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Abstract

First, we retrace, on the basis of an analysis of European Union documents, how religion became a means for integration on the level of EU policies and debates. Second, we analyze, on the basis of the European Value Survey, how religion and xenophobic attitudes relate to a sense of European-ness among European citizens. We argue that religion gained relevance for the European Commission and in public debates as a marker to distinguish “us” from “them.” On the individual level, we found that denomination does not play an important role in defining European-ness when we controlled for church attendance and intensity of belief. Xenophobic attitudes do not contribute to the cohesion of a European “we.” Instead, they decrease European-ness. We show that although religion is important on both levels, it refers to different concepts and displays different dynamics when observed as part of integration policies and when observed in relation to individual attitudes.

Integration of the member states has been a major goal of the European Union (EU) since the first Treaty of Rome (1957). Whereas the political agenda during the first decades focused mainly on economic unification, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 manifested a fundamental change toward a political and social union (Kohler-Koch 1999). This endeavor was accompanied by a growing salience of religion on the EU level. While churches became political and social partners in the course of an increased inclusion of civil society organizations, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 confirmed antidiscrimination with regard to religion as part of the primary legislation. In the aftermath of terror attacks in New York, Madrid, and London and the failed Constitutional Treaty, the so-called Christian heritage of Europe became a highly contested feature of European identity.

Our focus in this article is twofold. On the basis of a brief analysis of documents, we want to retrace how religion has been used to stimulate integration on the EU level, in particular in the policies and debates of the European Commission (EC). Additionally, we want to know how religiousness and xenophobic attitudes relate to feelings of Europeanness¹ on an individual level through the means of a quantitative multilevel analysis: while on the EU level, religion grew into an important means for European integration, does religion play a similar role on the individual level? We do not imply that EU policies directly influence people's attitudes; rather, we investigate whether and how integration through culture takes place both on the level of EU policy and on the level of EU citizens. We want to determine whether the means-ends combination projected by the EC is echoed on the individual level. Our purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of the roles that religion and religious heterogeneity play in shaping Europeanness by bringing together two well-established but still separate debates on the political developments to expedite cultural European integration and on the cultural roots of individual euroskepticism.² Combining an analysis of EU policies and an analysis of individual attitudes enables us to conceptualize religion as a multilevel phenomenon and to compare how religion affects European integration processes on the different levels. By retracing the different ways in which religion matters for individual attitudes toward the EU and in European politics, we also hope to contribute to a better understanding of European secularization processes.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO INTEGRATE

The EU has a history of defining and politicizing integration reaching back as far as the first Treaty of Rome (1957). Back then, economic integration was supposed

¹ The term *Europeanness* was introduced by Offe (2003: 438).

² *Euroskepticism* is defined as criticism of the EU and opposition to integration of the member states.

to produce integrative spillover effects into other fields of policymaking and in appeasing the region after two devastating wars. During the first economic and enlargement crisis of the 1970s, Europeanness became a major concern of the EC. Common symbols such as a European currency, flag, and anthem were seen as devices to revitalize the European integration project (Tindemans 1976). The EC became an essential institution of the newly framed integration process and shaped the aim to strengthen integration among the peoples in Western Europe through policy programs and the Single European Act in 1986 (European Council 1987). The most essential change, however, was the establishment of the EU in 1992. It constituted a political union alongside the economic community. Policies that were “close to the people” were launched through cultural programs and an emphasis on civil rights. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) became the legal turning point of the social and political integration project (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Jansen 2005; Kohler-Koch 1999; Quenzel 2005; Shore 2000).

During the late 1940s, the Christian Democratic parties had become dominant in Western European politics, and the Catholic Christian elite and the Vatican strongly supported the progress of European integration (Leustean and Madeley 2009). However, religion did not appear as a documented topic of EC’s policies until 1992. The appearance of religion in official EC documents and later in the Treaty of Lisbon (2006) was consequential. It enlarged the competencies of the EC by establishing religion as a means for integration, expanded the legal rights of the citizens, and legitimated the churches as partners of a political dialogue on the EU level. The two major developments that led to the “discovery of religion” were the legislative establishment of antidiscrimination regulation of religious orientations and the discovery of “a soul for Europe.”

Antidiscrimination Policy and the Discovery of Religion

Antidiscrimination legislation was established as a policy field to support the single market. In the 1980s, the EC, the member states, and the European Parliament reinforced, through different documents and treaties, the conviction that discrimination and racism ought to be seen as a hindrance for free movement and social cohesion in the single European market.³ However, religion was not mentioned until the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, in which antidiscrimination policy became legally codified with regard to religion and the freedom of religious expression. Article 13 of that treaty established religion-related antidiscrimination as

³ This joint initiative is codified in the Single European Act in 1986, “Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia” (European Parliament, European Council, and European Commission 1986), the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market (European Commission 1985), and the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights (European Commission 1989).

part of the primary legislation of community law and by that made it a EU-wide operative:

Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

The phrase “may take appropriate action to combat discrimination” specifies that the EC is entitled to develop its own policy against discrimination and implies that the member states passed this policy area on to the European level. The treaty enabled the EC to formulate and actively enforce actions against discrimination and to position the single market over and against national rights and customs.

The EC used this mandate to establish a set of regulations and programs to substantiate antidiscrimination. With the regulations for nondiscrimination in employment and profession (European Council 2000a) and nondiscrimination against race and ethnic origin (European Council 2000b), the EC ostensibly addressed the Common Market. Moreover, these regulations set the ground for all people under the jurisdiction of the EU to be protected against discrimination—inter alia, against discrimination on the basis of their religious beliefs. To complete this agenda, the EC established the Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination (2001–2006) (European Council 2000c). Articles 2 and 3 and the Protocols of the Treaty of Lisbon realized the antidiscrimination legislation in 2008 by connecting antidiscrimination to European citizenship. This treaty covers a broad area of potential fields and dimensions of discriminatory behaviors not only by individuals, but also by organizations, corporations, and national administrations.

Antidiscrimination became a key area that established a social and political space of decision making beyond national restrictions and harmonized fundamental citizen rights across the member states. Subsequently, antidiscrimination and equal opportunity policies became a focal policy area in creating and substantiating economic, political, and social integration.

Besides antidiscrimination legislation, the dialogue with the churches became an important pillar of the EC’s integration policies. A speech by EC President Jacques Delors in 1992 emphasized the importance of religion as a resource of integration and addressed the representatives of Roman Catholicism and Lutheran Protestantism as partners in the integration process.⁴ With the notion of “a soul for

⁴ Other churches, congregations, and religious organizations were included neither in Delors’s address nor in the consultations afterwards.

