who favor enacting Islamic law place significantly more weight on having an official religion, and they are more tolerant of including religious leaders in government. The results favor H3a and H3c.

Figure 3: Enact Islamic Law or Not

Next, whether religious leaders should interfere in voting behavior is considered (Figure 4). In Egypt, both those who would allow religious leaders to weigh in on voting decisions and those who oppose it favor multiparty election states and are less favorable to states with no elections. The choices of those who think religious leaders should not interfere are more informed by the level of barriers to political participation. Both those who would and would not allow their interference, on average, favor having an official religion; the non-Islamists place more weight on keeping religious leaders out of government. The differences between these groups are not significant with respect to democratic participation or the role of religion in the regime.

Figure 5: Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable

In Morocco, both groups favor a state with multiparty elections and oppose having no elections; those who think elections are not compatible with Islam are less tolerant of a state with single party elections. Those who think Islam allows elections prefer fewer barriers to participation. They are also more tolerant of a state with only single party elections while being less tolerant of the absence of elections ($p < 0.10$). This is consistent with Ridge's (2023a) finding that believing Islamic teachings allows electing the government promotes support for democratic institutions. Both groups support having an official religion while preferring not to have a role for religious leaders in the government. There are significant differences between the groups. Those who think that elected governments are compatible with Islamic teachings are more likely to support having an official religion and a formal role for religious leaders in government.

Overall, despite the handwringing about Muslims and democratic suppression, these results do not reveal any such discord on attitudes towards democracy. While more religious Muslims are placing less weight on democratic participation in making these choices, the *average* is still on the side of political

participation. The greatest distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims and devout Muslims and less religious Muslims appear with respect to the role religion should play in the state. Muslims and the devout, in these Muslim-majority countries, are more willing to have an official religion. To the extent that the literature has predicted that (religious) Muslims are less interested in secular governance, that is substantiated. These findings favor H3a and H3c.

Taking all of these findings together offers some patterns. These results do not indicate that Islam or Muslims are inherently opposed to democracy. Muslims, though, are more interested in seeing their religion formalized in government than non-Muslims are. By these metrics, it seems more religious Muslims are less invested in democracy than less religious Muslims; however, on average, they still favor elections and popular participation in government. They are also more interested in religion's integration in government. Similarly, while not opposing democracy, Islamists are more tolerant of restrictions on democracy. They are also more interested in linking the religion and the regime.

Table 4: Hypotheses and Results

	Prediction	Results Consistent with the Prediction
H1	Muslims/Non-Muslims do not express different support for democracy	Yes (Null)
H2a	Religious individuals are less democratic	Yes
H2b	Religious individuals are more democratic	No
H2c	Religious individuals want to integrate religion in the state	Yes
H3a	Islamists are less democratic	Yes
H3b	Islamists are more democratic	No
H3c	Islamists want to integrate religion in the state	Yes

Two patterns within the results are also noteworthy. First, the effect of personal religiosity on opinion is stronger in Egypt, the country in which Islamist parties have faced greater restrictions. By contrast, the effect of Islamist ideology is stronger in Morocco, which had a religious party in government and in which the king is associated with Islam. The support for democracy, even among Islamists, is consistent with the PJD's not overthrowing the parliamentary structure in Morocco. Overall, the impact of religiosity and ideology is somewhat context dependent. Future scholarship can examine additional country contexts to explore their variations.

Second, the differences of opinion between the groups were usually larger with respect to having an official religion than to the role for religious leaders in government. This suggests that the public skepticism to that profile was crossing the religiosity and ideology spectrum. Whether or not to have an official religion showed greater variation in respondent sentiment across the subgroups. These states recognize Islam, and official religions are common worldwide. Removing or maintaining an official religion in the hypothetical state is a less costly indicator of affiliation and support. Thus, it is a reasonable place for subgroup divergences to appear.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to delve further into the arguments linking Islam and anti-democratic and anti-secular sentiment. Islam and political Islam are perennially treated as a source of anti-democracy movements in the Middle East. Studies at the national and individual level though have provided inconsistent evidence for this presumed relationship. These studies have left open the possibility that preferences for democratic participation and religious incorporation are disingenuous or contingent on the economic outcomes or (de-)secularization that respondents think democratization will induce.

