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Economic and Social Attitudes in Guatemala

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Abstract

This study seeks to assess the compatibility between the global trends of the prosperity gospel and liberal individualism by analyzing social survey data from Guatemala, which is one of the largest hosts of the prosperity gospel. Data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life's 2006 survey *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* is used to conduct logistic regression analyzing the relationship between agreement with the prosperity gospel and economic and social issues. Results suggest that the prosperity gospel acts as a modernizing agent with regard to individuals' economic attitudes but not necessarily with regard to attitudes towards social issues. We recommend that further studies be devoted to analyzing the impact of the prosperity gospel on economic, political, and civic spheres.

Peter Berger (1999: 16) has written with some justification that Max Weber is “alive and well, and living in Guatemala.” Since the 1980s Latin America has both rapidly integrated into the global economy and experienced a surge in religious movements that celebrate, and sometimes sacralize, entrepreneurship and Weberian rational capitalism. The most prominent examples of the new “market religions” (Haenni 2005; Ignatow and Johnson 2014) in Latin America are Pentecostal (or neo-Pentecostal) movements based on the “prosperity gospel” (Haynes 2012; Mora 2008; Murray 2012). Though its roots are in the United States, the prosperity gospel is a core belief within the most recent global expansion of Pentecostalism (Jenkins 2002; Miller 2013; Nolivos 2012; Smith 2009; Woodberry 2013). In essence the prosperity gospel is the religious belief that God will financially bless believers who have enough faith, although it is also associated with the divine blessing of good health and relationships.

Research on Pentecostalism, the prosperity gospel, and economic development has mostly relied on case studies (Folarin 2007; Girard 2013; Haynes 2012; Kim 2012; Maxwell 1998; Mora 2008; O’Neill 2009) and theoretical discussion (e.g. Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose 1996; Hunt 2000; Murray 2012). For instance, a number of ethnographic studies have focused on materialism and consumption within the neo-Pentecostal movement. Girard (2013) compared the rural and urban branches of one Honduran neo-Pentecostal congregation and found that members of the rural church wore designer clothes and shoes while those in Guatemala City drove high-end cars. Other studies have focused on Pentecostal national economic and political elites. Some studies have shown that megachurches in Guatemala serve as places where elites cultivate exclusive elite social networks (Casaus Arzú 1992; Samson, 2012: 74).

The small number of studies of the prosperity gospel that use quantitative methods have either focused on the United States or else used statistical analysis of survey data for descriptive rather than explanatory purposes (Koch 2009; Pew Hispanic Center 2007; Pew Research Center 2007, 2014; Schieman and Jung 2012). While the extant studies on the prosperity gospel help us to understand the interrelations of religious change and economic activity, we still do not know very much about how belief in the prosperity gospel interacts with other social attitudes (see Kim 2012; Murray 2012; Nolivos 2012).

The prosperity gospel may influence economic and social attitudes in contemporary society in several ways. It may contain ideological elements that are compatible with participation in global capitalism, but it may also include elements that are incompatible or less compatible with modern, mostly individualistic social attitudes (Miller 2013; Murray 2012; Pew Research Center 2014). Thus the purpose of the present study is to explore the relations between adherence to the prosperity gospel and liberal-individualistic social and economic attitudes (see Davis and Robinson 1999).

There are two major reasons why it makes sense that Guatemala be the country of focus for this study. First, it is estimated that about 71 percent of Guatemalans who belong to a religion or believe in God embrace the prosperity gospel to some extent (Pew Research Center 2007). Second, the explosion of the prosperity gospel in Guatemala occurred around the same time as Guatemala's democratization and passing of legislation that opened the country up to free trade and greater economic development.

Therefore, we analyze 2006 survey data from Guatemala to examine the relations of prosperity gospel beliefs to liberal-individualistic economic and social attitudes. We find that agreement with prosperity gospel ideas is associated with support for liberal economic policies but not associated with liberal social attitudes (in this case attitudes related to homosexuality). In the conclusions we consider some implications of our findings for understanding long-term global social and cultural change.

THE PROSPERITY GOSPEL IN LATIN AMERICA

A more in-depth discussion of the prosperity gospel here is warranted. The prosperity gospel, also referred to as the "health and wealth" gospel, the "name it and claim it" gospel, and the "faith movement" (Hunt 2000; Koch 2009; Mora 2008), has roots in the mid-20th century American faith movement led by preachers such as Kenneth Hagin, Kenneth Copeland, Robert Schuller, and Oral Roberts (Gifford 2007; Hunt 2000; Nolivos 2012; Rosin 2009; Yong 2012). This movement continues to thrive in the United States, where the prosperity gospel is featured in megachurches and on the DayStar television network, which broadcasts the preaching of American prosperity preachers Jesse Duplantier, Creflo Dollar (Bowler 2013; Gifford 2007; Walton 2012), and Joel Osteen (Bowler 2013; Gifford 2007; Rosin 2009).

Prosperity gospel preachers rely on several biblical passages to justify their celebration and sacralization of economic prosperity, including passages on the prosperity of the Hebrew patriarchs (Hunt 2000) and the "law of the harvest" found in 2 Corinthians 2:9 of the New Testament. The latter passage is often used as motivation for church donations (Girard 2013; Haynes 2012). The prosperity gospel originally reached Latin America in the form of Pentecostal missionaries to Central America in the early- to mid-20th century. In Guatemala, Guatemalan nationals later promoted it.

While Pentecostalism in Guatemala varies and certainly cannot be described as monolithic, two major strands of Pentecostalism can be identified: classical Pentecostalism, which is common in rural areas, and neo-Pentecostalism, which is generally associated with megachurches in Guatemala City (Smith 2009), although urban megachurches often have a presence in rural areas through

satellite churches. Due to the lack of standardization of these terms in social science literature, Robbins (2004) acknowledges the complexity in defining them. While space does not permit a more thorough explanation, Pentecostal tends to refer to evangelical Christians who have traditionally emphasized the experiential aspect of religion and the central role of the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, neo-Pentecostal, although often used interchangeably with Pentecostal, more specifically refers to the most recent wave of Pentecostalism and is associated with urban megachurches and the prosperity gospel. Guatemalan megachurches such as Verbo, La Fraternidad Cristiana, La Mega Frater, Casa de Dios, and Familia de Dios all embrace the prosperity gospel to varying degrees.

These megachurches are often viewed as modernizing structures because they utilize advanced technology in the form of radio, television, and the Internet to market their messages, and they also capitalize on small business strategies to promote church growth (Murray 2012). Moreover, many have in-house bookstores that sell books on leadership (Miller 2013), some even authored by the pastor. These pastors often give the image of being white-collar professionals and executives through their dress (Bastian 2001). Furthermore, the large, impressive architecture of the megachurches contributes to the modernizing influence and image of neo-Pentecostalism (Girard 2013).

Although generally the prosperity gospel has been more closely associated with Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals than with other Christian groups, this study examines prosperity gospel adherents in general rather than focusing on any particular religious affiliation. This perspective is for three main reasons. The first reason is due to practicality, as the sample size of Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal cases in the data set is quite limited. More important, however, is the extent to which the prosperity gospel has permeated other Christian groups and even the broader Guatemalan society. Although 82 percent of Pentecostals believe in the prosperity gospel, 71 percent of Charismatics and 68 percent of other Christians in Guatemala also adhere to this belief (Pew Research Center 2007). Gooren's (2010) finding that Guatemala has experienced what he calls "the pentecostalization of society" should come as no surprise then. Therefore, to focus only on Pentecostals or neo-Pentecostals in our methodology would ignore a larger population that may have prosperity gospel leanings.

EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF THE PROSPERITY GOSPEL

In order further to understand the influence of the prosperity gospel and its connection with liberal individualism, it is important to consider why the prosperity gospel, and with it the megachurch model, has succeeded in Latin America and especially in Guatemala. There are known proximate causes, such as the historical influences of the United States within Guatemala (Hunt 2000;

Robbins 2004), one of which is the exporting of the U.S. megachurch model (Hunt 2000). But the influence of the United States in the growth of the prosperity gospel in Guatemala is debated. There are also global trends that have influenced Guatemalan society and that may have laid the groundwork for, and be influenced by, the success of neo-Pentecostalism and the prosperity gospel. Some scholars argue that this growth is not due to U.S. imperialism (Adogame 2006; Martin 2006) but rather is a transnational social movement facilitated by globalization (Murray 2012). Accordingly, examining the social correlates of prosperity gospel beliefs may help us better to understand long-term trends in religion and society in Latin America. Contemporary sociology provides two main theoretical frameworks for thinking about such large-scale and long-term trends in society and culture. The first framework is focused on modern conceptions of the individual, the second on religious change as a consequence of capitalist expansion.

Modern Individualism

From Durkheim's thesis on the division of labor to mid-20th century modernization theory (Rostow 1959), the work of Anthony Giddens (1990), and world culture theorists (Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer 2010; Meyer and Jepperson 2000), sociologists have sought to explain large-scale and long-term trends in modern society in terms of processes of societal *individualization*, generally theorized as a liberation of the individual from traditional collective identities and obligations. Individualism, one of the dominant social ideologies in the modern world (Bird 1999; Lukes 2006), conceives humans as autonomous and agentic individuals responsible for their own economic success and free to make their own decisions on matters of morality. Individualism values the autonomy of the individual in moral decision-making as well as the responsibility of the state to protect the diversity of values that individuals hold. Values associated with individualism are self-determination (Clark 2006), individual self-sufficiency (Christman 2004), self-reliance, and independence (Bird 1999).

In contrast to traditional Catholicism, Pentecostalism conspicuously places the individual at the center of the act of conversion and views spirituality as a matter of intensely personal, rather than primarily collective, experience (Miller and Yamamori 2013). As is the case for other Protestant denominations and groups, Pentecostals believe that the individual can pray directly to God without the need of mediation by a priest (Miller and Yamamori 2013). And the discourses of personal empowerment used in Pentecostal churches emphasize individuals' self-worth and encourage them to take personal control of their own moral and economic success (Miller and Yamamori 2013; cf. O'Brien 2015).

Capitalism and Religious Change

There is a long sociological tradition originating with Max Weber of analyzing religious change and economic development as interdependent and mutually reinforcing social phenomena. Although Weber is generally thought to have argued that religious beliefs can contribute directly to capitalist expansion, Turner (1974a) demonstrated that Weber's concept of "elective affinities" between religious beliefs and capitalism had long been oversimplified. While Weber is widely believed to have rejected Marx's economic determinism, Turner draws from Marxian sociology, including Walton's (1971) use of Mills's (1940) sociology of motives to argue that, for Weber, actions are the result of socially constructed motives. According to Mills, social groups develop a "vocabulary of motives" (Turner, 1974b: 18) to justify actions taken largely out of self and class interest.

It may be the case that prosperity gospel churches provide vocabularies of motives that legitimize adherents' taking advantage of expanding opportunities for capitalistic business practices, acquisitiveness, and consumerism. Neoliberal economic reforms were instituted beginning in the mid-1980s almost simultaneously with the emergence of the prosperity gospel and neo-Pentecostalism in the global South, and it is possible that neoliberal economic policies created environments in which new or expanded vocabularies of motive were needed. This hypothesis is essentially what Haenni argues (2005) in his analysis of new "market-friendly religions" worldwide. In examining Islam in Turkey, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, he finds religious movements that he characterizes as *l'islam de marché* ("market Islam") or "*religiosité* 'market-friendly'" (Haenni, 2005: 59; see also Ignatow and Johnson 2014).

It is fitting then that critics of Latin American Pentecostalism and the prosperity gospel argue that they are tools of neoliberal hegemony (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose 1996; Murray 2012). By serving to legitimate individuals' pursuit of wealth, "the uninhibited economic nature of neo-Pentecostalism" enables it to be one of the "major forces of capitalist development in the region" (Nolivos, 2012: 100). Hunt (2000: 334) echoes this position by arguing that the doctrines of the prosperity gospel are the "cultural and ideological underpinnings of both components of capitalism: the ethic of consumerism and the entrepreneurial spirit." In similar fashion, Kim (2012: 52) argues that Pentecostalism is "tailor-made for the consumer culture" and represents the "commercialization and self-centered materialism of contemporary evangelical Christianity" (2012: 53). Murray (2012), too, suggests that the prosperity gospel has served to legitimize Christian individualism and the pursuit of material gain by the burgeoning middle classes in developing societies (see also Adogame 2006; Martin 2006).

HYPOTHESES

The theoretical frameworks reviewed above are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, prosperity gospel beliefs seem to be widespread across socioeconomic sectors in Guatemala (Johnson 2014), and there is some agreement among researchers that the prosperity gospel and neo-Pentecostalism help individuals to transition to the modern world (Gifford 2007; Martin 1990; 2006; Nolivos 2012). Still, there may be affinities between prosperity gospel beliefs and specific modern beliefs and attitudes. The following hypotheses illustrate what we expect to find based on our review of the literature and theoretical framework.