Europe,” Delors expressed confidence in the churches’ ability to bring people together and pledge them to the European project. He stated:

We are in fact at a crossroads in the history of European construction. 1992 is a turning point. . . . The Maastricht summit marked the end of the economic phase of European construction—what has been described as the “semi-automatic” development of the EC, based on the drive toward the Common Market. . . . —a time when the debate on the meaning of European construction becomes a major political factor. Believe me, we won’t succeed with Europe solely on the basis of legal expertise or economic know-how. It is impossible to put the potential of Maastricht into practice without a breath of air. If in the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a soul to Europe, to give spirituality and meaning, the game will be up. . . . This is why I want to revive the intellectual and spiritual debate on Europe. I invite the churches to participate actively in it. . . . We must find a way of involving the churches (quoted in Luibl 2005: 197).

The speech highlights the churches as providers of religion, which was seen as a resource for spirituality and emotionality; the churches seemed to be able to give significance to the integration project. But more important, they could provide a “soul,” a necessary affective dimension (Moïsi 1999; Weiss 2003). To incorporate the churches and, later, other religious groups, the EC in 1994 started the initiative known as A Soul for Europe, a name taken from Delors’s speech. This initiative provided an opportunity for dialogue between religious groups and the EC and, accordingly, for affecting each other’s policies (Bureau of European Policy Advisers 2011). The initiative secured the legal status of churches and religious communities within the larger European context. Beyond their “soul,” churches and religious groups were seen as mass organizations that can mobilize support for integration. “Since these communities represent a large number of people in Europe, the actual number of members in A Soul for Europe is much bigger than six. In fact, every citizen in Europe that belongs to any of these communities is, in a way, a member of the initiative” (Bureau of European Policy Advisers 2011).

The 11th Declaration of the Treaty for the Foundation of the European Community in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) became a major step in legally acknowledging churches and religion as a resource for integration (Jansen 2000; Houston 2009; Robbers 1997) and ended the “church blindness” of the EC (Mückl 2005: 35). While the 11th Declaration addresses churches and congregational groups as the bearers of rights, it explicitly confirms and recognizes the legal forms of regulating religion as they exist in the member states. It states: “The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical

and non-confessional organisations.” The 11th Declaration thereby embodies the dictum “unity in plurality” as the basis of European identity and policymaking. This special arrangement between the EU and the religious communities forms a particular government-religion relationship and determines a new, harmonized frame for state-religion relationships in Europe (Grötsch 2009).

In 2008, the Declaration became part of the Treaty of Lisbon. Consequently, it was translated into community law and manifested a strong legal position that guides the relationship between the EC and the religious communities and organizations. Churches and other religious organizations were now accepted as important partners in order to implement EU programs. At the same time, the Declaration empowered religious organizations by granting access to decision-making processes on the European level.

The antidiscrimination policies strengthened the individual rights of religious beliefs and expressions of all European citizens, even against national governments. Additionally, these policies staked out a new operative field of the EC, consolidating the EU’s sphere of influence. While the human rights agenda declared religion to be a personal subject, the dialogue with the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Protestant churches advocated religion as a means of fostering a sense of Europeanness and, at the same time, excluded nonreligious people and believers who were outside the addressed groups. Both the EC’s human rights agenda and the legal inclusion of churches and religious organizations can be understood as an attempt to harmonize and standardize national understandings and perspectives on religion and to overwrite differences in national legislation without interfering directly with national sovereignty. They are attempts to substantially define Europeanness. Politically, these attempts at cultural inclusion through standardization became controversial and contradictory. Religion changed from a nonproblematic nonissue into a controversial, exclusive topic. This shift is mirrored in two major European public debates that accompanied the legal and policy developments on the EU level.

The Debate of the Accession of Turkey to the EU and the Role of Religion in European Self-Understanding

While the public debate on the full membership of Turkey turned into a debate about the compatibility of Islamic and Christian values and lifestyles, religion became a problematic issue during the dispute over the Preamble of the proposed European Constitution. Both debates concerned cultural-religious roots, the self-definition of Europe, and what Europeanness should and could be.

In 1963, Turkey gained EEC associate status, which was maintained until 1987, when Turkey submitted an application for formal membership. Turkey received candidate status in 1999 together with ten East European countries, but it

was the only candidate that did not become a full member in 2004. In 2006, the EC suspended negotiations between Turkey and the EU (European Commission 2006). After the French and German governments questioned the human rights situation in Turkey, the Turkish parliament refused to ratify the Ankara Protocols involving recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. This rejection broke off the negotiations thus far.

During Turkey's submission and the negotiations, public debates on the membership issue became increasingly controversial. The main focus was on whether Turkey really fitted into the EU. Cultural and religious differences were highlighted when the economic and political benefits of a full membership were discussed (Jung and Raudvere 2008; Leggewie 2004; Wimmel 2006). Turkey became the cultural and religious "other" (Casanova 2004; Küçük 2008) against which European identities could be constructed. Two lines of argument became salient. First, despite its secular tradition, Turkey was perceived as an Islamic country whose citizens did not share basic democratic values. Second, Turkey was portrayed as a developing country dominated by peasants that would gain the benefits of full membership status without being able to contribute (for a summary of the arguments, see Wuermeling, 2007).⁵ The second debate accompanying the discovery of religion on the EU level concerned the reference to God that was proposed for the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000 (European Council 2010) and the Constitutional Treaty (2004). Both treaties aimed at establishing a base for identification and a social and cultural dimension of the European project. The conflict was over the relevance of such a reference for establishing shared European values and a community based on those values. Liberal and left-wing members of the European Council as well as members for France and Belgium opposed the idea, in contrast to conservative members and those from countries with a Roman Catholic majority (Foret and Riva 2010). Although a compromise was found in 2000 by using different wordings in the various language versions, the conflict escalated because of the formulation in the Preamble that the EU should be "*drawing inspiration* from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe" (Constitutional Treaty 2004 [emphasis added]).

The membership negotiations with Turkey and the controversy around the Preamble indicated that European identity, European values, and European self-

⁵ The debate over Turkey's EU membership was accompanied by conflicts concerning Muslim immigrants and the space for Islamic representation, of which debates on the wearing of headscarves and on forced marriage were just a few examples. The debates were fueled by an atmosphere of insecurity after the attacks on September 11, 2001, the "war on terror" and European military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, and the controversy driven by the 2005 publication in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands Posten* of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. Islam became a synonym for terrorism.

understanding are still highly contested (Mandry 2009; Marrani 2004; Naumann 2008): Shall Europe be perceived as a Christian entity, or shall it be secular? Both debates substantiate struggles about the right and the power to define Europeanness in which different religious and political groups claim legitimacy to set the agenda. However, the debates are differently related to the issue of European identity. While the first debate refers to Europeanness through indicating—negatively—who is not a part of it, the second can be seen as an attempt to determine positively who is a part of it.

European policy with regard to integration through religion became Janus-faced: While a strong antidiscrimination policy allows for the freedom of individual worship and religious expression, the inclusion of the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Protestant churches in a political dialogue and the two debates on Turkey's membership and the Constitutional Treaty made religion a major topic of cultural integration and exclusion. The analysis of the EC's documents and treaties indicated that religion has regained salience on the European level since Jacques Delors's speech on a soul for Europe. While religion became important to define, shape, and harmonize a cultural European identity, conflicts and different national political positions became visible during the debates on Turkey's membership and the Constitutional Treaty. These different positions within the public and political debates led to frictions and controversies. They challenged the harmonization policies of the EC and the attempt to integrate Europe through a common cultural heritage.

These developments raise the questions as to whether religion as a means for inclusion and increased Europeanness, as proposed by the EC, holds on the individual level and whether the construction of a Christian heritage through exclusion works as a unifying force among the citizens of the EU.

EXCLUSIVE INCLUSION: THE DILEMMA OF EUROPEANNESS

The previous discussion indicates that on the EC level, religion is considered an important means for the European integration project. Despite this increased significance, research on individual-level attitudes toward the EU and European integration have mostly ignored religion. Most studies focus either on macro-economic factors such as inflation and trade concentration (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) or on individual economic benefit-oriented considerations (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998), national identities (Bruter 2003), or multiculturalism as a threat (Kriesi et al. 2008; McLaren 2002). Only recently has religion gained more attention as a factor influencing attitudes toward European integration (Hobolt et al. 2011; Nelson, Guth, and Fraser 2001; Nelson, Guth, and Highsmith 2011). In these studies, religion is understood chiefly as individual religiousness. However, as the debates over Turkey's membership and over the

Constitutional Treaty indicate, religion is relevant on other levels as well. Religion refers to a shared symbolic order of societies; it comprises organizations such as churches and religious congregations and is inherently part of the state-religion relationship. All these aspects may influence the relationship between individual religiousness and attitudes toward the EU.

The second part of this article focuses on the question as to whether religion influences European integration on the individual level and what role prejudice against other religious groups (in particular, against Muslims) plays for Europeaness. We test whether the means-end relationship between religion and integration initiated by the EC policies can also be found on the level of the European citizens. For our analysis, we refer not only to individual religiousness but also to religion as part of the environmental context of individual attitudes and beliefs. The analysis pertains less to the question of whether the EU program is successful than to the question of the extent to which the program realistically reflects the impact of religion on the individual level of EU citizens.

Inclusion Through Religion

There is comprehensive theoretical and empirical evidence that on the individual level, religion and religiousness are important for feelings of social inclusion. Durkheim (1990 [1887], 2010 [1912]) was among the first sociologists to suggest that religion plays a fundamental role in integration.⁶ For Durkheim, religion provides the necessary norms, meanings, rites, and symbols and the opportunity structure that facilitate interpersonal attachment and thereby solidarity and social cohesion. Secularization theories suggesting that religion lost these functions during the development modernity (Berger 1967; Davie 1990; Luckmann 1967; Weber 2006 [1922]) are empirically not entirely supported (Greeley 2002; Halman and Draulans 2006; Pew Research Center 2002; Pollack 2008). On the contrary, research on social capital has shown that religion still has the capacity to generate an inclusive “radius of trust” (Fukuyama 2001: 8). This radius of trust has the potential to lead to a decline in crime, delinquency, and anomic behavior (Iannaccone, Stark, and Finke 1998; Stark 1996) and an increase in cooperation and reciprocity (Jagodzinski 2009; Putnam 2000; Smidt 2003) and thereby social cohesion and integration of societies. These studies argue that religiousness on the individual level works in favor of societal integration.

To analyze which particular aspects of individual religiousness are relevant for Europeaness, we follow Glock (1969) and distinguish between three dimensions

⁶ Durkheim defines religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, i.e. things set apart and forbidden; beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim 2010 [1912]: 76, translation by Florian Grötsch).

of individual religiosity: (1) institutional ties and relations to religious groups, churches, and congregations that provide networks and opportunity structures but also group sanctions and social control; (2) religious attitudes, individual feelings, ideas, and emotions that a person has in daily life that provide emotional and cognitive orientation; (3) practices of institutionalized common worship that are important aspects of shared and private religious practices. We explicitly do not refer to the content of different religions or to the functional or substantial dimensions of religion.⁷

In contrast to other studies, we understand religion as a multilevel phenomenon that consists not only of individual religiousness but also of communal beliefs and shared systems of meanings, morals, and values that have the power to bind people through interpretations, norms, and sanctions (Stark 1996; Swidler 1986; Welsh, Tittle, and Petee 1991). Such shared systems can manifest themselves on the level of smaller regional communities or larger societal, cross-border collectives. In the following analysis, we focus, in contrast to Durkheim, less on the local community level than on aspects of religion on the country level. The practical reason is the availability of adequate data. The theoretical reason lies in the close relationship between the nation-state and religion in Europe. On one hand, national constitutions and policy systems mirror Christian social teaching and can be understood as the manifest result of conflicts between different religious and political groups throughout history (Knippenberg 2006; Manow 2005; Rokkan 2000); on the other hand, the national educational systems are major transmitters and homogenizers of ideological and cultural perspectives and understandings (Gellner 1983), and the state-religion relationship is highly significant for religious practices (Fox and Flores 2009). Distinguishing between such country-specific characteristics allows us to take into account the diverse national conditions in investigating the impact of individual religiosity in Europe.

Exclusion Through Prejudice

There is a body of literature not only on the inclusive but also on the exclusive tendencies of cultural and religious group formation and identity formation. Although the literature concerning the relationship between cultural heterogeneity and social integration in general is inconclusive at best,⁸ there is strong theoretical

⁷ This differentiation, which is suggested by Berger (2001), refers to rather essentialist definitions of religion.

⁸ At least for the United States, it could be shown that ethnic heterogeneity reduces individual trust and the willingness to commit to the societal common good (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Sears and Citrin 1985; Soss, Schramm, and Fording 2003; Wolfe and Klausen 1997). Religious heterogeneity due to immigration and globalization is one major source of cultural heterogeneity and therefore can be suspected to reduce trust and commitment. However, the negative influence of cultural heterogeneity on social cohesion is not uncontested. Some researchers claim that although

evidence that perceived cultural differences—and thereby religious differences—may lead to stereotyping, prejudice, xenophobia, and violence. In particular, group threat theory (Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995) has a longstanding tradition in explaining how group formation leads to social demarcation and exclusion from equal opportunities and social resources.

According to Blumer's (1958) classic argument, intergroup hostility results from perceived threats from minorities. Minorities are perceived as a threat because they are capable of successfully challenging the social order by contesting the economic, political, and social position of the majority. In a zero-sum sense, all new claims pose a threat to the existing distribution. In-group identification, out-group stereotyping, devaluation, and the perception of threat lead to prejudice and rejection. They reduce trust and the willingness to accept redistribution. The original theory suggests that if the minority group grows, the perceived threat will grow as well, and studies have repeatedly shown that people are less willing to contribute to the common good if the community contains minority groups that are perceived as threatening (Olzak 1992). However, threat theory is not uncontested. Hjerm (2007, 2009), for example, indicates that minorities become a threat only under particular conditions: They must be visible and distinct from the majority, they must be significant, and they must be perceived as real competition. Hjerm addresses the necessity to take higher-level contexts such as political articulation into account in order to trace these dynamics (Hjerm 2007; King and Wheelock 2007), and according to contact theory (Pettigrew 1998), minorities are included if friendship ties are developed.

At the same time as minorities can become a threat, they seem to be needed for identity formation as the "other" against whom one can define oneself (Barth 1969; Jenkins 1994). For the following analysis, we want to know whether minorities are a threat challenging European integration or whether Europeaness is constructed against these minorities being the "other." In line with Quillian (1995: 588), we measure the individual perception of threat by articulated negative attitudes toward a particular group: "The greater the sense of threat to prerogatives, the more likely are members of the dominant group to express prejudice against threatening outsiders."⁹ Because societies often comprise several minorities, the main challenge for threat theory is to explain which minority in a given society has become salient as a threat (Hjerm 2007). In the United States, group threat

social cohesion is needed to uphold democratic institutions, heterogeneity does not necessarily affect social cohesion negatively (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Helly 2003). They claim that cultural heterogeneity might become part of the multicultural self-understanding of groups and that social cohesion depends on universal rules of participation and redistribution rather than on heterogeneity as such.

⁹ We assume that the Christian majority sees differences between the three largest Christian churches (Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox) as less salient than those between Christianity and Islam.

patterns are most often observed among racial groups (Hood and Morris 1998). By contrast, in Europe, religion has a great potential to serve as an important group marker. Within the EU, the Islam-Christianity divide is often seen as the main provider of opposing cultural frames and differences in value orientations. Those have been visible in the conflict about Turkey's EU membership but also in confrontations between immigrant groups and the autochthonous population of European countries (Gerhards 2004; Spohn 2009; Wuermeling 2007). We would expect to find that a stronger sense of Europeanness involves xenophobic attitudes especially toward Muslims.

DATA AND METHOD

So far, we have shown that religion became a means for integration on the level of the EC, while it was used to mark boundaries on the level of public debates. We now want to know whether such a means-ends combination of integration as suggested on the EC level holds for the individual level and whether boundary drawing supports individual Europeanness. We do not test whether EU institutions or developments on this level influence individual-level attitudes. More precisely, we test whether religious involvement and negative attitudes toward immigrants, Muslims, and people of other ethnic origin¹⁰ influence acceptance of the EU. Our goal is to trace back cohesive and adhesive forces within the European integration project on the individual level.

Such an analysis requires data encompassing different dimensions of religion, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes, and attitudes toward the EU. The European Values Study (EVS) is a large-scale, cross-national survey that provides insights into beliefs, preferences, attitudes, and values of European citizens. It is the only comparative European dataset that comprises questions concerning people's religious beliefs, practices, and memberships as well as tolerance toward minorities and attitudes toward the EU. For the following analysis, we employ the fourth wave (European Values Study 2008), which covers the twenty-seven European member states.

The EVS contains several questions about the EU. One block comprises questions on fears about the EU taking over too much responsibility, one question concerning future enlargements of the EU, and one question on confidence in the EU. A factor analysis of these questions showed two distinct factors: the fear questions on one hand and the enlargement and confident questions on the other. All

¹⁰ Although people most often do not distinguish between these groups in their everyday lives, they cluster these groups differently in different countries. While the terms *immigrant* and *race* are highly correlated in Sweden, for example, they are not in Great Britain. Because we are not particularly interested in such country-specific differences, we decided to include these three groups separately in the analysis in order to analyze their different influences in Europe.

questions correlate only moderately (Pearson's r is less than 0.2 in all cases). Because the fear questions seem to measure a different dimension, we decided to leave them out of the analysis. They capture the fears that the EU will reduce national sovereignty and thereby are related to national identities.¹¹ The question about future EU enlargements in 2008 concerns mainly countries of the former Soviet Union and tackle the acceptance of economic redistribution rather than cultural differences. We therefore decided to use the question (Q63) "How much confidence do you have in the European Union?" as an indication of people's attitudes toward the EU. We conceive the answers as an expression of individual acceptance of the EU as an economic and political system but also as a cultural system that can be understood as the main aspect of Europeanness. The answers are coded from 1 to 4 and cannot be interpreted as a continuous variable as required for a linear regression analysis. We decided to recode the answers bivariate into "1 = confidence" and "0 = no confidence" and to perform a logistic regression instead.¹²

Influencing Factors

Individual religiousness is differentiated into belonging to a denomination (Roman Catholic, Protestant,¹³ Orthodox, other, and none, coded as dummy variables, referring to being member of a larger community), the practice of service attendance (frequency of church attendance,¹⁴ coded on a six-point scale, referring to opportunity structures, community attachment, and shared rites and rituals), praying outside service (praying, four categories, referring to individual rites and routines), and the salience of religious contents (religiousness, referring to understandings and orientations).¹⁵ We thereby separate the effects of the "branding" of

¹¹ Among others, Opp (2005) or Berg (2007) argued that national and transnational identities are not necessarily exclusive and can relate concordantly.

¹² Research in other areas provides evidence that single-item questions are easier to answer and are not necessarily inferior to more complex item batteries (Nagy 2002). The cross-check with data from the International Social Survey Programme (2008) showed that the country means for EU confidence are comparable. Therefore we consider the EVS data to be trustworthy.

¹³ This category does not include members of Free Churches, nonconformists, or evangelicals. Because of their small number, they are coded as "other."

¹⁴ Church attendance is measured independently of denomination. One may assume that members of some denominations are more frequent churchgoers than are members of others, but because we are interested only in the effect of regularly taking part in religious rituals and ceremonies, we do not account for such a denominational effect on the frequency of church attendance.

¹⁵ This is captured by an index of eight questions on transcendental issues that is standardized between 0 and 1, 0 indicating no salience and 1 meaning high salience. For these items, a Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.844$ is reported; the country-specific α s all exceed 0.7. The country-specific means are displayed in Table A2 in the Appendix.

the in-group of which the respondent is a member, the “doing” of religion, and the intensity of the individual’s belief in a higher power.

To explore the influence of xenophobic attitudes on Europeaness, we used the question “Whom do you not like as neighbours . . . [people of different race/Muslims/immigrants]?” (Q6B/H/I). The answers were dummy-coded. We decided to use the single items to gain a more precise picture of whether and how the respondents differentiate between these groups.¹⁶

We included the respondents’ sex, age, year of completed education, and yearly household income as sociodemographic control variables. Additionally, we controlled for the individual self-assessment on a left-right scale (Q57) and general trust in others (Q7). Research has shown that these factors might influence assessment of the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; McLaren 2002; Nelson, Guth, and Fraser 2001).¹⁷ Although we are not interested in the effects of these variables in particular, we controlled for them to ensure that variances in the dependent variables are not due to their influence and that the country-specific differences in confidence do not depend on their country-specific distributions.

Contexts matter.¹⁸ To determine more specifically which aspects of the nation-state’s context matter precisely for the influence of religion, we test for the national economic situation operationalized by GDP, social spending, and unemployment rate (Eurostat 2007).¹⁹ These data are indicators of the distributive situation within a country and its comparative wealth. They serve as control variables because we are interested in cultural differences rather than economic differences. Because we assume that the cultural diversity of a country, characterized by its percentage of immigrants (U.N. population statistics), degree of religious homogeneity (Herfindahl index for religious heterogeneity calculated from aggregated EVS data), and attitudes toward Muslims (aggregated from EVS data) should also be substantial. The latter characteristics seem particularly interesting in light of the above-analyzed public debates on Turkey’s membership and the Constitutional Treaty.

¹⁶ To check for multicollinearity, we calculated the collinearity statistics. None of the issued variance inflation factor (VIF) values exceed 2.3 (tolerance not less than 0.42). Pearson’s r for all bivariate correlations is less than 0.5. Following Allison’s (2009) recommendation of a VIF less than 2.5 and a tolerance greater than 0.4, we consider the statistical problem of multicollinearity as less severe in our case.

¹⁷ All items are measured on a ten-level scale and are thereby treated as approximately quantitatively measured variables. A multicollinearity check showed only small significant correlations.

¹⁸ This claim is in line with welfare studies showing that, in particular, national policies matter for individual attitudes and actions (Mettler and Soss, 2004; Pierson, 1993; Svallfors, 2007). Multilevel analyses help to avoid the pitfalls of the methodological nationalism by specifying which of the national characteristics show any influence.

¹⁹ These data are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix.

Because we take these country-level properties into consideration and because we assume that individual attitudes vary accordingly, we performed a multilevel analysis (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). We used a multilevel logistic regression (performed with STATA) that is effectively a multiple logistic regression that can handle nested sources of variability such as individuals in nation-states. Multilevel logistic regression performs better than logistic regression if macro variables are included. The variation within the dependent variable is due to two sources of variation: variation within groups and variation between groups. If a single-level model is performed, the assumption of independence of the error terms is violated because observations within a group can be expected to be more similar than those between groups and standard errors are underestimated (Hox 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999). A minor problem is that the number (N) of included countries is only 27. We follow Snijders and Bosker (1999) in arguing that if N is 10 or more, a random intercept model is preferable to a fixed model of regression analysis.

The Results of the Models

In 2008, 52 percent of Europeans expressed confidence in the EU. The country variances of people's confidence in the EU is not exceptionally high ($\eta^2 = 0.086$) but is significant. A comparison of the country-specific odds (Figure 1) shows differences among the countries. The likelihood of being confident in the EU is highest among respondents from Luxembourg and Slovenia, while euroskepticism is especially likely for people from Great Britain and Austria.

Table 1 (on page 18) displays five multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models. An empty model is tested to determine whether there are significant country differences, which in this case account for 7.2 percent of the total variance. Table 1 reports the odds ratios,²⁰ taking different sets of variables into account.

A brief look at the control variables suggests that there are no significant gender differences and that the likelihood of confidence in the EU decreases with age and left-wing attitudes and increases with education and income. People who are generally more trustful have a higher probability of showing confidence in the EU.

²⁰ Odds higher than 1 indicate that the probability of positive attitudes exceeds the probability of negative attitudes; odds lower than 1 indicate the opposite.

Figure 1: Confidence in the EU: Country-Specific Odds for 2008 (Great Britain Without Northern Ireland; Cyprus Without Northern Cyprus)




Table 1: Multilevel Analysis for all EU Member States

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Gender	1.002	1.000	0.986	0.987	0.986
Age	0.994**	0.994**	0.994**	0.994**	0.994**
Education	1.013**	1.013**	1.012**	1.012**	1.012**
Left-right self-positioning	1.034**	1.049**	1.051**	1.051**	1.051**
Income year	0.997	1.020**	1.020**	1.020**	1.020**
Trust	1.259**	1.456**	1.436**	1.436**	1.437**
No denomination			1.016	1.017	1.015
Roman Catholic	1.562**	1.025			
Protestant	0.710**	0.987			
Orthodox	1.364**	0.820*			
Other religion	1.251**	1.010			
Attitude toward race			0.867*	0.867*	0.867*
Attitude toward Muslims			0.914*	0.914*	0.914*
Attitude toward immigrants			0.908*	0.908*	0.907*
Prayer outside service		0.999	0.994	0.994	0.994
Intensity of belief		1.137*	1.142*	1.142*	1.140*
Church attendance		1.059**	1.064**	1.064**	1.064**
Herfindahl index religion				3.622*	
Social spending					0.947*
_cons	0.703**	0.674**	0.694*	0.261*	2.148
var (_cons)	0.000	0.596	0.359	0.054	0.234
Expl. country var %	0.000	15.3	9.8	1.6	6.6
χ^2	45.100	1,742.410	1,530.72	1,701.990	1,719.260
Number of observations	35,060	33,900	32,196	32,196	32,196
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27
Wald χ^2	870.630	716.130	751.30	757.300	757.510

Source: European Values Study (2008).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Models 1 to 3 in Table 1 indicate that religion and religiosity on the individual level in fact influences the likelihood of confidence; compared to nonreligious people, the mere fact of church membership increases the likelihood of confidence in the EU among Catholics by 56 percent and among Orthodox believers by 36 percent and reduces the likelihood among Protestants by 29 percent. However, this effect vanishes if we include frequency of church attendance, praying outside service, and intensity of individual belief. For Catholics and Protestants, the direction of influence is stable but insignificant, while it changes for Orthodox believers from a positive to a negative direction of influence.²¹ Intensity of belief

²¹ This effect can be shown for the original variable in a linear regression as well.

and church attendance increase the likelihood of confidence in the EU by 14 percent and 6 percent, respectively. These increases are small but significant.²²

At the same time, we observe that negative attitudes toward immigrants, Muslims, and people of other ethnic origin go hand in hand with increased Euroskepticism. Whereas religiousness increases Europeanness, negative attitudes toward these groups function as an adhesive force decreasing the likelihood of confidence in the EU. The reductions are small but significant. Negative attitudes toward Muslims are less strong in their impact on confidence in the EU (reducing the likelihood by 8.6 percent) than negative attitudes toward immigrants (which reduce the likelihood by 9.2 percent) and negative attitudes toward people of other ethnic origins (which reduce the likelihood by 13.3 percent). Although Muslims have the highest chance of being discriminated against, as Table A3 in the Appendix shows, these attitudes are less strong in their impact on Europeanness.

Table 2: Correlation Between Religious Practices and Negative Attitudes Toward People of a Different Race, Muslims, and Immigrants in 27 Countries

Religious Practices		Negative Attitudes Toward		
		People of a Different Race	Muslims	Immigrants
Prayer outside service	Pearson's <i>r</i>	0.036**	0.010*	0.016*
	<i>N</i>	37,005	36,895	36,920
Believing	Pearson's <i>r</i>	0.018**	0.007	0.011*
	<i>N</i>	38,279	38,170	38,183
Church attendance	Pearson's <i>r</i>	0.050**	0.036**	0.032**
	<i>N</i>	37,948	37,848	37,863

Source: European Values Study (2008).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Are xenophobic people especially religious? Without wanting to explore the discriminatory effects of religion in detail here, we show in Table 2 that people who are religiously active are slightly less tolerant toward religious and ethnic minority groups. This result ties in with findings from a comparative literature study for the United States by Hunsberger and Jackson (2005), which indicates that other religious and ethnic groups can become the target of religiously motivated

²² Because denomination lost its significance for Europeanness after we controlled for religious practices and to reduce the complexity of the model, we aggregated the denomination variable into "member of a denomination or not."

prejudice. However, for Europe as a whole, the correlations are not very strong, especially when it comes to Muslims.²³

We now want to test which of the discussed country-level factors influence Europeanness. None of the country-specific variables moderated the positive impact of individual religiosity and the negative impact of xenophobic attitudes.

Model 4 in Table 1 implies that religion plays a role also as a country variable; that is, religious homogeneity turns out to be a strong factor for Europeanness. A higher level of religious homogeneity increases the likelihood of confidence in the EU tremendously, by 260 percent per unit of the Herfindahl index. Religious homogeneity in Europe, however, means first and foremost Christianity and thereby again displays exclusive tendencies at the same time as it provides grounds for a common cultural basis. Additionally, when it comes to the general cultural-discursive climate, the degree of general xenophobia does not trigger mistrust per se; the impact of aggregated anti-Muslim attitudes as well as the mere share of immigrants is not significant. The latter supports Hjerm's (2007, 2009) claim that it is not the plain number of a minority that counts but the salience and framing of the group as threatening.

Model 5 in Table 1 shows the impact of social spending, which increases the likelihood of euroskepticism by 5.3 percent. People in countries with higher social spending seem to fear a negative impact of EU politics on their national redistributive systems. At least on the country level, social policies reduce Europeanness; economic risks as indicated by unemployment rate and the level of economic performance do not.

DISCUSSION

It is our aim in this article to explore whether and how the impact of religion and religiousness on the concept of Europeanness implied by EU policies is echoed on the individual level. Because European integration is one of the major goals of the EU, we wanted to know what role religion plays not only on the policy level but also for EU citizens. While the EC established religion as a means for integration, religion was employed to mark boundaries and the "other" during the public debates on Turkey's membership, on the Constitutional Treaty (and in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attack). On the individual level, individual religiousness and religious homogeneity both support Europeanness, while, parallel to the public debates, xenophobia reduces Europeanness. In particular, the homogeneity of the religious environment matters, and this is a context variable that has not often been considered.

²³ Interaction effects between religion and xenophobia do not show any significant results in our multilevel models. That supports findings that religious individuals are not necessarily more intolerant.

Counter to diagnoses of secularization in Europe, we found a tendency toward desecularization²⁴ at least on the European policy level. The A Soul for Europe initiative established religion as an important means for European integration. It substantiated a new field of policies for the EC on the legislative level and included religion in its organizational form of the churches as civil society partners into the political dialogue. As part of the EU's antidiscrimination legislation, religion developed into a tool for integration and harmonization, circumventing the nation-state level. The cultural dimension of religion as an identity marker of Europeanness became visible in its exclusive form in the national public debates on EU membership for Turkey and in its inclusive form in the debates on the Constitutional Treaty. Both debates indicated how small the consensus is on what Europeanness should consist of and how "religious" it should be.

Without implying that the EU policy of emphasizing religion has a direct impact on the individual level, we analyzed whether the means-ends combination suggested by the EC manifests itself on the level of the EU citizens. Although for this level, we cannot make any statements about trends of secularization or desecularization, it is safe to say that religion still matters for Europeanness. Our mixed-method approach reveals, in a new combination of results, that the EC in fact touches on an issue that is important for Europeans to feel European. Our finding that Orthodox people are more skeptical about the EU than are nonreligious people and other Christian believers implies that the EC might underestimate differences among the Christian churches and has not managed to involve the Orthodox Church sufficiently to stabilize trust in the EU.

The multilevel analysis of religion showed on the individual level that the frequency of church attendance, the intensity of belief, and the homogeneous religious environment are what matter rather than the denomination as such. Although the research question is slightly different, our analysis ties in with the recent study on the impact of religion by Nelson, Guth, and Highsmith (2011), which suggests that religion is less influential than it was in earlier years and that the importance of religion depends on regional differences, religious commitment, and the generation of the responder. It seems that on the level of the EU citizens, Europeanness is not a predominantly Catholic project, although religion as an identity marker is not out of the picture, especially for religiously committed individuals.

While group threat theories and identity theories suggest that salient minorities serve as a background for in-group affiliation, our analysis of attitudes toward immigrants, Muslims and people of other ethnic origin indicates that Europeanness does not necessarily depend on the definition and exclusion of the "others." On the contrary, the data reveal that Europeanness involve a higher level

²⁴ We consider secularization to be a multilevel concept. Here, we understand desecularization as a reentry of religion on the policy level.

of tolerance. To put it differently, religiousness seem to play a role in positively defining Europeaness, while xenophobia, in particular against Muslims, does not lead to a stronger in-group feeling of Europeaness. On the other hand, it seems that if immigrants, Muslims, and people of other ethnic origin are perceived as a threat, the EU does not exactly contribute to the reduction of this perception.

The dual approach of the analysis of documents and the multilevel analysis implies that despite the EC's initiative, the citizens may perceive the EU as "too far away" and too diverse to be unified by a substantially Christian definition of Europeaness. Religion seems to matter in too many different ways to substantiate Europeaness unambiguously. As we argued above, this ambiguity of the roles of religion appears on the level of the debates on the Turkey's EU membership and the Constitutional Treaty, in which one area of contention was whether and how religion should be part of the European identity and whether Europe should be secular or not. The ambiguity also appears on the individual level, where Christian and non-Christian denomination matters far less than intensity of belief and particularly, the homogeneity of the religious environment.

Regarding the theoretical perspective on religion, this means that religion does not have the same meanings and characteristics on different societal levels. It comprises inclusive and exclusive ideological meanings, unifying rituals and practices, organizations and possibilities of dialogue, perceived threats, and inclusively shared belief systems. For the theoretical debate on religion, this raises the question of what may be a common denominator among these different concepts. This is consequential for the secularization debate as well. It implies that secularization must refer to different dynamics and mechanisms if we take different levels into consideration.

There are more issues that are open to question. The results on the individual level do not reveal whether religiousness supports feelings of integration through organizational inclusion or the provision of a cosmology of humanitarian values that support trust in others and in the institutional environment. Although our analysis does not allow for strong statements here, the results suggest that it is no longer the belief system of any particular denomination that supports feelings of Europeaness. Instead, church attendance and the intensity of belief appear to be more important for creating Europeaness. In one way, it looks as though general trust created in smaller groups on the community level is transferred to the larger unit of the EU, as is suggested by research on civil society and social capital (Fukuyama 2001; Jagodzinski 2009; Putnam 2000). This suggests that Durkheim's thesis is still valid: The sharing of rituals, symbols, and emotions seems to instill trust and solidarity that spill over into other spheres of life and affect attitudes in general. Churches and congregations provide opportunity structures and the means for this mechanism to develop. In this regard, the EC has selected the right partner to transmit the integration project to the people. However, it is open

to question—already posed by Durkheim—whether churches and congregations are the only organizations that are able to enforce integration or whether other organizations, such as unions, can become functional equivalents.

The results also suggest that in strong redistributive systems, people fear the loss of advantages through immigration and through EU interventions into the national systems of redistribution. While this is not surprising, we found that a higher amount of redistribution does not moderate the individual-level influence of religiousness and intolerance. Successful national social policies tend to create an environment for euroskepticism that nevertheless is not strong enough to overwrite other factors such as identities, group memberships, or preferred segregation. These observations tie in with research suggesting that culture has become more important in influencing people's attitudes toward the EU since the system transformation in 1992 (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Hobolt et al. 2011; McLaren 2002).

Whether threat theory holds for Europe is still open to question. Our results support research suggesting that threat theory falls short as long as it focuses only on group size. Minorities need to be given particular ascriptions before they turn into threats. However, it is plausible that euroskepticism, going hand in hand with intolerance toward immigrants, Muslims, and people of other ethnic origin, might be generated by the fear of losing status because of a higher degree of competition for resources through a higher degree of labor migration initiated through EU integration policies. These resources need not be economic only. Cultural heterogeneity might bear the risk of devaluation of cultural capital because traditions become questioned by alternative ways of living. It is still an open question what role EU policies can play in reducing such fears indicated by heterogeneity: emphasizing religion seems to be quite an ambivalent means. The result that people in religiously homogeneous national environments with a higher Herfindahl index are far more in favor of the EU indicates that heterogeneity can lead to insecurities, fear, and disaffirmation, a tendency that might even be supported by the EC's policy of making religious differences salient.

All in all, the data revealed a tension between (religious) cohesive and (xenophobic) adhesive forces on the individual level that seems challenging for the European integration process. While individual religiousness in general decreases euroskepticism, it increases euroskepticism if that religiousness goes hand in hand with xenophobic attitudes and the challenges of heterogeneous cultural national environment. Obviously, EU politics cannot reach all groups to resolve this tension. In fact, EU policies of antidiscrimination may add to the fears of people who worry about their own economic and social positions and who are afraid of cultural differences. Inclusive policies based on the salience of cultural and religious similarities mark outsiders—in particular, Muslims—as such and thereby

contribute to the mechanisms of prejudice and exclusion without necessarily leading to a higher in-group affiliation in Europe.

One of the reasons why EU integration policies have not been able to bridge the cohesive and adhesive tendencies among its citizens may lie in the fact that EU policies reach their limits when nation-state sovereignty is affected. EU integration intends to amalgamate not only different groups of people but also different governments, lobbies, and political interests that are not necessarily similar to one another. The different power structures within and between the member states make it even harder to overcome the tensions on the individual level by providing an integrative cultural, social, and political supranational framework. EU policies of antidiscrimination and integration are caught between supranational ideals and the attempt to standardize cultural understandings among the member states on the one hand and the missing legitimacy to do so on the other. The EU policies of integration can be read as a struggle to define nothing less than Europeanness, which obviously is not granted by the public and the citizens of Europe and may even promote the emphasis of the “other” that leads to segregation and exclusion.

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Appendix: Country-Specific Contextual Data**Table A1: Country-Specific Contextual Variables**

Country	GDP in PPS 2007 (Eurostat)¹	Social Spending 2007 (Eurostat)¹	Unemployment Rate 2007 (Eurostat)¹	Share of Immigrants 2009 (U.N. Population Statistics)²
Austria	32,800	27.01	4.4	15.06
Belgium	31,500	25.46	7.5	8.86
Bulgaria	4,000	13.68	6.9	1.38
Cyprus	20,300	17.80	4.0	16.06
Czech Republic	12,300	18.01	5.3	4.4
Denmark	41,700	28.06	3.8	8.4
Estonia	11,800	12.15	4.7	14.16
Finland	34,000	24.60	6.9	3.84
France	29,600	29.00	8.4	10.66
Germany	29,600	26.62	8.7	13.02
Great Britain	33,700	22.32	5.3	10.12
Greece	20,300	23.89	8.3	9.58
Hungary	10,000	21.97	7.4	3.54
Ireland	43,400	17.62	4.6	17.68
Italy	26,000	25.50	6.1	6.52
Latvia	9,300	10.94	6.0	15.64
Lithuania	8,500	14.08	4.3	4.32
Luxembourg	78,100	18.96	4.2	35.2
Malta	13,400	17.78	6.4	3.44
Netherlands	34,900	26.69	3.6	10.54
Poland	8,200	17.79	9.6	2.2
Portugal	16,000	22.65	8.1	8.04
Romania	5,800	13.19	6.4	0.6
Slovakia	10,200	15.41	11.1	2.38
Slovenia	17,100	20.76	4.9	8.22
Spain	23,500	20.49	8.3	12.74
Sweden	36,900	28.48	6.1	13.38

¹ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.² <http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=2>.

Table A2: Country-Specific Means for Individual-Level Religious Characteristics

Country		Non- religious (%)	Roman Catholic (%)	Protestant (%)	Orthodox (%)	Degree of Religious Homogeneity (%)
Austria	1510	16.99	72.66	5.64	1.19	72.60
Belgium	1509	43.30	50.46	1.26	0.46	50.46
Bulgaria	1500	25.44	0.20	0.20	60.54	60.10
Cyprus	1000	0.40	1.50	0.10	96.80	96.80
Czech Republic	1821	69.40	26.02	1.98	0.28	70.30
Denmark	1507	12.03	0.53	85.91	0.00	85.91
Estonia	1518	66.07	1.33	12.79	17.63	17.63
Finland	1134	23.58	0.09	73.67	1.16	73.67
France	1501	48.80	44.72	1.27	0.33	44.72
Germany	2075	46.08	22.80	28.61	0.53	28.61
Great Britain	1561	41.88	10.82	38.92	0.00	38.92
Greece	1500	3.13	0.67	0.00	94.13	94.13
Hungary	1513	46.52	39.83	12.39	0.07	53.30
Ireland	1013	11.36	83.12	3.62	0.20	83.12
Italy	1519	19.37	79.56	0.07	0.13	79.56
Latvia	1506	33.69	19.88	21.95	23.28	23.28
Lithuania	1500	13.88	80.48	0.48	4.29	80.48
Luxembourg	1610	29.63	62.06	3.19	0.69	17.55
Malta	1500	2.13	96.13	1.20	0.07	96.13
Netherlands	1554	47.36	26.55	22.04	0.00	26.55
Poland	1510	4.50	92.75	0.34	0.67	92.75
Portugal	1553	12.96	82.79	1.35	0.00	82.79
Romania	1489	2.02	5.06	2.43	86.37	86.00
Slovakia	1509	19.73	70.60	8.33	0.53	70.60
Slovenia	1366	28.47	66.45	0.44	1.84	66.45
Spain	1500	24.15	57.39	0.27	1.27	57.39
Sweden	1187	31.97	1.74	62.20	1.05	62.20

Source: European Values Study (2008).

Table A3: Country-Specific Means for Individual-Level Attitudes Toward Minority Groups and Religious Practices

Country	Negative Attitudes Toward			Prayer Outside Service 0–4	Believing 0–1	Church Attendance 1–7
	People of Different Race	Muslims	Immigrants			
Austria	0.176	0.310	0.232	1.738	0.434	2.709
Belgium	0.054	0.145	0.062	1.249	0.349	2.166
Bulgaria	0.212	0.195	0.181	1.502	0.358	2.660
Cyprus	0.168	0.360	0.244	2.877	0.575	3.811
Czech Republic	0.224	0.307	0.302	0.900	0.240	1.975
Denmark	0.047	0.131	0.068	1.011	0.259	2.369
Estonia	0.246	0.339	0.322	1.131	0.305	2.187
Finland	0.091	0.234	0.160	1.560	0.341	2.209
France	0.091	0.234	0.160	0.991	0.334	1.962
Germany	0.046	0.262	0.116	1.059	0.256	2.149
Great Britain	0.058	0.129	0.149	1.332	0.445	2.198
Greece	0.101	0.169	0.154	2.700	0.555	3.520
Hungary	0.090	0.110	0.152	1.501	0.380	2.208
Ireland	0.109	0.227	0.141	2.754	0.597	3.730
Italy	0.156	0.227	0.161	2.449	0.486	3.529
Latvia	0.140	0.286	0.209	1.724	0.448	2.531
Lithuania	0.146	0.470	0.256	1.599	0.462	3.020
Luxembourg	0.123	0.168	0.133	1.288	0.340	2.411
Malta	0.256	0.316	0.341	3.412	0.765	4.792
Netherlands	0.111	0.189	0.154	1.606	0.353	2.512
Poland	0.122	0.251	0.175	2.837	0.648	4.167
Portugal	0.123	0.148	0.079	2.456	0.505	3.339
Romania	0.208	0.229	0.208	3.176	0.660	3.746
Slovakia	0.154	0.231	0.166	2.475	0.498	3.449
Slovenia	0.289	0.293	0.285	1.265	0.334	2.685
Spain	0.040	0.129	0.042	1.834	0.421	2.421
Sweden	0.056	0.158	0.064	0.9492	0.2091	1.9350

Source: European Values Study (2008).