Recent surveys from Egypt and Morocco are brought to bear on this question. In a conjoint experiment, respondents chose between possible states that were described in terms of their opportunities for political participation, the role for religion in the state, and economic deliverables. The conjoint framework allows identification of different levels of preference for these regime features between population subgroups (e.g., supporters and opponents of political Islam). The conjoint analysis does so net of their preferences for these other features, rather than independently of them.

Religious Muslims show somewhat less commitment to participatory government than less-religious Muslim Egyptian and Moroccans. They are *not*, however, uniformly anti-participatory government. These groups take very different tacks, though, when it comes to integrating religion and the state. Devout (as opposed to less devout) inhabitants are much more interested in incorporating religion into their regimes. That takes the form both of establishing a religion for the country and – the higher bar – being more open to including religious leaders in the government.

The (non-)Islamist cleavage plays out clearly in these results. Supporters of political Islam are not consistently less democratic. They, compared to their counterparts, are similarly open to a regime that has elections and opportunities for political participation. They are consistently more invested in whether or not the state engages with Islam. They are more favorably disposed to regimes that would

formalize Islam's status and give a role to religious leaders. In a context in which survey participants are regularly accused of misrepresenting their opinions, Islamists' preferences in the conjoint experiment align with their expressed support for political Islam. That said, those who support political Islam are not revealing overtly anti-democratic preferences; the major distinction appears in their commitment relative to those who do not endorse political Islam. This study thus lends credence to the principle that MENA residents are accurately reporting their democratic *and* religio-political sentiments.¹⁰

Increasingly scholars of religion are examining religion in terms of belief and behavior as well as belonging. Consideration of religious "worldviews" – to borrow Ciftci et al.'s (2019) terminology – will increase researchers' understanding of what (non-)religious individuals believe and of how religion connects to politics and to society. Understanding attitudes towards political engagement as a worldview (e.g., being in the world and/or of the world) offers a means of understanding within-religious-group variation in religious participation, policy preferences, and political behavior.

These results have indicated that country-particular phenomena inform religious and democratic attitudes. Religiosity and ideology matter more in some cases than others. These forces, in particular ideology, have been treated differently across country cases. Demographics and relative majority seem also to inform interest in democracy's majoritarianism. Future studies should examine the effect of demographic proportionality or historical treatment of ideological blocs on support for democratic institutions and political participation. This will require more experimental settings.

This study, as all studies, has limitations. The survey included only two Muslim-majority states. Future research could evaluate preferences in other countries, including states with larger religious-minority populations and outside the Arab world (e.g., Southeast Asia). Additionally, in providing the fuller image of the state, it was still necessary to be parsimonious due to cognitive load. Thus, some factors that could have been included in the conjoint description were omitted. Further studies could incorporate other dimensions of state structure. Support for liberal values (e.g., women's rights) have been inconsistently linked to democratic commitment (Fish 2002; Ridge 2022). Cultural and security threats from democratization, which have been linked to anti-democratic fears, could also be included (Benstead 2015). Religion, religiosity, or ideology inform citizens' commitments to values such as freedom of religion or women's equality. Experiments might also consider a role for the military or religious parties in government, security issues, or participation by religious parties.

Future research can also consider citizens' (non-)democratic attitudes qualitatively. Some headway has been made in this respect. For instance, Schaffer (2000) has documented the terms Senegalese citizens use to describe their country's democratic institutions. Khanani (2021, 12) examines qualitatively how Moroccan "*ilsāmiyūn*" ("nonviolent, socially conservative political actors who draw upon the Muslim tradition") use the word *dimuqratiyya*. His findings are in line with the general pattern that citizens invoke, on one hand, freedom and accountability and, on the other hand, economic programs and personal dignity in explaining *dimuqratiyya*. To really understand how citizens perceive regimes and the tacit assumptions that they make about political systems, such qualitative analyses can be quite fruitful. Where qualitative research can be combined with quantitative research, subjects could even expostulate on their choice making process and relative values. The conjoint technique is agnostic about this element, but it could be enlightening to ask them to discuss the choices retrospectively and to compare it to their behavior in the task. By this method it would be evident how cognizant respondents are of their own political decision-making.