Hypothesis 1: The higher a respondent's level of agreement with the prosperity gospel, the more likely they are to support a free market economy, *ceteris paribus*.

Hypothesis 2: As agreement with the prosperity gospel increases, support for homosexuality increases, *ceteris paribus*.

Although the prosperity gospel is expected to have a modernizing effect on individuals' economic attitudes, there is reason to doubt that it has the same effect in regard to issues of morality. It has been established that Pentecostals maintain conservative attitudes on issues relating to sexual behaviors, divorce, and abortion (Miller 2013). And although Latin Americans and Guatemalans tend to be socially conservative in general (Pew Research Center 2014), Pentecostals seem to be even more conservative. In Latin America, Protestants are more likely than Catholics to believe that abortion should be illegal and to disapprove of same-sex marriage (Pew Research Center 2014). For example in one ethnographic study of El Shaddai church, O'Neill (2009) found that homosexuality was believed to be a result of problematic fatherhood.

ANALYSIS

Data

To analyze the relationship between belief in the prosperity gospel and support for individualistic social and economic attitudes, we used data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life's 2006 *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala*.¹ This survey sought to collect data regarding the civic, social, and religious views of Guatemalans and is part of a broader multi-

¹ The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life bears no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations of the data presented here.

country survey. The sample size of the Guatemala data set is 1,305. The data was downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.TheARDA.com). The research firm MERCAPLAN carried out data collection in Guatemala under the supervision of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. This survey used a national probability sample with an over-sampling of Pentecostals and charismatics. We weighted the sample using the weight variable GPWGT and excluded missing values using listwise deletion for each analysis, as well as the responses “don’t know” and “refused.” To account for sparse categories, we restricted the sample to Catholic, Protestant, and secular affiliations (33 cases of self-identified Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Mayan traditional religion, and Jewish were omitted) as well as to ladinos and indigenous persons (5 cases of self-identified Garifuna, a minority population of African descent, were omitted). The English and Spanish versions of the survey were compared closely to verify the wording of the questions.

Dependent Variables

Free Market Economy. The variable in the Pew survey that best represents individualistic economic attitudes involves support for a free market economy. This question asked respondents whether they (1) “completely agree,” (2) “mostly agree,” (3) “mostly disagree,” or (4) “completely disagree” with the statement “Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.” Table 1 shows the original distribution of this variable without the missing values. Due to sparse categories, the variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable, with (1) “completely agree” and (2) “mostly agree” combined into one category: 1 = “agree”; and (3) “mostly disagree” and (4) “completely disagree” combined into “disagree” as the reference category. While our need to dichotomize this dependent variable produces a methodological disadvantage, we believe this change does not significantly alter the data as the categories that were collapsed had very few cases (see Table 1).

Table 1: Percentage Distribution for Dependent Variable: Support for a Free Market Economy

Completely Agree	31.7%
Mostly Agree	40.1%
Mostly Disagree	9.6%
Completely Disagree	14.7%
Total (<i>N</i> = 921)	100.0%

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006)

Acceptance of Homosexuality. Acceptance of homosexuality was selected as the variable that best represents individualistic social attitudes. Starks and Robinson (2009) used this measure previously to measure liberalism on cultural issues. Table 2 shows the original distribution of this variable without the missing values. The original measurement is an ordinal variable that asked respondents if homosexuality can (1) “always be justified,” (2) “sometimes be justified,” or (3) “never be justified.” The variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable with (1) “always be justified” and (2) “sometimes be justified” combined into 1 = “always or sometimes justified”; “never justified” was treated as the reference category. The justification for the collapsing of categories is due to the controversial nature of the social issue at hand. Respondents who chose “sometimes be justified” do not seem to view the moral boundary of homosexuality as hard and fast as those who chose “never be justified”; therefore, it makes sense to combine them with respondents who responded with “always be justified.”

Table 2: Percentage Distribution for Dependent Variable: Acceptance of Homosexuality

Always Justified	9.5%
Sometimes Justified	24.9%
Never Justified	65.6%
Total ($N = 926$)	100.0%

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006)

Predictor Variables

Belief in the prosperity gospel is the main predictor variable. The original measurement is ordinal and asked respondents whether they (1) “completely agree,” (2) “mostly agree,” (3) “mostly disagree,” or (4) “completely disagree” with the statement “God will grant material prosperity to all believers who have enough faith.” The variable was reverse recoded in order to measure the amount of agreement with the statement. Table 3 shows the distribution of this variable. This survey question was only given to respondents who had in an earlier question indicated a belief of God or that they belonged to a religion.

Table 3: Percentage Distribution for Main Predictor: Agreement with the Prosperity Gospel

Completely Disagree	18.8%
Mostly Disagree	7.7%
Mostly Agree	15.5%
Completely Agree	57.9%
Total (<i>N</i> = 939)	100.0%

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006)

Control Variables

Several control variables are added to the second model of each analysis. Nominal control measures include gender (male = 1, female = 0), race (ladino = 1, indigenous = 0), region (capital = 1, outside capital = 0), and religious affiliation (Catholic, Secular, and Protestant as the reference category). Ordinal control measures include age, education, income, and religiosity. Religiosity is represented by church attendance, which is an appropriate measure (Starks and Robinson 2009). The variable recodes and descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6.

Table 4: Variable Recodes

Name of Variable	Dependent or Independent	Response Categories	Recoded name	Response Categories
Most people better off in free market economy even if some are rich and some are poor (GOV_MARK)	Dependent	1 = completely agree	FREEMARKET	1 = Agree
		2 = mostly agree	1 = 1	0 = Disagree
		3 = mostly disagree	2 = 1	
		4 = completely disagree	3 = 0	
		4 = 0		
		8 Don't know	8=sysmiss	
		9 Refused	9=sysmiss	
Justification for Homosexuality (HOMOSEXU)	Dependent	1 Always justified	HOMOSEXU1	1 = Always
		2 Sometimes justified	1 = 1	or sometimes
		3 Never justified	2 = 1	justified
		8 Don't know	3 = 0	0 = Never
		9 Refused	8 = sysmiss	justified
			9 = sysmiss	

Prosperity Gospel (PROSPER)	Independent	1 Completely Agree 2 Mostly Agree 3 Mostly Disagree 4 Completely Disagree 98 Don't know 99 Refused	PBELIEF 1 = 4 2 = 3 3 = 2 4 = 1 98= sysmiss 99= sysmiss	1 = Completely disagree 2 = Mostly disagree 3 = Mostly agree 4 = Completely agree
Gender (GENDER)	Control	1 Male 2 Female	MALE 1 = 1 2 = 0	1 = Male 0 = Female
Race (ETH_GUA)	Control	1 Indigenous 2 Ladino/Mixed	LADINO 1 = 0 2 = 1	1 = Ladino 0 = Indigenous
Age (I@AGE)	Control	1 18–24 2 25–29 3 30–39 4 40–49 5 50–59 6 60+	I@AGE 1–6 = same	1 18–24 2 25–29 3 30–39 4 40–49 5 50–59 6 60+
Region (REG_GUA)	Control	1 Capital City 2 Quetzaltenango 3 Chimaltenango 4 Escuintla 5 Mazatenango 6 Coban 7 Puerto Barrios 8 Chiquimula 9 Jutiapa	CAPITAL 1 = 1 2–9 = 0	1 = Capital 0 = Outside capital
Education (EDUC_GUA)	Control	1 No formal education 2 Incomplete primary 3 Complete primary 4 Incomplete secondary: vocational 5 Complete secondary: vocational 6 Incomplete secondary: university prep 7 Complete secondary: university prep 8 Some university 9 Complete university 99 Refused	EDUC 1 = 1 2 = 1 3 = 2 4 = 3 5 = 4 6 = 3 7 = 4 8 = 5 9 = 6 99 = sysmiss	1 = None or incomplete primary 2 = Complete primary 3 = Incomplete secondary 4 = Complete secondary 5 = Some university 6 = Complete university

Household Income (INC_GUA)	Control	1 < 1,600 2 1,601–3,200 3 3,201–4,800 4 4,801–6,400 5 6,401–8,000 6 8,001–12,000 7 12,001–16,000 8 16,001–20,000 9 20,001–24,000 10 24,001–28,000 11 28,001+ 98 = Don't Know 99 = Refused	INCOME 1–5 = same 6–9 = 6 98 = sysmiss 99 = sysmiss	1 < 1,600 2 1,601– 3,200 3 3,201– 4,800 4 4,801– 6,400 5 6,401– 8,000 6 > 8,000 Q
Church Attendance (ATTEND)	Control	1 More than once a week 2 Once a week 3 Once or twice a month 4 A few times a year 5 Seldom 6 Never 8 Don't Know 9 Refused	ATTEND1 1 = 6 2 = 5 3 = 4 4 = 3 5 = 2 6 = 1 8 = sysmiss 9 = sysmiss	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = A few times a year 4 = Once or twice a year 5 = Once a week 6 = More than once a week
Religious Affiliation (Q3GUA)	Control	1 Roman Catholic 2 Evangelical/Protestan t 8 No religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic	Catholic 1 = 1 2 = 0 8 = 0 Secular 1 = 0 2 = 0 8 = 1	1 = Catholic 0 = Not Catholic 1 = Secular 0 = Not secular

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Name of Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
Prosperity Gospel	3.167	1.151	1.00	4.00
Male	0.500	.500	0.00	1.00
Ladino	0.800	0.400	0.00	1.00
Age	2.760	1.658	1.00	6.00
Reside in Capital	0.280	0.450	0.00	1.00
Education	3.245	1.438	1.00	6.00
Income	2.771	1.426	1.00	6.00
Religious Attendance	4.370	1.581	1.00	6.00
Catholic	0.493	0.500	0.00	1.00
Secular	0.158	0.365	0.00	1.00

N = 760

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006)

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

Name of Variable	<i>N</i>	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
Support for Free Market	921	0.747	0.435	0.00	1.00
Acceptance of Homosexuality	926	0.345	0.475	0.00	1.00

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006)

Bivariate Analysis

A correlation matrix was constructed to determine the degree of correlation between the dependent variables, and then two separate regression analyses, with a total of four models, were conducted. The first model for each analysis used bivariate regression to examine the relationship between the main predictor, prosperity gospel belief, to the corresponding dependent variable. In the second analysis, the control measures were added and logistic regression was used. No problems were found with multicollinearity according to Allison's (1999) tolerance value measurements. No outliers were found when the Mahalanobis test, recommended by Mertler and Vannatta (2010), was conducted.

RESULTS

Correlation Matrix

Table 7 presents the bivariate correlation matrix. Contrary to expectations, the dependent variables for social and economic individualism are not intercorrelated. The main predictor variable was also included in the correlation matrix. Table 4 indicates that there is a slightly significant, positive, weak relationship between agreement with the prosperity gospel and support for a free market economy. Also, there is a weak, negative, but statistically significant relationship between prosperity gospel belief and acceptance of homosexuality.

Table 7: Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables and Main Predictor Variable

	Support for a Free Market Economy	Acceptance of Homosexuality	Agreement with the Prosperity Gospel
Support for a Free Market Economy	1		
Support for Homosexuality	-0.056	1	
Agreement with the Prosperity Gospel	0.068*	-0.167**	1

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006)

Support for a Free Market Economy

Model 1 of Table 8 shows a positive relationship between belief in the prosperity gospel and support for a free market economy ($N = 742$). The odds of supporting a free market economy are expected to increase 18.7 percent with each additional level of agreement with the prosperity gospel ($p \leq 0.05$). This finding supports our first hypothesis, which predicted compatibility between the prosperity gospel and economic individualism. But this relationship can only be confirmed at the bivariate level, as the model loses significance when the control measures are included in the second model. A third model with the control variables but without the prosperity gospel variable was added to identify any

potential interaction effects. Since there are no changes in significance among the variables between Models 2 and 3, it is unlikely that there are interaction effects between the control variables and the main predictor variable.

Table 8: Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting Prosperity Gospel Adherents' Support for a Free Market Economy


<i>Predictor</i>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	<i>b</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>
Agreement with the Prosperity Gospel	0.171*	1.187	0.169*	1.185		
Male			0.105 (0.177)	1.111	0.073 (0.176)	-0.076
Ladino			-0.233 (0.237)	0.792	-0.265 (0.236)	0.232
Age			0.058 (0.056)	1.059	0.055 (0.056)	-0.056
Resides in Capital			-0.259 (0.190)	0.772	-0.237 (0.189)	-0.789
Education			0.030 (0.072)	1.031	0.013 (0.072)	-0.014
Income			0.050 (0.069)	1.051	0.051 (0.069)	-0.053
Religious Attendance			0.006 (0.076)	1.006	0.019 (0.075)	-0.019
Catholic			-0.236 (0.207)	0.790	-0.316 (0.203)	0.271
Secular			0.038 (0.365)	1.038	-0.049 (0.362)	0.048
Constant	0.590*		0.502		1.127*	
-2 Log likelihood	821.101		814.670		819.587	
Model χ^2	5.625*		12.056		7.140	
Pseudo R ²	0.011		0.024		0.014	
Degrees of freedom	1		10		9	
N	742		742		742	

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

Note: The odds ratio is the antilog of B, and the standard errors are in parentheses. Nagelkerke used for Pseudo R² value.