Nonetheless, this study is a step forward in understanding democratic commitment in the Muslim world. It builds on prior studies that have asked citizens to endorse democracy and/or political Islam by presenting respondents' with a more complete image of the state that they could endorse – (non)democracy, political Islam, and economic conditions. In doing so, it addresses the confluence of support for political Islam and democracy in the Middle East. Pertinently, it finds support for participatory opportunities and institutions across religious and religiosity blocs. Although citizens have different tolerances for the role religion and religious leaders play in the state, the Muslim population expresses robust interest in participatory governance.

¹ While Covid-19 had been identified in China by this point, it was not yet a pandemic disease. Covid-19, which was identified in Morocco in March 2020, is thus not considered a factor in this study.

² Surveys in the Middle East use the word *dimuqratiyya* to translate democracy. Citizens' can apply the word *dimuqratiyya* expansively, including both electoral institutions and socio-economic outcomes. Ridge (2023b) demonstrates that this translation leads scholars to overestimate public support for democracy in survey studies. All studies using the World Values Survey and Arab Barometer thus have fuzzy metrics for democratic commitment.

³ Having an official state religion does not necessarily make the populace more devout, although citizens may assume it would. Having an official religion may reduce religious participation (Fox and Tabory 2008; Iannaccone 1991), whereas religious freedom has been linked to greater participation in the Muslim world (Ridge 2020). In Iran, in particular, the perception that attending services is an endorsement of the regime discourages participation, even among the devout (Tezcür and Azadarmaki 2008). That said, Muslim-majority states that enforce religious law by criminal sanction can drive up compliance (Ridge 2019).

⁴ Six attributes may seem like a lot of information for a respondent to consider; however, conjoint analysis is robust to even large numbers of “potentially meaningful attributes,” and respondents are not “overwhelmed with meaningful information” (Bansak et al 2021, 69). Many potential features were not included in the studies in order to ease the cognitive burden of the task.

⁵ The results were not significantly different across the rounds.

⁶ Some studies of subgroup effects use the differences in the average marginal component effects (AMCEs). The difficulty is that the AMCE is a measurement against a reference level. As Leeper et al (2020, 208) explain, “where preferences in subgroups toward the experimental reference category are similar, the difference-in-AMCEs conveys preferences reasonably well. The problem occurs when preferences between subgroups diverge in the reference category. Here, the difference-in-AMCEs is a misleading representation of underlying patterns of favorability.” Thus, the difference in marginal means is superior to the difference in AMCEs for comparing subgroups’ preferences. The subgroup AMCEs and differences in AMCEs are shown in Appendix B.

⁷ YouGov is an opt-in panel that benchmarks against the census for representation. To build the panel, YouGov (2017) draws on sources including “search engine optimization (SEO), affiliate networks, niche websites, and growth hacking techniques such as panelist refer-a-friend campaigns and social networks.” According to the World Bank (2020), 72% of Egyptians and 84% of Moroccans use the internet, so an internet-based survey can have extensive reach. The survey was IRB approved by the Duke University IRB board. It featured multiple demographic questions as well as direct questions about regime-type and policy preferences. The Moroccan survey was slightly longer because it included additional questions. The conjoint experiment was the final stage of the survey.

⁸ According to the 2018 Arab Barometer surveys, 20.6% of Egyptians had “no formal education.” In the 2020 Arab Barometer, 16.6% of Moroccans had “no formal education.” However, basic reading is also taught at home and in religious education centers. Illiteracy is more common in the older generations.

Studies using nationally representative datasets (e.g. World Values Survey, Arab Barometer) have found slight increases in support for democracy with education, when treated as a linear variable; the effect is not identified for political Islam. However, the theories of educated democratization largely pertain to post-secondary education, not literacy/illiteracy, and the effects of higher education are not reliably demonstrated (Jamal 2006; Ciftci 2013; Ridge 2023a). As such, it is not expected that illiterate Egyptians and Moroccans would play the conjoint game differently than their literate peers. As visual and audio conjoint techniques expand, this is an area for future research.

⁹ Whether or not to have a king was not included in the choice task. Firstly, this decision increases comparability across the samples. Egypt has not had a monarchy since the 1952 revolution. Secondly, asking about removing the monarchy can be a sensitive question in Morocco. Respondents might drop out (Hegasy 2007), and the survey might get shut down (“Moroccan” 2009). On these bases, that element was not introduced.

¹⁰ See Benstead (2018) for a refutation of exceptional survey non-response or preference falsification in the Arab world.