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006).

Based on the data from Model 1 in Table 8, Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities for prosperity gospel adherents' support for a free market economy. Consistent with the results described above, support for a free market economy increases as agreement with the prosperity gospel increases. An individual who completely disagrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.6816 predicted probability of supporting a free market economy. An individual who mostly disagrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.7175 predicted probability of supporting a free market economy. An individual who mostly agrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.7508 predicted probability of supporting a free market economy. Lastly, an individual who completely agrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.7814 predicted probability of supporting a free market economy. This probability is about 0.1 unit higher than an individual who completely disagrees with the prosperity gospel.



Acceptance of Homosexuality

Model 1 in Table 9 presents the results of regressing acceptance of homosexuality on agreement with the prosperity gospel ($N = 740$). The results contradict our second hypothesis, which predicted that agreement with the prosperity gospel would be positively associated with acceptance of homosexuality. As Model 1 shows, with every one-level increase in agreement with the prosperity gospel, the odds of thinking that homosexuality can always or sometimes be justified decreases by 27.3 percent ($p \leq 0.001$). This significant relationship continues with little change when the control measures are added in

Model 2, with the odds of accepting homosexuality decreasing by 27.4 percent with every one-level increase in agreement with the prosperity gospel ($p \leq 0.001$).

Table 9: Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting Prosperity Gospel Adherents' Acceptance of Homosexuality

Predictor	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	<i>b</i>	Odds ratio	<i>b</i>	Odds ratio	<i>b</i>	Odds ratio	<i>b</i>	Odds ratio
Agreement with the Prosperity Gospel	-0.319*** (0.066)	0.727	-0.316*** (0.072)	0.729			-0.286*** (0.080)	0.249
Male			-0.321 (0.171)	0.725	-0.259 (0.168)	0.228	-0.322 (0.171)	0.275
Ladino			-0.048 (0.218)	0.953	0.000 (0.215)	0	-0.057 (0.218)	0.056
Age			-0.309*** (0.058)	0.734	-0.298*** (0.057)	0.258	-0.311*** (0.058)	0.267
Resides in Capital			0.407* (0.182)	1.503	0.361* (0.180)	-0.435	0.410 (0.182)	-0.506
Education			-0.023 (0.070)	0.978	0.006 (0.068)	-0.006	-0.024 (0.070)	0.023
Income			0.023 (0.065)	1.024	0.025 (0.064)	-0.025	0.026 (0.065)	-0.026
Religious Attendance			-0.143* (0.072)	0.867	-0.161* (0.072)	0.149	-0.147* (0.073)	0.137
Catholic			0.411* (0.197)	1.508	0.555** (0.191)	-0.741	0.424* (0.197)	0.528
Secular			-0.739* (0.352)	0.477	-0.554 (0.346)	0.425	-0.326 (0.594)	0.278
SECULARPG							-0.157 (0.183)	0.145
Constant	0.282		1.697**		0.513		1.624**	
-2 Log likelihood	916.491		863.243		882.555		862.504	
Model χ^2	23.223***		76.471***		57.158***		77.210***	
Pseudo R ²	0.043		0.137		0.103		0.138	
Degrees of freedom	1		10		9		11	
N	740		740				740	

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

Note: The odds ratio is the antilog of B, and the standard errors are in parentheses. Nagelkerke used for Pseudo R² value.


Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala* (2006).

Model 2 also indicates that five additional predictors have a significant effect on acceptance of homosexuality: age, region, church attendance, Catholic identification, and no religious affiliation. Some of these results are not surprising: as age increases, acceptance of homosexuality decreases; individuals in the capital city are more likely to be accepting of homosexuality than those

living outside the capital; and increased church attendance is negatively associated with acceptance of homosexuality. Interestingly, despite church teachings against homosexuality, Catholics are 50.8 percent more likely than Protestants to think that homosexuality can be justified. It is unclear why people that do not belong to a religion are 52.3 percent less likely than Protestants to think that homosexuality can be justified. Further investigation beyond the scope of this paper would be necessary in order to determine why.

In addition, a third and fourth model were created in order to identify any interaction effects between the main predictor variable and the control variables. While the variable “secular” lost significance when only the controls were included in Model 3, an interaction term created between secular and agreement with the prosperity gospel was not significant when taken into account with all the variables in Model 4. This finding suggests that the variable “secular” did not lose significance due to interaction effects with the primary predictor variable. Therefore, Model 2 remains the best-fitting model.

The predicted probabilities for the acceptance of homosexuality are based on the results from Model 2 in Table 9. Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities for prosperity gospel adherents’ acceptance of homosexuality. Consistent with the results described above, acceptance of homosexuality decreases as agreement with the prosperity gospel increases. An individual who completely disagrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.7992 predicted probability of accepting homosexuality. An individual who mostly disagrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.7437 predicted probability of accepting homosexuality. An individual who mostly agrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.6790 predicted probability of accepting homosexuality. Lastly, an individual who completely agrees with the prosperity gospel has a 0.6066 predicted probability of accepting homosexuality. This probability is about 0.2 units lower than an individual who completely disagrees with the prosperity gospel.



DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This study seeks to assess the compatibility between the global trends of neo-Pentecostalism and the prosperity gospel and individualistic social and economic attitudes. The analysis found mixed results in that there seems to be compatibility, although weak, with regard to economic individualism but not with regard to social attitudes—at least with regard to attitudes toward homosexuality. These findings suggest that Turner (1974a; 1974b), Ignatow and Johnson (2014), and Haenni (2005) provide a sound explanation for understanding the relationship between the prosperity gospel and broader social trends. Prosperity gospel adherents' friendliness to economic individualism is consistent with Haenni's (2005) concept of new "market-friendly" religions and with Ignatow and Johnson's (2014) findings on neo-Pentecostalism in Guatemala and the Gulen Movement.

Our results resonate with Weber's concept of "elective affinities" between religion and economic activity, as discussed by Turner (1974a; 1974b), in that there seems to be compatibility between the religious belief in material prosperity as God's blessing and the outcome of support for a free market economy. It appears that the discourse provided by the prosperity gospel and its "vocabularies of motive" (Mills 1940) may encourage and justify believers' consumption and economic pursuit, a timely pursuit considering the sanctification of global capitalism in recent decades. The limits of elective affinities end there, though, as there appears to be no affinity and actually an opposite relationship between belief in the prosperity gospel and at least one social dimension of liberal individualism. This finding supports Davis and Robinson's (1999) theory of religious cosmology in that prosperity gospel believers do not seem to have changed in their attitudes towards social issues when compared with earlier generations of Pentecostals. While economic attitudes may have shifted in the direction of consumerism, their moral cosmology continues to be a determinant in regards to retaining conservative social attitudes.

Although the most recently developed theory of all those included here, institutional theories are the least supported by the results. There is support for the idea that institutions help transition individuals to the modern world in regard to the compatibility between the prosperity gospel and economic liberalism, but the usefulness of this theory in explaining the evolution of individuals and the possible role of Pentecostalism as a culturally modernizing, individualizing institution stops there. It appears that this social modernization is split between its economic and social dimensions rather than arriving in one modern package.

This study presents a complex picture of the relationship between religious beliefs and economic and social attitudes, specifically in regard to the prosperity gospel and liberal individualism. The prosperity gospel does not appear to

influence its adherents to embrace more liberal attitudes in regard to social issues such as homosexuality, but it may influence its adherents to embrace modern attitudes related to global capitalism, in terms of both free trade and consumerism, although the latter has yet to be tested empirically.

As Pentecostalism continues to grow in the global South, the implications it has for social and economic life will be more influential. This significance may be especially true considering the growing influence of Pentecostals in politics in Guatemala and in other nations in the global South. In 2014, Uganda criminalized homosexuality. The Anti-Homosexuality Act gained popularity in part due to religious pressure (Cheney 2012). Although it is unknown whether other countries will follow suit, the influence of Pentecostals in politics ensures that religion will by no means disappear from public discourses on social issues in the near future.

Further research on the political impact of the prosperity gospel is necessary in order to explain and predict long-term social and cultural trends. Survey data, while advantageous in that one is able to generalize to the larger population, is limited in its ability to capture the nuances of the interactions between religious and social change. To continue to study the influence of the prosperity gospel, it would be helpful to conduct qualitative research on a larger scale than has been done previously. This research would potentially address some of this study's limitations, such as social desirability and respondents' lack of knowledge on issues such as free trade and homosexuality.

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