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
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Appendix A


Muslims v. Non-Muslims (Egypt)

Marginal Means




Egypt (Muslims v. Non-Muslims)

Differences in Marginal Means




Muslims v. Non-Muslims (Morocco)
Marginal Means




Morocco (Muslims v. Non-Muslims)

Differences in Marginal Means




Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily (Egypt)

Marginal Means




Egypt (Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily)

Differences in Marginal Means




Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily (Morocco) Marginal Means




Morocco (Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily)

Differences in Marginal Means




Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily (Egypt)

Marginal Means




Egypt (Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily)

Differences in Marginal Means




Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily (Morocco)

Marginal Means




Morocco (Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily)


Differences in Marginal Means



Enact Islamic Law v. Not Enact Islamic Law (Egypt)
Marginal Means




Egypt (Enact Islamic Law v. Not Enact Islamic Law)
Differences in Marginal Means




Enact Islamic Law v. Not Enact Islamic Law (Morocco)

Marginal Means




Morocco (Enact Islamic Law v. Not Enact Islamic Law)

Differences in Marginal Means




Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice (Egypt) Marginal Means




Egypt (Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice)


Differences in Marginal Means




Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice (Morocco) Marginal Means



Morocco (Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice) Differences in Marginal Means




Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable (Egypt) Marginal Means




Egypt (Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable)


Differences in Marginal Means



Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable (Morocco) Marginal Means




Morocco (Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable) Differences in Marginal Means



Appendix B


Muslims v. Non-Muslims (Egypt)

Average Marginal Component Effects




Egypt (Muslims v. Non-Muslims)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Muslims v. Non-Muslims (Morocco)

Average Marginal Component Effects




Morocco (Muslims v. Non-Muslims)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily (Egypt)

AverageMarginalComponentEffects



Egypt (Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily (Morocco)

Average

Marginal


Component

Effects



Morocco (Pray Daily v. Not Pray Daily)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily (Egypt)

Average


Marginal

Component

Effects



Egypt (Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily)
Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily (Morocco)

Average

Marginal


Component


Effects




Morocco (Qur'an Daily v. Not Qur'an Daily)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects





Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Enact Islamic Law v. Not Enact Islamic Law (Morocco)

Average

Marginal


Component

Effects




Morocco (Enact Islamic Law v. Not Enact Islamic Law)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice (Egypt)




Egypt (Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice (Morocco)

Average Marginal Component Effects



Morocco (Leaders Influence Vote Choice v. Leaders Influence Not Vote Choice)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects




Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable (Egypt)

Average


Marginal

Component


Effects



Egypt (Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable)


Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects

Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable (Morocco)



Morocco (Elections are Acceptable v. Elections are Not Acceptable)

Differences in Average Marginal Component Effects



Appendix C

Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?

هل تنتمي إلى دين أو مذهب ديني ما؟ لو الإجابة "نعم" يرجى التحديد؟

- <1> No
 <2> Yes – Muslim
 <3> Yes – Christian
 <4> Yes – Something else

- <1> لا
 <2> نعم – الإسلام
 <3> نعم – المسيحية
 <4> نعم – مذهباً آخر

How often, if at all, do you

كم مرة تقوم بما يلي:

ROWS

- a. Read or watch the news
 b. Read or listen to the Qur'an/ Bible
 c. Pray

- (1) قراءة أو مشاهدة الأخبار
 (2) قراءة أو الاستماع إلى القرآن / الإنجيل
 (3) الصلاة

COLUMNS

- <1> Everyday
 <2> Most of the time
 <3> Sometimes
 <4> Rarely
 <5> Never

- (1) يوميا
 (2) أغلب الوقت
 (3) أحيانا
 (4) نادرا
 (5) أبدا

How much do you agree with the following statements?

ما مدى موافقتك على العبارات التالية؟

- d. It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does
 e. Electing governments is acceptable under the teachings of Islam
 f. Our country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state

- g. Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders
- h. Religious leaders like imams and priests should not interfere in voters' decisions in elections
- i. The government should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law

- (1) من الضروري أن تكون الحكومة قادرة على القيام بدورها حتى وإن لم يكن لنا تأثير على أدائها
- (2) الحكومات المنتخبة نظام متوافق مع تعاليم الإسلام
- (3) ستصبح الدولة أفضل لو تقلد المتدينون المناصب العامة فيها
- (4) بما أن الانتخابات تأتي أحياناً بنتائج سيئة فيجب أن نتبنى طرقاً أخرى في اختيار قادة الدولة
- (5) يجب على رجال الدين مثل الأئمة والكهنة عدم التأثير على قرارات المصوتين في الانتخابات
- (6) يجب أن تقوم الحكومة بسن القوانين طبقاً لمبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية

- <1> Strongly agree
- <2> Agree
- <3> Disagree
- <4> Strongly disagree

- (1) أوافق بشدة
- (2) أوافق
- (3) لا أوافق
- (4) لا أوافق بشدة

You will now be shown descriptions of two potential systems of government based on different features. Some features may be the same, while others will be different. Please choose the potential set-up for a government that you would prefer. You will be offered five pairs of choices.

سنعرض فيما يلي وصفين لنظامين محتملين للحكومة بناء على خصائص مختلفة. بعض هذه الخصائص قد تكون متشابهة بينما الأخرى مختلفة. يرجى تحديد نظام الحكومة المحتمل الذي تفضله. سنعرض عليك خمسة أزواج من الخيارات.

CRITERIA المعايير	TYPE النوع
Elections الانتخابات	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 40%;"> <p>></p> <p>></p> <p>></p> </div> <div style="width: 55%;"> <p><i>There are elections with one recognized political party</i></p> <p><i>There are elections with multiple recognized political parties</i></p> <p><i>There are no elections</i></p> </div> <div style="width: 40%; text-align: right;"> <p><</p> </div> </div> <p>اجراء الانتخابات لحزب سياسي واحد معترف به</p>

	< إجراء الانتخابات لأحزاب سياسية متعددة معترف بها < لا يوجد انتخابات
Citizen participation مشاركة المواطنين	> Few barriers to citizen political participation > Some barriers to citizen political participation > Many barriers to citizen political participation < وجود القليل من العوائق فيما يخص مشاركة المواطنين في الحياة السياسية < وجود بعض العوائق التي تخص مشاركة المواطنين في الحياة السياسية < وجود العديد من العوائق التي تخص مشاركة المواطنين في الحياة السياسية
Official religion الدين الرسمي	> There is an official state religion > There is no official state religion < اقرار دين رسمي للدولة < لا يوجد دين رسمي للدولة
Role for religious leaders دور رجال الدين	> No formal role for religious leaders in government > Formal role for religious leaders in government < لا يلعب رجال الدين دورا رسميا في الحكومة < أن يكون لدى رجال الدين دورا رسميا في الحكومة
Provision of public services توفير الخدمات العامة	> Little government provision of basic items (ie housing and food) to individuals > Some government provision of basic items (ie housing and food) to individuals > Good government provision of basic items (ie housing and food) to individuals < توفير الحكومة القليل من الخدمات الأساسية (مثل: المأكل والسكن) للأفراد < توفير الحكومة بعض الخدمات الأساسية (مثل: المأكل والسكن) للأفراد < توفير الحكومة للخدمات الأساسية (مثل: المأكل والسكن) بشكل جيد للأفراد
Unemployment rate معدل البطالة	> Low unemployment (7%) > High unemployment (14%) < معدل بطالة منخفض (7%) < معدل بطالة مرتفع (14%)

Which of these two political systems of government would you prefer the most?

مجموعة 1: أي من بين نظامي الحكومة السياسيين التاليين تفضل أكثر؟

<1> OPTION 1 خيار 1	<2> OPTION 2 خيار 2
Elections: <ENTER STATEMENT> الانتخابات:	Elections: <ENTER STATEMENT> الانتخابات:

Citizen participation <ENTER STATEMENT> مشاركة المواطنين في الحياة السياسية :	Citizen participation <ENTER STATEMENT> مشاركة المواطنين في الحياة السياسية :
Official religion <ENTER STATEMENT> الدين الرسمي للدولة:	Official religion <ENTER STATEMENT> الدين الرسمي للدولة:
Role for religious leaders <ENTER STATEMENT> دور رجال الدين :	Role for religious leaders <ENTER STATEMENT> دور رجال الدين :
Provision of public services <ENTER STATEMENT> توفير الخدمات العامة:	Provision of public services <ENTER STATEMENT> توفير الخدمات العامة:
Unemployment rate <ENTER STATEMENT> معدل البطالة:	Unemployment rate <ENTER STATEMENT> معدل البطالة: