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Events and Value Change:
The Impact of September 11, 2001, on the
Worldviews of Egyptians and Moroccans

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Abstract

The significance of a historical event depends largely on the meaning it carries for the social actors it has the potential to affect. That meaning is not haphazardly produced but rather is structured by the nature of the political and cultural context in which the social actors are embedded. That meaning determines whether and how individuals and entire societies reexamine their attitudes toward and beliefs about historically significant issues. We tested this proposition by examining how the attitudes of Egyptians and Moroccans were affected by the terrorist act perpetrated by al-Qa'ida on September 11, 2001, which was ostensibly carried out not only to avenge the presumed trauma Muslim nations have suffered because of the American-led "Jewish-Crusade alliance," but also to rally the Islamic publics behind al-Qa'ida's banner for the construction of an Islamic state. Based on survey data, our findings indicate that these publics displayed more favorable attitudes toward democracy, gender equality, and secularism after 9/11 than they did before. Accordingly, the event influenced the attitudes of the Egyptian and Moroccan publics in ways contrary to those intended by the radical Islamists. Some effects were also moderated by the respondents' age, education, and gender. We discuss how these results contribute to the growing body of literature on the role of events in historical and social processes.

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The nineteen al-Qa'ida terrorists who were responsible for the horrific violence of September 11, 2001 on U.S. soil were all from Arab countries. Fifteen hijackers were Saudis, and the remaining four were from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon. In attacking the "far enemy," these Muslim terrorists were convinced that they would be handsomely rewarded in paradise (Schwartz 2002: 171). Their act was also a part of a larger worldly project to establish an Islamic order. Speaking with the authority of an Islamic theologian, as a revolutionary strategist, and as a calculating propagandist, the leadership of al-Qa'ida warned and proclaimed that jihad was the only solution to the problem of Muslim decline, that "all other methods that tried to evade assuming the burdens of jihad" were futile as shown by the betrayal of the peaceful Algerian Islamic movement, and that "the Jewish-Crusade alliance, led by the United States, will not allow any Muslim force to reach power in any of the Islamic countries" (cited in Sageman 2004: 20, 23). Furthermore, its literature asserted that the violence carried out by a small, dedicated vanguard of Islamic *mujahedin* would receive the grateful acclamation of the Muslim nations, create a reserve of fighters, show the weakness of the enemy, publicize the issues, reject compliance and submission to decadent regimes, provide legitimacy to Muslim fighters, spread fear and terror within the ranks of local agents of the United States, and expose the "ugly" face of Americans as the U.S. forces retaliate against the perpetrators—all effects that, it was presumed, would win over the Muslim publics (Gunaratna 2002: 75; Sageman 2004: 22).

Less than a month after 9/11, al-Qa'ida leader Osama bin Laden issued a statement that praised the violence against the United States. In doing so, he broadcast his view of the trauma Muslims have endured in recent history and eulogized the terrorists as "vanguards of Islam," apparently expecting other Muslims to follow suit:

There is America, hit by God in one of its softest spots. Its greatest buildings were destroyed, thank God for that. There is America, full of fear from its north to its south, from its west to its east. Thank God for that.

What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation (the Islamic world) has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80 years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked, and no one hears and no one heeds.

When God blessed one of the groups of Islam, vanguards of Islam, they destroyed America. I pray to God to elevate their status and bless them.¹

¹ These remarks aired on Qatar's Al-Jazeera television station and were translated from Arabic. This text was reported by *USA Today* on Sunday, October 7, 2001.

That 9/11 had a dramatic impact on both U.S. foreign policy and the American public at large is hardly debatable, although only the future will show the full nature and extent of this impact. This event also received enormous publicity globally, and the terrorists were universally condemned for their mass destruction of human lives and property. However, it is not clear how much 9/11 and al-Qa'ida's representation of Muslim trauma affected the attitudes of the Islamic publics. In what way did the event of 9/11 attain meaningfulness for these publics? To what extent did the terrorists have "illocutionary success," to use Alexander's (2004: 12) phrase, in shaping the mass public opinion in Islamic countries? Were the terrorists able to win Muslims over to their worldviews on gender, religion, and politics? Did the Islamic publics become more supportive of the Shari'a? Is such gruesome violence as was committed on 9/11 an effective means of changing attitudes in the direction expected by the perpetrators? We attempt to answer these questions for two Muslim Arab countries—Egypt and Morocco—for which survey data are available from before 9/11 and after 9/11.

By gaining insight into the dynamic of change in public opinion in these two countries from before 9/11 to after 9/11, we also attempt to contribute to sociological knowledge about the relationship between events and attitude change. We draw from two diverse traditions of comparative historical sociology and public opinion research to theorize more clearly about events and their effects on social processes. We propose that incidents might not have automatic societal consequences. Rather, they become eventful when and if they are inserted into the existing process of cultural debates, framing contest, and political conflict.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT: EVENTS AND CHANGE

Historical sociologists who expressed misgivings about the unilinear evolutionary image of change projected by the universal history paradigm did so by pointing, among other things, to the outbreak of an event not only as a historical marker that separates one era from another, but also as a key explanatory variable that contributes to rapid changes in social relations, bringing into relief a new cultural pattern. Featured prominently in their works were such notions as the revolutionary break with the past as a precondition for the emergence of different forms of modern social organization (Moore 1964), the presence of historical conjuncture that makes the articulation of ideology and social structure possible (Wuthnow 1989), and the disruptive influence of changes in external conditions on the intellectual network that unleashes creativity (Collins 1998).

A 1996 essay by William Sewell, however, is among the first to theorize about events, arguing that significant changes in social life are rarely continuous, incremental, or smooth in character. Rather, they come "clustered into relatively intense bursts." Even when incremental changes are accumulated, they often

result “in a building up of pressures and a dramatic crisis of existing practices rather than a gradual transition from one state of affairs to another.” For Sewell, the moments of accelerated changes “are initiated and carried forward by historical events.” Historical events are therefore important to theorize about because “they reshape history, imparting an unforeseen direction to social development and altering the nature of the causal nexus in which social interactions take place” (1996: 843).

Sewell’s analysis of the French Revolution has focused on the historical processes that were punctuated and thrust forward by unfolding occurrences in the short period preceding the revolution. These involved simultaneously the actions (e.g., taking the Bastille), interpretations (e.g., popular violence as a legitimate popular revolution), signification (new meanings given to such terms as *revolution*, *people*, *liberty*, and *despotism*), and articulation of action to conception of French men and women that in one week (July 12–17, 1789) produced and signified “the taking of the Bastille” (Sewell 1996: 851), a historical event that became synonymous with the French Revolution. Although Sewell cannot know how the French public thought about and perceived the unfolding events, his description makes a convincing case for the relationship between events and the process of change in people’s perceptions and values.

Events also form a key element in Moaddel’s (2001, 2005) episodic-discourse model of ideological production. By partitioning history into distinct episodes, he argues, events introduce discontinuities into the process of cultural change. An episode is a bounded historical process that has a beginning and an end, displaying certain distinctiveness by virtue of its discontinuity from the preceding and following episodes. By causing ruptures in social structure, which change the balance of social forces or dramatically affect human emotion, events may bring a new regime of signification to prominence. This regime then forms the ideological target in opposition to which new discourses are produced and disseminated in the social environment. Since *target* is the key factor in this model, an event is crucial in affecting the process of ideological production insofar as it generates new targets and/or causes a shift in the position of culture producers in the sociopolitical space, opening up a new angle from which the target is viewed, interpreted, and criticized and leading to new ideological resolutions.

Islamic modernism in India was thus produced within the pluralistic discursive context that was shaped by the reorganization of social forces following the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857–1859.² Similarly, modern cultural change in Egypt began after the brief interlude of the French occupation of the country (1798–1801), which weakened the Mamluk, exposed Egyptians to a new superior

² For the impact of the Mutiny in contributing to the rise of Islamic modernism, see Hali (1979 [1901]), Malik (1980), Richter (1908), Russell (1957 [1860]), and Troll (1978).

Western power, and proved consequential for the transformation of Egypt in the subsequent decades. Contributing to the emergence of other cultural movements in Egypt were such events as the defeat of the Urabi rebellion (1879–1882) and the British occupation of the country, which set the stage for the development of territorial nationalism around the turn of the twentieth century, and the economic crisis of the early 1930s, which contributed to the cultural shift away from liberal nationalism and toward supraterritorial ideologies from the mid-1930s on (Gershoni and Jankowski 1995; Safran 1961; Smith 1973). The military coup in 1952 opened the way for the rise of religious extremism in the country.³

Similarly, in Iran, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 gave impetus to Shi'i political modernism, anticlerical secularism, and modern nationalism, which remained the dominant discourse until the U.S.- and British-engineered coup in 1953. The breakdown of Reza Shah's authoritarian rule in 1941 as a result of the Allied invasion of the country created a political space that was favorable for the emergence of liberal nationalism, but the coup of 1953 was another significant event that marked a new episode in the country's contemporary history in which the newly empowered Shah undermined the organization of secular oppositional movements, channeling oppositional politics into the religious medium—hence the rise of radical Islamism. Finally, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the imposition of a monolithic religious discourse from above by the ruling clerics opened the way for the decline of religious fundamentalism and the rise of Islamic reformism.⁴

Other Islamic countries also experienced cultural change following a major event. Syria's crisis of 1860, during which scores of Christians and Jews were massacred by Muslim mobs; Abdülhamid pan Islamic despotism; and the Turkish revolution of 1908 contributed to the rise of liberal Arabism among Syrian intellectuals. The Baathist 1963 coup in Syria, which led to the formation of an intrusive secular Arab socialist regime, resulted in the decline of secular ideologies and the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism.⁵ Finally, the 1962 Algerian independence was a historic event marking the breakdown of the

³ For information about events and cultural change in different periods in 19th and 20th century Egypt, see Ahmed (1960), Baer (1962), Gershoni and Jankowski (1995), Heyworth-Dunne (1968), Hourani (1983, 1991), Hunter (1984), Issawi (1954), Kepel (1985), Lia (1998), Marsot (1968a, 1968b, 1984), Mitchell (1969), Moaddel (2002), Vatikiotis (1980), and Wendell (1972).

⁴ For analyses of sociocultural and political changes in Iran in the 19th and 20th centuries, see Abrahamian (1982), Afary (1996), Akhavi (1980), Arjomand (1984), Dabashi (1993), Kashani-Sabet (1999), and Moaddel (1993, 2002).

⁵ For the rise of Arabism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism in Syria, see Antonius (1938), Batatu (1982), Cleveland (1971), Dawisha (2003), Dawn (1973), Haim (1962), Hinnebusch (1982, 1990), Hourani (1983), Keilany (1973), Khalidi and colleagues (1991), Khoury (1983, 1987), Moaddel (1996), Olson (1982), Rabinovich (1972), Salibi (1968), Seale (1965), Torrey (1964), and Zeine (1973).

religion-secular alliance between the ulama (Muslim theologians) and the Western-educated elite, which led the liberation movement against the French. The Islamic movement then developed into a strong protest in 1964 against the socialism of Ben Bella's regime. It was further radicalized in reaction to the leftward shift in the policies of Boumedienne's regime in the early 1970s.⁶

Table 1 presents a summary list of these events and the subsequent cultural outcomes.

Table 1: Significant Events and Cultural Change in the Islamic World

Episode	Discourse
Sepoy Mutiny in India (1857–1859)	Islamic modernism
Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798–1801)	The rise of liberal age
Assembly of delegates (1866), economic crisis, Urabi rebellion (1879–1882), British occupation of Egypt	Development of liberal nationalist thought
The crisis of 1860 in Syria, Abdülhamid despotism (1876–1908)	Development of liberal Arab nationalism
Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911)	Anticlerical secularism, modern nationalism
Economic crisis of the 1930s, following the economic boom of 1920s	The crisis of orientation (mid-1930s): the decline of liberal nationalism, the rise of Arab nationalism and the Muslim Brothers
Military coups in Egypt (1952), Iran (1953), and Syria (1963) and shift in the state's policies in Algeria in 1970.	Decline of secular ideologies and the rise of religious extremism, Islamic fundamentalism
Iranian Revolution (1977–1979)	Decline of Islamic fundamentalism and the rise of reformism

In these cases, an event is a causal factor in historical change, and the change itself is measured, according to Moaddel (2005), in terms of differences in the dominant cultural trends in society between the period before and the period after the event, using the discourses of intellectual leaders as indicators of these trends. However, the attribution of causality to an event is much more complicated than it first appears. Not all occurrences are eventful, not every event marks a new cultural episode, and not every rupture in a local structure tears social bonds in the structure of the larger society. A fight in a local bar, as Sewell explains, while breaking the usual routine of sociability, might have no serious consequences. "But if, say, one of the combatants is white and the other black, the initial rupture

⁶ For analyses of social change in Algeria, see Burgat and Dowell (1997), Christelow (1991), Ottaway and Ottaway (1970), Roberts (1988), Ruedy (1990), and Vallin (1973).

could be amplified by a rupture in the system of race relations that also structures interactions in the bar, and this could lead to a generalized racial brawl, which could touch off a citywide riot, which in turn could permanently embitter race relations, discredit the mayor and police chief, and scare off private investments—and, of course, alter the mode of sociability in bars” (1996: 44).

To stress further the signification process involved in transforming a local occurrence into a major national event, we may cite the British infliction of a swift and severe punishment on a group of villagers for killing one of their officers in Dinshawai, Egypt, in June 1906. The cruelty of the sentence—the condemned men were flogged and hanged in their own village while their families looked on—caused indignation among Egyptians. Ali Yusuf wrote twenty-three articles in *al-Muayyad*, Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kamil used the incident fully in Paris, and hardly a poet kept silent. Qasim Amin recorded that “every one I met had a broken heart and a lump in his throat. There was nervousness in every gesture—in their hands and their voices. Sadness was on every face, but it was a peculiar sort of sadness. It was confused, distracted and visibly subdued by superior force. . . . The spirits of the hanged men seemed to hover over every place in the city” (Ahmed 1960: 63). The intense emotions that the incident aroused and the unity of identity between the villagers who experienced the trauma and the wider Egyptian public, however, signified that something broader was happening in the country’s political landscape: the rise of a generalized nationalist consciousness that enabled educated Egyptians to join in common cause with the peasants against the British (Berque 1972: 237–238). The British had been attacked in Egypt before the Dinshawai incident, and they had displayed their unshaken resolve by punishing the perpetrators swiftly. In this case, however, the suffering of the villagers was elevated to a national trauma, personifying the ongoing struggle of Egyptians against the British for national liberation (Moaddel 2005).

Thus, events might or might not attain signification attributes, and this apparent indeterminacy has led Sewell (1996: 844) to admit that “the conception of historical events retains significant theoretical and methodological ambiguities.” Furthermore, since cultural change is the result of human action and humans begin to act when events shape their attitudes and emotions, historical materials such as books, polemics, documents, and other traces of human actions are hardly adequate for a systematic assessment of event-induced attitudinal and value changes. Researchers in the field of public opinion, on the other hand, have made considerable advances in understanding the influence of events in shaping mass-level belief systems and attitudes, using a more sophisticated survey research methodology. They nonetheless share Sewell’s concern.

These researchers have also offered considerable empirical evidence to connect events to attitudinal change, collective memory, and emotion. For

example, they have shown that a sudden political crisis abroad can increase Americans' support for the president through what is known as the rally-around-the-flag effect (Mueller 1973) and that abrupt changes in foreign-policy opinions among Americans are connected to specific events, particularly war or political conflict (Page and Shapiro 1992: 332–334). While some events have historical effects (Converse 1987: 69), the influence of other events is cohort-dependent (Jennings 1987: 77); that is, “the crucial carriers of collective memories of an event are not all who were alive when the event occurred, but mainly those individuals who experienced the event during their critical ages of adolescence and early adulthood” (Schuman and Rodgers 2004: 250). Furthermore, different generational experiences may prompt individuals to accept varying politically significant historical analogies—for example, whether an individual saw the Persian Gulf war as analogous to World War II or to the Vietnam war depended on whether his or her impressionable years coincided with WWII or the Vietnam war (Schuman and Reiger 1992: 315–317). According to Pennebaker, Paez, and Rimé (1997: viii), “broad-based collective events derive much of their potential power by inciting strong emotional feelings and provoking active discussion.” Public opinion researchers have used such terms as *event-graded* (Featherman and Lerner 1985) and *episodic* (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991: 17) to capture the magnitude of event-induced changes in individual attitudes.

Yet, as is the case in historical sociology, the problem of the attribution of causality to events is not fully resolved in the public opinion literature, and the reasoning behind this problem is not too different from Sewell's. As Page and Shapiro (1992: 335–336) note, there are ambiguities in connecting events to opinion changes; whereas events have some unmediated impact, their influences often work through the interpretive and manipulative processes that are unleashed by politically powerful individuals and through the control mechanisms these individuals exert. These “mediators in turn, may be influenced by various actors in society, including organized interests, corporations, and mass movements” (Page and Shapiro 1992: 353). Ambiguities, for these authors, arise because of the difficulties in dissecting the direct impact of the occurrences from the influence of spin doctors—the interpretations of the occurrences by politically weighty individuals and groups.

Nonetheless, the problem of causality might be due not to the ambiguities of events. It may instead be related to the way in which events are conceptualized. The primary question is not whether events cause a change in people's perceptions and attitudes, but rather under what conditions events cause this change. Certain occurrences have no notable political or social consequences, despite their magnitude in affecting human conditions, whereas others become eventful, having significant effects on social relationships, attitudes, and emotion. Horrendous “events,” says Alexander (2004: 8), “do not, in and of themselves,

create collective trauma. [They] ... are not inherently traumatic. Trauma is a socially mediated attribution.” We therefore argue that the significance of an occurrence may be derived not from the thing that happened, but from the kind of meaning the event carries for social actors. The meaning itself is not haphazardly produced; it is structured by the nature of the political and cultural context in which social actors are embedded as well as by the type of occurrences. The key issue, however, is to specify the mechanism through which event may affect attitudes.

Given that the dynamics of public opinion are tied to the dynamics of politics (Sniderman 1993: 220), an event may affect public opinion when it shapes—solidifies, modifies, or radically alters—the existing arrangement of legitimate political discourses that are adhered to by various political groups or changes the perceptions of the targets in opposition to such discourses are produced. As a result of insertion into the political process, an event is thus constituted by and through the social process of representation, which signifies, for example, a terrorist act as a legitimate resistance against the (perceived) domineering power or as an inhumane act of defiance. An occurrence becomes eventful when it gains socially constituted attributes that convey meanings for individuals. These attributes give the event a distinctive identity. In fact, the symbolic significance of an occurrence and the kind of interpretation that is attached to it by various groups and influential individuals, while being contested and revised in different historical episodes, form the key elements from which an event is constructed. We therefore contend that events are consequential in bringing about outcomes—in this case, attitude change—when they are incorporated into the ongoing cultural debate and political conflict.⁷

To understand how events contribute to attitudinal changes, therefore, it is necessary to adequately comprehend the nature of the historically significant issues being debated in society, the competing ways of framing the event, and the individuals and groups that are involved in this competition. Issues are points of

⁷ Our contention is borne out by the findings of the extant research on the role of political events in shaping collective memory and emotions. That is, the emotional impact of an event depends not simply on the event itself, but also on such other factors as the emotional nature of the narration of the event (e.g., the kidnapped former Belgian prime minister telling his audience about his ordeal in captivity), feeding collective memory (Rimé and Christophe 1997); the nature of the political environment—whether open discussions of past unfavorable political events are encouraged or repressed—which creates a positive or negative emotional climate (Paez, Basabe, and Gonzales 1997: 147); and people’s group belonging and social identity, which decide the degree to which “emotional experiences tied to specific political events can result in vivid flashbulb memories”—for example, members of the British upper class have more emotional experiences and flashbulb memories of the fall of Thatcherism than do others (Gaskell and Wright 1997: 187). Events themselves do not produce flashbulb memories; rather, the creation of such memories depends on the emotionality with which people react to the announcement of an unexpected political event (Finkenauer, Gisle, and Luminet 1997: 206).

conflict among different political and cultural contenders. Events provide the sense experience or information for different sides of the conflict to articulate their positions on these issues, to promote their resolutions of the issues, and to change the balance of forces in their favor to win public attitudes to their side. If historical events initiate and push forward moments of change, historical issues are the pivots around which such changes revolve. Changes in people's attitudes toward issues after an event are indicative of the manner in which people have interpreted the event.

LINKING THEORY AND DATA

The event of 9/11 is distinctive not just in terms of the method the terrorists used and the extent of devastation they caused. It is also unique because the terrorists, proclaiming themselves representative agents of the Islamic world, launched their violent attack on Americans with the intention of affecting the attitudes of the publics in Islamic countries. They justified their terrorism on the basis of an image, which they themselves created, of Muslim nations tormented and traumatized by the American-led "Jewish-Crusade alliance" (Sageman 2004: 20). They expected the Islamic publics to perceive the image as true and the act as justified and therefore to rally to the terrorists' side. In other words, as the terrorists were aiming to destroy America's symbols of success and greatness, they were also aiming to destroy, metaphorically, the edifice of the secular discourse around which cultural warfare has been intensely waged in Islamic countries, including Egypt and Morocco. Given that the terrorists' agenda was based on the rejection of Western values on such principles of social organization as religion, gender, and politics, a favorable societal impact of the terrorists' action would have been a shift in the public opinion away from the Western values.

To be sure, the influence of events is spatialized; *where* events happen is important in influencing collective memory (Griffin 2004; Scott and Zac 1993). It is reasonable to expect that 9/11 would have a much more dramatic effect on people living near ground zero than on those who were farther away. Moreover, for the publics of Middle Eastern countries, the event of 9/11 is certainly different from such events as, for example, the military coup of 1952 in Egypt, Algerian independence of 1962, or the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which deeply affected not only people's emotions and values, but also the structure and rules of social organizations. What is more, considering anecdotal evidence, newspaper reports, and commentaries by public officials and opinion leaders in Arab countries, many people in the Islamic publics have held the view that 9/11 had nothing to do with Muslims or Islam, even questioning whether a group of terrorists was capable of

successfully launching the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.⁸ How can one connect 9/11 to changes in people's attitudes in Arab countries?

The increasing interconnectedness of different parts of the world through systems of mass communication and transportation as a result of globalization may to some degree overcome the problem of distance as news about events is broadcast globally and instantaneously. Furthermore, Muslims' separation of the terrorists act from their religion or even denial of the possibility that a small group could carry out such a vicious attack might indicate that Muslims could not remain indifferent to what transpired on that day. Remoteness and denial notwithstanding, the Middle Eastern publics have also had close encounters and experiences with the political violence perpetrated by radical Islamic groups in their own societies. Within the context of these encounters and experiences, 9/11 may thus gain meanings and become eventful. We argue that the nature and extent of the impact of 9/11 on public attitudes depend on the degree to which the event has relevance for the ongoing conflict between radical Islamism and the secular government and groups in these countries. In the following narrative, we therefore first present the state of cultural and political conflict between the followers of radical Islamism and the secular governments in Egypt and Morocco in the decades preceding 9/11. We also discuss the issues being contested. We then develop hypotheses about the effects of 9/11 on people's attitudes toward these issues. Next, we use the values survey data collected before and after 9/11 to assess the impact of this event on the value orientations of the publics toward these issues in the two Islamic countries.

Contests for the Intellectual Control of Society: Egypt and Morocco

In the modern period, Middle Eastern countries have experienced such diverse cultural movements as Islamic modernism, liberal nationalism, Arabism and Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and monarchy-centered nationalism. Despite this diversity, the issues in relation to which the intellectual leaders of these movements formulated their discourses have remained remarkably invariant. These issues are related to Western culture, national identity, form of government, the role of religion in politics, and the status of women. These cultural movements represent different resolutions of these issues. In Islamic modernism, for example, Western culture is acknowledged favorably, Islamic political theory and the idea of constitutionalism are reconciled, the construction of the modern state is endorsed, and a feminist exegesis of the Quran is advanced in order to defend women's rights. In Islamic fundamentalism, by contrast, Western culture is

⁸ For example, the Saudi interior minister, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al Siyasa* on November 29, 2003, blamed the "Zionists" for the attacks. See International Crisis Group (2004: 8).

portrayed as decadent, constitutionalism is abandoned in favor of the unity of religion and politics in an Islamic government, and the institutions of male domination and gender segregation are prescribed and rigorously defended (Moaddel 2005).

The degree to which the attitudes of the Islamic publics converge with the fundamentalist positions on these issues may be an indication of the level of support for radical Islamism in Middle Eastern society.

Religion and Politics in Egypt

The liberal age in Egypt declined in the mid-1930s before the onslaught of two movements that were united by their common hostility toward liberal nationalism and parliamentary politics. One was Arab nationalism, which was used by the “free officers” of the Egyptian army to stage the 1952 coup; the other was the fundamentalism of the Muslim Brothers (Gershoni and Jankowski 1995). Although the Brothers were not an extremist group and in the 1940s opted to participate in parliamentary politics, an extremist trend prevailed in their midst as pluralism declined and their participation in electoral contests was blocked. This process was reinforced after the coup, when the Arab nationalist leaders imposed a monolithic regime of signification on Egyptian society. One of the spokespeople for the growing religious extremism was Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), who rejected the Islamicity of the existing order and depicted Egypt as a throwback to the state of the ignorance (*jahiliyya*) that, in the Muslim view, had characterized the conditions of pre-Islamic Arabia (Kepel 1985; Mitchell 1969). His disciple, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–1982), further claimed that the current rulers of Islamic countries were all apostates and should be overthrown in order to establish a truly Islamic state (Akhavi 1992: 94–95).

Several factors are believed to have strengthened radical Islamism in the 1970s through the 1980s: (1) the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, which eroded the legitimacy of Arab nationalism; (2) President Sadat’s courting of the Islamic groups in order to weaken the leftist legacy of his predecessor Nasser; (3) the Iranian revolution, which provided an example of a successful Islamic revolution; and (4) reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which mobilized Muslim activists from all over the Islamic world and brought them together in one place to interact, share ideas, and gain considerable military training. However, in their plans to change society according to their view of a proper Islamic order, a significant portion of Muslim activists failed to utilize the favorable cultural environment in a peaceful and moderate manner. They preferred to use force and violence to effect change.

The major incidents perpetrated by the adherents of extremism include a failed plot by an Islamic liberation organization to launch a coup by first killing

President Sadat and his top officials in 1974; the formation of a puritan group that ran afoul of the law in 1976 and the kidnapping and killing of a former minister in 1977 by this group; the assassination of President Sadat in 1981; the launching of a campaign of terror against Egyptian officials, secular writers, and the Copts in the 1980s; an attempt on President Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in 1995; and the killing of more than sixty tourists in Luxor in 1997. These campaigns of terror not only failed to produce an Islamic state, but also resulted in heavy losses among the perpetrators. Nearly all the leaders of the radical Islamic groups were either killed or captured by security forces. The leaders of Islamic Jihad, one of the two major terrorist groups, fled Egypt to escape persecution and joined forces with Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida. The leaders of the other group, Jama'a Islamiyya, and a large number of its followers were captured and imprisoned (Sageman 2004: 25–51). If these groups had any success, it was to force the government to take an Islamic posture on the public stage, secularist writers to engage in self-censorship to avoid becoming the target of attack by the extremists, and women to wear headscarves to prevent harassment by Muslim activists.

Heavy losses and the general failure of their attempts to Islamize society naturally forced the imprisoned leaders of the Islamic group to reflect on the correctness and effectiveness of their tactics. As early as July 1997, the leaders of Jama'a Islamiyya announced from prison a unilateral cease-fire, reasoning that the terrorist campaign in Egypt had been a failure and the strategy of mobilizing the public to overthrow the government had backfired, turning Egyptians against them. Instead, they stressed using peaceful means in the pursuit of their religious objectives. They also condemned the Luxor massacre (Sageman 2004: 47). After 9/11, they even criticized Osama bin Laden for his obsession with jihad, the destruction of the World Trade Center, and the killing of innocent people, a terrorist act that did not serve Muslims (Ahmed 2002).

Religion and Politics in Morocco

Unlike Egypt, which has been dominated by secular politics since the time of Muhammad Ali in the early 19th century, the Moroccan regime is based on the Islamic identity of the monarch. The king is portrayed as a defender of Islam, a descendant of the Prophet, a bearer of the Sufi virtues, a holy man, and a dispenser of God's blessing in the world (Lapidus 1992: 19). Nevertheless, under King Hassan II (r. 1961–1999) Morocco experienced considerable transformation (Sabagh 1993). The king modified religious tradition and promoted a liberal economy and multiparty politics. He described this political strategy as “homeopathic democracy,” a process of controlled and well-managed change that was intended to maintain social peace while promoting economic development

and improved general welfare (Combs-Schilling 1989; Maddy-Weitzman 1997; Zartman 1987).

The first major threat to the kingdom since independence from France in 1956 came from the socialist and leftist forces in the 1960s. In addition to using force and propaganda (Munson 1993: 149), the king courted Islamic groups to curb the influence of the left. This policy was similar to that of Egyptian President Sadat, and it contributed to a similar outcome: the rise of Islamic extremism in the 1970s. Represented by a Muslim Youth Association (formed in 1969 and legally accredited in 1972), the extremist trend in Morocco considered itself the vanguard of an authentic Islamic revolution and launched a violent campaign against secular groups by assassinating a left-wing leader and two of his supporters. Other major Islamic trends, predominantly nonviolent, were nonetheless socially aggressive in promoting what they considered the moral standards of a virtuous society. Led by a mosque preacher in Tangier, Fqih al-Zamzami, this movement focused on matters of individual piety and righteousness, criticizing corruption and the concentration of wealth. Another and more radical trend was that of Abdl al-Salam Yasin, a former Education Ministry school inspector, who organized the outlawed al-Adl wal-Ihsan (“Justice and Charity”) movement (Munson 1993:153–158, 162–173).

With the upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism (Barber 1994; *The Economist* 1995: 44), Moroccan university campuses became the scene of conflict between Islamic and leftist groups. In 1994, violent confrontations between these groups left seven people dead (Kokan 1994: 11). In 1997, the security forces put down strikes by students at the University of Casablanca and the University of Marrakech to curb the rising tide of the radical Islamization of the students (*The Economist* 1997: 45). Even when King Hassan embarked on a policy of change and reform, the chief beneficiaries were such fundamentalist politicians as Abdelilah Ben Kirane, a member of Morocco’s Islamic youth movement who in the 1970s was elected to parliament and promised that Morocco would apply its constitution as a true Islamist state (*The Economist* 1999: 46). Emboldened Islamic activists forced the king to shelve the pro-women reform program even though, in 1994, women’s groups collected one million signatures petitioning for revision of the personal status law (Fernea 2000; Maddy-Weitzman 1997). The new king, Mohammed VI, was more committed to reform, but when he launched a national action plan to give more rights to women, the Islamic groups mobilized their supporters in opposition. In 2000, the Moroccan government and the Islamic groups staged rival rallies for and against the plan, respectively. At these rallies, the fundamentalists outnumbered the government’s supporters by ten to one (*The Economist* 2000: 44, 46). Pressure from the fundamentalists and some of the ulama forced the government to turn the proposals over to a committee for revision.

In addition, Islamic activists began a vociferous campaign to express discontent with what they considered “the prevalence of nudity and semi-nudity on the country’s beaches. ... They claimed that hundreds of [their] ... members, both men and women, flocked to the country’s beaches, holding congregational prayers, rebuking and enjoining less modest Moroccans to do good and forsake evil deeds, and jumping into the water fully clothed” (Crescent International 2001). Some extremists went as far as kidnapping and killing individuals who allegedly engaged in drinking alcohol, going to bars, or dancing (Irvine 2002).

September 11 and Changes in the Balances of Cultural Forces in Egypt and Morocco

While al-Qa’ida presented itself as the vanguard of the Islamic movement to free Muslim nations allegedly subjugated by the agents of the far enemy, the legacy of radical Islamism in Egypt and Morocco paints a different picture. For well over two decades before 9/11, Islamic extremists were involved in extensive acts of violence, assassinations and kidnappings, and harassments of religious minorities, of secular intellectuals, and of people whose lifestyle was, in their view, un-Islamic. However, decades of radical Islamism not only failed to produce a successful Islamic revolution, but also contributed to public indignation against the religious extremists.⁹ We therefore propose that when the news of 9/11 reached Egyptians and Moroccans, in all likelihood this background played a key role in their assessments of the event and its meanings. For them, the horrific violence on U.S. soil represented another instance of the violent activities committed by the religious extremists. Consequently, it changed the balance of cultural forces in the two countries in favor of the proponents of modern values: democracy, gender equality, and secularism.

We propose that, far from winning them over, the terrorism of 9/11 further alienated the Islamic publics, contributing to changes in their attitudes in a direction away from the ideology of Islamic extremism.

SURVEYS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 IN EGYPT AND MOROCCO

The pre-9/11 survey in Egypt was carried out in August–September 2001; the post-9/11 survey was carried out about six months later, in January–February

⁹ According to BBC correspondent Stephanie Irvine (2002: 1), “the trial in Morocco of three Saudis and seven Moroccans accused of being part of an al-Qaeda plot has shaken the image many Moroccans hold of their country as a peaceful, tolerant Muslim state. Many here now fear their country is under threat from the import of radical, fundamentalist ideas from abroad.”

2002.¹⁰ Of the national representative sample of 3,000 Egyptians 16 or older who were randomly selected to be interviewed, 2,230 completed the surveys just before 9/11. These cases covered the governorates of Cairo, Alex, Menofia, Bani Suef, Sohaq, and Aswan. The other 770 cases covering the governorates of Ismailia, Kafr el-Sheikh, and South Sinai were completed after 9/11. The post-9/11 survey was based on a sample of 1,000 adults randomly selected from the six governorates that were covered by the survey before 9/11. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 samples by governorates.

Table 2: Distribution of Samples Before and After 9/11 by Governorates of Egypt

Governorate	Sample Size Before 9/11*	Sample Size After 9/11
1. Cairo	400	180
2. Alex	200	90
3. Ismailia	[170]	
4. Menofia	630	285
5. Kafr el-Sheikh	[500]	
6. Bani Suef	320	140
7. Sohag	500	225
8. Aswan	180	80
9. South Sinai	[100]	
Total	2,230 [3000]	1,000

*Data in brackets collected between September 11 and October 30, 2001.

¹⁰ Systematic comparative values surveys of Middle Eastern countries began as a NSF-sponsored collaborative pilot project between Mansoor Moaddel, Eastern Michigan University (SBR-9820062); Ronald Inglehart, the University of Michigan (SBR-9820060); and overseas collaborators: Saad ed-Din Ibrahim, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Study, Cairo, Egypt; Abdul Hamid Safwat, Suez Canal University, Egypt; Taghi Azadarmaki, the University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran; and Mustafa Hamarneh and Tony Sabbagh, the University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan. Collectively, the investigators designed and pretested a questionnaire focusing on the attitudes of Egyptians, Jordanians, and Iranians toward a variety of gender, religious, socio-economic, cultural, and political issues. The questionnaire also replicated key items from the World Values Surveys questionnaire to permit comparisons between these countries and the data from more than seventy societies covered by those surveys. Following the completion of the pilot study in 1999 and in collaboration with overseas colleagues—Abdul Hamid Abdul Latif, American University in Cairo, Egypt; Taghi Azadarmaki, the University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran; and Mustafa Hamarneh, Tony Sabbagh, and Fares al-Braizat, the University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan—and with financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0097282), the Ford Foundation, and Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, full-scale surveys of the national representative samples of 3,000 Egyptians, 1,200 Jordanians, and 2,500 Iranians were carried out in 2000–2001. Using a similar questionnaire, a national values survey was carried out in Morocco under the supervision of Juan Diez-Nicolas, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain. The post-9/11 surveys in Egypt were carried out under the supervision of Abdul Hamid Abdul Latif, American University in Cairo. In Morocco, both the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 surveys were conducted by SEREC, a marketing research firm in Casablanca, Morocco.

Table 3: Indicators of Change in Egyptian and Moroccan Worldviews

<p>1. Western cultural invasion: Do you consider Western cultural invasion to be (5) very important, (4) important, (3) somewhat important, (2) least important, or (1) not important problem? [not included in pre-9/11 survey in Morocco]</p> <p>2. Religious authorities: Do you think—(1) No, (2) Yes—that the religious authorities in this country are giving adequate answers</p> <p>a) To the moral problems and needs of the individual?</p> <p>b) To the problems of family life?</p> <p>c) To people’s spiritual needs?</p> <p>d) To the social problems facing our country today?</p> <p>3. The Shari’a: Do you consider (5) very important, (4) important, (3) somewhat important, (2) least important, or (1) not important for a good government to implement only the Shari’a? [not included in pre-9/11 survey in Morocco]</p> <p>4. Religion and politics: Could you please tell me if you (5) agree strongly, (4) agree, (3) neither agree or disagree, (2) disagree, or (1) disagree strongly with the following:</p> <p>a) Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office</p> <p>b) It would be better for your country if more people with strong religious beliefs hold public office (religious people in public office)</p> <p>c) Religious leaders should not influence the government [not included in the Egyptian surveys]</p> <p>5. Women: Do you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) disagree strongly with:</p> <p>a) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do?</p> <p>b) A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl?</p> <p>c) Do you (3) agree, (2) neither agree nor disagree, or (1) disagree with men should have more right to a job than women?</p> <p>6. Democracy: Do you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) disagree strongly with:</p> <p>a) In democracy, the economy runs badly?</p> <p>b) Democracies are indecisive?</p> <p>c) Democracies aren't good at maintaining order?</p> <p>d) Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government?</p> <p>7. Strong leader: Is it (4) a very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad or (1) very bad to have a strong head of government who does not have to bother with parliament and elections?</p> <p>8. The economy serves whose interests: Generally speaking, would you say that this country’s economy is run (1) for the benefit of all the people or (2) by a few big interests looking out for themselves?</p>

In Morocco, the pre-9/11 survey of a national representative sample of 1,251 adults (18 years of age or older) was completed in August 2001. The post-9/11 survey of a representative sample of 1,013 adults was carried out in February 2002, about six months after completion of the first survey. All the surveys were based on face-to-face interviews.

Indicators of Sociopolitical and Cultural Attitudes

Table 3 reports the questions and coding that are related to the Egyptians' and Moroccans' attitudes toward historically significant sociopolitical and cultural issues. These questions measure the respondents' attitudes toward (1) Western cultural invasion, (2) religious authorities, (3) the Shari'a (Islamic law), (4) religion and politics, (5) women, (6) democracy, (7) a strong leader, and (8) whose interests the country's economy serves. Except for a few items, the survey questionnaires in Egypt and Morocco were identical.

For a more effective analysis and better comprehension, composite measures of the variables that were fairly to highly correlated and reflected a common concept were constructed. The first composite measure is based on attitudes toward religious authorities: indicators 2a–2d. For both countries, zero-order correlation coefficients among these indicators ranged from 0.40 to 0.72. The average of these variables is used as a composite index of attitudes toward religious authorities (Religious authorities).¹¹ The second composite measure is based on attitudes toward democracy: indicators 6a–6d. Among these four questions, 6d displayed little variation across the surveys. Before 9/11, 97% of Egyptians *agreed strongly* or *agreed* that democracy is the best system of government, compared to 99% after 9/11. For Morocco, these figures were 96% and 96% before and after 9/11, respectively. Because of the minimal variability, we dropped this indicator from further analysis. Indicators 6a–6c, on the other hand, displayed considerable variability across the surveys. The size of zero-order correlation coefficients among these indicators ranged from 0.39 to 0.54. A composite measure based on these questions (Democracy) was constructed in the same way as the composite variable for attitudes toward religious authorities.

The means and standard deviations of all the indicators of attitude changes that are used in the analysis and the percentage mean differences between the period before 9/11 and the period after 9/11 for Egypt and Morocco are reported in Table 4. This table summarizes attitudes for the two countries before and after 9/11.

¹¹ That is, Religion = (2a + 2b + 2c + 2d)/4. Factor analytic technique yielded the same results.

Table 4: The Means and Standard Deviations of Indicators of Attitude Change and Percentage Mean Differences for Egypt and Morocco Before 9/11 and After 9/11

Variable	Egypt				Morocco				Egypt % Mean Change	Morocco % Mean Change
	Before 9/11		After 9/11		Before 9/11		After 9/11			
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
1. Western cultural invasion	4.50	0.87	4.62	0.69	—	—	4.55	0.84	2.53	—
2. Men make better political leaders	3.41	0.80	3.01	0.90	3.20	1.01	3.02	1.04	-11.86	-5.46
3. University education is more important for boys	2.18	1.08	1.80	0.93	2.71	1.21	1.94	0.98	-17.36	-28.37
4. Men have more rights to a job	2.88	0.34	2.92	0.27	2.79	0.57	2.61	0.75	1.41	-6.50
5. Strong leader	1.57	0.73	1.26	0.50	1.55	1.01	1.55	0.96	-19.32	-0.19
6. Democracy	2.99	0.63	3.12	0.48	2.27	0.78	2.70	0.70	4.09	19.32
7. Satisfaction with religious authorities	1.87	0.24	1.69	0.37	1.97	0.14	1.94	0.19	-9.59	-1.44
8. Atheist politicians are unfit for public office	4.43	1.08	4.45	1.07	4.61	0.85	4.24	1.21	0.27	-7.99
9. Religious people in public office	4.39	0.84	4.16	0.95	3.58	1.41	3.64	1.25	-5.24	1.63
10. Religious leaders should not influence politics	—	—	—	—	3.53	1.45	3.93	1.20	—	11.36
11. Good government implements only the Shari'a	4.21	1.00	3.92	1.19	—	—	—	—	-6.94	—
12. Economy serves big interests	1.68	0.47	1.77	0.42	1.74	0.44	1.79	0.41	5.66	2.90

Hypotheses

Between the surveys that were completed just before 9/11 and those that were completed about six months later, a host of other events also transpired: (1) the launching of a massive campaign against radical Islamism and the authoritarian governments in the Middle East that were implicated, either directly or otherwise, in the rise of religious extremism; (2) the U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan, overthrow of the Taliban, and stepped-up efforts at regime change and nation building; and (3) sharpened U.S. rhetoric against Iran and Iraq as part of the “axis of evil,” and against Saudi Arabia as a conniving ally. In assessing the impact of the event of 9/11 on the worldviews of Egyptians and Moroccans, as we have argued, the event cannot be detached from the interpretations of it by diverse actors. The massive campaign against religious extremism has certainly been an important factor in shaping public opinion against Islamic fundamentalism. To counter that, al-Qa’ida and other Muslim extremists also continued their campaign against the United States and its values.

However, given the legacy of Islamic extremism in Egypt and Morocco, we argue that the terrorist attack would not be likely to promote favorable attitudes toward the ideology of radical Islamism. We have formulated several explicit hypotheses suggesting that, contrary to the terrorists’ expectations, the violence of 9/11 would produce a shift in public attitudes toward greater democracy, gender equality, and secularism.

We do not believe that this change in public opinion is a result of the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and the shift in U.S. policy toward regime change. It is hard to sustain an argument that the military intervention, which unavoidably entailed the destruction of Muslim lives and property, would prompt the Egyptian and Moroccan publics to develop more favorable attitudes toward Western values. There is, however, one way to assess a possible effect of the U.S. intervention on the attitudes of Egyptians and Moroccans. We argue that if the U.S. intervention and military presence in the Middle East promoted Western values, then there must be less concern among the publics about Western cultural invasion after 9/11 than before. That is, the Islamic publics would become less concerned about Western cultural invasion.

Support for democracy is measured in terms of the respondent’s score on the composite measure of democracy and attitude toward a strong leader. Support for gender equality is measured in terms of attitudes toward the three gender-related variables: “Men make better political leaders,” “University education is more important for boys,” and “Men have more rights to a job.” Support for secularism is measured in terms of the respondent’s score on the composite measure of satisfaction with religious authorities and attitudes toward “Atheist politicians are unfit for public office,” “Religious people in public office,” “Religious leaders

should not influence politics,” and “Good government implements only the Shari’a.” Only one variable measures concern about Western cultural invasion. We propose that after 9/11, the Egyptian and Moroccan publics would become more supportive of democracy and less supportive of a strong leader; more in favor of gender equality in political leadership, access to university education, and the job market; less satisfied with religious authorities, less supportive of the Shari’a; less supportive of having religious people hold public office; less unfavorable toward atheist politicians; more in favor of religious leaders not interfering in politics; and less concerned about Western cultural invasion than they were before 9/11.

Furthermore, given the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian and Moroccan governments and the lack of transparency in their conduct, the shift in attitudes toward democracy and secularism and away from religious fundamentalism might not be associated with an increase in support for the secular government. Because of political sensitivity, researchers were not allowed to ask questions about people’s satisfaction with the current ruler or his government’s economic performance. Instead, the respondents were asked whether their country’s economy runs for the benefits of a special few or for the benefits of all the people. This question is used as a proxy measure of the degree of support for the political system. We propose that after 9/11, a higher percentage of Egyptians and Moroccans would believe that the economy runs for the interests of a special few than did before 9/11.

Events do not affect all members of society uniformly. The influence of event is often moderated by age, education, and gender. Mannheim (1952 [1928]) was among the first to recognize the significance of common cohort experiences in shaping attitudes. Following his lead, researchers uncovered the vulnerability of younger cohorts to the influences of social and political events (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Schuman and Rieger 1992; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Sears 1981). Schuman and Scott (1989) found that when people of varying ages were asked what historical events seemed especially important to them, they disproportionately referred to events that occurred in their late teens and early twenties. Pennebaker and Banasik (1997: 14) report that “research dealing with autobiographical memories suggests that people tend to spontaneously recall memories that were formed between the ages of 12 and 25.”

To assess the age-differential impact of 9/11, we created a dichotomous variable; respondents below 26 years of age are treated as the impressionable group and coded “1,” and respondents age 26 years and above are coded “0.” We proposed that the event of 9/11 would result in more extensive changes in the attitudes of the younger cohort than it would in the attitudes of the older cohort.

Researchers have also established that attitude change may depend on the likelihood of comprehending the meaning of an event and on the ability to learn

from it. These factors, in turn, depend on one's level of political awareness and preexisting knowledge of political affairs (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989: 216; Price and Zaller 1993: 157; Zaller 1992: 148). It has been argued that well-informed people are more likely to express opinions, to use ideological terminology correctly, to possess stable opinions, to make use of facts in political discussion, to take an active part in politics, and to pick up new information easily and retain it readily (Kinder 1998: 176). One of the key determinants of political awareness and knowledge of politics is formal education, as "higher education clearly promotes political engagement and learning about politics" (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989: 278). Education is also an indicator of cognitive ability (Stimson 1975), which strengthens the information-processing efficiency of citizens and encourages certain values among individuals, including "openness of mind, a respect for science and empirical knowledge, an awareness of complexity and possibilities for change, and tolerance, not only of people but of points of view" (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991: 9; Tetlock 1986).

Considering these propositions and to assess the moderating effects of education on the relationship between 9/11 and attitude change, we constructed a dichotomous variable based on high and low educational level (0 = low, 1 = high) and propose that the event of 9/11 would result in more extensive changes in the attitudes of the high-education group than in those of the low-education group.¹²

Finally, studies have shown persistent gender differences in attitudes and value orientations (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Moaddel 2006; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992). Moreover, given that gender is one of the most important organizing principles of Islamic societies and that some of the key issues in the cultural debates in contemporary Egypt and Morocco are related to the status of women, we explore the moderating effect of gender on attitudes change. Gender is coded as a dichotomous variable (0 = male, 1 = female). We propose that the impact of 9/11 on the attitudes of Egyptians and Moroccans would be moderated by gender.

Effects of 9/11

The independent variable based on pre-9/11 and post-9/11 surveys was created as a dichotomous variable (0 = before 9/11, 1 = after 9/11). Analyses were applied separately to Egyptian and Moroccan samples. We begin by presenting

¹² The low-education group included people with (1) no formal education, (2) incomplete primary school, (3) complete primary school, (4) incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (5) complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (6) incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type, or (7) complete secondary: university-preparatory type. The high-education group consisted of people with (1) some university-level education without degree or (2) university-level education with degree.

zero-order correlations among the variables. We then use multivariate analysis of variance to determine both the impact of 9/11 and the moderating effects of age, education, and gender.

Eleven variable indicators are used in pre-9/11 and post-9/11 Egyptian data. Table 5 presents the zero-order correlation matrix among these indicators.¹³

Table 5: Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients Between September 11 and the Dependent Variables for Egypt

September 11	1.000												
Western cultural invasion	0.055**	1.000											
Men make better political leaders	-0.225***	0.094***	1.000										
Univ. ed. is more important for boys	-0.128***	0.040*	0.198***	1.000									
Men have more rights to a job	0.060**	0.026	0.114***	0.082***	1.000								
Strong leader	-0.191***	-0.101***	0.042*	0.101***	-0.037	1.000							
Democracy	0.088***	0.063**	0.007	-0.118***	0.021	-0.161***	1.000						
Satisfaction with religious authorities	-0.299***	0.004	0.125***	0.012	-0.061**	0.075***	0.004	1.000					
Atheist politicians unfit for public office	-0.003	-0.009	-0.015	-0.005	-0.003	0.009	0.007	0.026	1.000				
Religious people in public office	-0.125***	0.011	0.138***	0.090***	0.035	0.055***	0.110***	0.005	-0.036	1.000			
Good govt. implements only the Shari'a	-0.118***	0.063**	0.151***	0.028	0.014	0.051**	0.019	0.048*	-0.029	0.230***	1.000		
Economy serves big interests	0.076***	0.036	-0.049*	0.015	0.059**	-0.030	-0.034	-0.098***	-0.019	-0.006	-0.026	1.000	

Listwise $N = 2,580$.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

¹³ Coding on attitudes toward Western culture, men make better political leaders, boys have more right to university education, men have more right to a job, strong leader, religious authorities, religious in public office, religion and politics, Shari'a, and in whose interests the economy runs was reversed; a positive correlation with 9/11 indicates increased support for the value in question.

As Table 5 shows, except for one indicator (“Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office”), 9/11 is significantly associated with attitudinal changes in all the other variables. It increased the respondents’ concerns about Western cultural invasion. On attitudes toward gender relations, 9/11 had a negative effect on attitudes toward “Men make better political leaders” and “A university education is more important for boys” but a positive effect on attitudes

Table 6: Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients Between September 11 and the Dependent Variables for Morocco

September 11	1.000										
Men make better political leaders	-0.094*	1.000									
Univ ed is more important for boys	-0.245***	0.320***	1.000								
Men have more rights to a job	-0.090*	0.146**	0.155***	1.000							
Strong leader	-0.034	-0.072	0.074	0.075	1.000						
Democracy	0.311***	-0.028	-0.096*	-0.069	-0.100*	1.000					
Atheist politicians unfit for public office	-0.178***	0.125**	0.193***	0.140**	-0.006	-0.205***	1.000				
Religious person in public office	-0.092	0.194***	0.227***	0.152***	0.013	-0.127**	0.341***	1.000			
Religious leaders not influence govt	0.182***	0.033	0.001	0.081	0.119**	-0.102*	0.106*	-0.095*	1.000		
Satisfaction with religious authorities	-0.099*	0.083	0.096*	0.131**	0.053	-0.086*	0.337***	0.272***	0.027	1.000	
Economy serves big interests	0.024	0.040	-0.008	-0.039	-0.103*	0.001	0.067	-0.043	-0.007	0.082	1.000

Listwise $N = 528$.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

toward “Men should have more right to a job.” On political attitudes, 9/11 negatively affected attitudes toward “Strong leader” and positively affected attitudes toward democracy. The event of 9/11 also had negative effects on all the religion-related variables (except for the indicator mentioned above). Finally, 9/11 enhanced the respondents’ view that the country runs for the benefits of a special few. While the direction of change in two of the indicators—attitudes toward Western cultural invasion and “Men should have more right to a job”—were contrary to our prediction, all other changes were in the expected direction in Egypt.

For Morocco, questions related to Western cultural invasion and the Shari’a were not included in the first survey, but the surveys contained an additional question, “Religious leaders should not influence the government.” As a result, ten indicators were included in the analysis. Table 6 presents the zero-order correlations among these indicators.

The event of 9/11 had no significant effect on three of the indicators: “Strong leader,” “Religious people in public office,” and “The economy serves a few big interests.” It had negative effects on all three gender-related questions: “Men make better political leaders,” “University education is more important for boys,” and “Men should have more right to a job.” It had a positive effect on attitudes toward democracy. On the religion indicators, the event of 9/11 enhanced Moroccans’ unfavorable attitudes toward the involvement of religion in politics and lowered their satisfaction with religious authorities. That is, it had negative effects on Moroccans’ attitudes toward “Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office,” on “People with strong religious beliefs should hold public office,” and on satisfaction with “Religious authorities” but a positive effect on attitudes toward “Religious leaders should not influence the government.”

In sum, it appears that a shift occurred after 9/11 in the attitudes of Egyptians and Moroccans in favor of gender equality, democracy, and secularism.¹⁴ In

¹⁴ The two surveys showed little change in certain crucial aspects of religious beliefs and practices among Egyptians and Moroccans between the period before 9/11 and the period after 9/11. In both periods, almost 100 percent of the respondents expressed belief in God, life after death, the soul, hell, and heaven and indicated that they get comfort from religion. There was also little change in the high percentage of respondents who considered religiosity to be a favorable quality for women to have (more than 96 percent in all the samples) or in the percentage of the respondents describing oneself as a religious person (98 percent or more in all the samples). On two indicators, there are differences between Egyptian and Moroccan samples. While Egyptian data showed no significant difference between the periods before and after 9/11 in participation in religious services or in the percentage of the respondents who considered religiosity to be an important trait for children to have, a significantly lower percentage of Moroccans reported participating in religious services or considered religiosity to be an important trait for their child after 9/11 than

Egypt, the largest changes occurred in attitudes toward religious authorities ($r = -.299$) and attitudes in favor of gender equality in political leadership ($r = -.225$) and university education ($r = -.128$). The increase in concern about Western cultural invasion was the lowest among the significant attitudinal changes ($r = .055$). In Morocco, the largest changes were in attitudes toward democracy ($r = .311$), gender equality in university education ($r = -.245$), and “Religious leaders should not influence the government” ($r = .182$). The change in attitudes toward “Men should have more right to a job” was the lowest ($r = -.090$) among the statistically significant changes.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Taking all the dependent variables together as a vector (a set of variables) and taking into consideration that they are all correlated, a 2 (pre-9/11 versus post-9/11) \times 2 (young versus old cohort) \times 2 (low versus high education) \times 2 (male versus female) multivariate analysis of variance was used to tests for overall differences between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 samples, overall differences between young and old age groups, overall differences between low-education and high-education groups, overall differences between male and female, and the moderating effects of age, education, and gender on the relationship between 9/11 and the dependent variables. This was followed by univariate analyses of variance that tested the statistical significance of each variable separately. Because we are interested in the effects of 9/11 and the moderating effects of age, education, and gender on the dependent variables, we discuss findings that pertain to these relationships only.¹⁵

September 11 and Attitude Change

For Egypt, the main effect of the difference between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 samples is significant (9/11 main effect: $F_{\text{mult}} [11, 2502] = 34.39, p < .001$). All the moderating effects are also significant (9/11*Age: $F_{\text{mult}} [11, 2502] = 2.27, p < .05$; 9/11*Education: $F_{\text{mult}} [11, 2502] = 5.92, p < .001$; and 9/11*Gender: $F_{\text{mult}} [11, 2502] = 2.29, p < .01$). Similarly, for Morocco, the main effect of the difference between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 samples is significant (9/11 main effect: $F_{\text{mult}} [10,$

before 9/11. This indicates that while there has been a decline in people’s orientation toward religion in both countries, the nature of this decline was different between Egypt and Morocco.

¹⁵ Since changes in people’s attitudes can be affected by differences in marital status and subjective social class identification between the two samples, these variables are included in the model as control variables.

571] = 5.80, $p < .001$), but only education has significant moderating effects (9/11*Education: $F_{\text{mult}} [10, 571] = 1.79, p < .1$).¹⁶

In assessing the effect of 9/11 on each of the variables individually, we find that for Egypt, our analysis shows that each of the dependent variables has changed significantly except for attitudes toward atheist politicians. After 9/11, Egyptians expressed less favorable attitudes toward “Men make better political leaders,” “A university education is more important for boys,” “It is good to have a strong head of government,” “Religious authorities,” “Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office,” and “Implementation of the Shari’a as a characteristic of a good government” than they did before 9/11. Egyptians also developed a more favorable attitude toward democracy but grew more critical of their government, as indicated by the finding that more Egyptians believed that their “economy serves a few big interests” after 9/11 than before 9/11. Before-and-after comparison of the sample data therefore shows that the attitudes of Egyptians changed in favor of democracy, gender equality, and secular politics, all in a direction that is consistent with Western values and different from the values of radical Islamism.¹⁷

There are, however, two exceptions to this pattern. One is that more Egyptians believed that “Men should have more right to a job” after 9/11 than before 9/11. The other is that Egyptians were more concerned about Western cultural invasion after 9/11 than before. The increase in favorable attitudes toward “Men should have more right to a job than women do” might be associated with the deteriorating economic conditions in Egypt, a result of the terrorism-induced decline in tourism. In a society in which men are expected to be the family breadwinner, there would be a growing support for according priority to men over women in a tight job market. The heightened concerns about Western cultural invasion after 9/11, on the other hand, might be related to the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and the increase in rhetoric both by the U.S. government and in the media against Iran and Iraq as parts of the “axis of evil” and against the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia as supporting terrorism and promoting religious intolerance. An examination of the R^2 values for Egypt demonstrates that the three variables for which the model explained the most variations are attitudes toward “Religious authorities,” toward “Men make better political leaders,” and toward “A university education is more important for boys,” explaining 13%, almost 11%, and 7% of the total variations in these variables, respectively.

¹⁶ The main effects of education and gender differences are significant for both countries. The main effect of age differences is significant only for Egypt.

¹⁷ The multivariate analysis assesses the significance of the difference between the two samples. We determine the direction of the change in terms of the sign of the correlation coefficients presented in the correlation matrices for both countries.

In Morocco, if we take the effect of 9/11 on each of the variables individually, the multivariate analysis shows that there is no significant difference in the respondents' attitudes for four of the indicators: "Men make better political leaders," "It is good to have a strong head of government," "Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office," and "Economy serves a few big interests." On all other indicators, Moroccans, after 9/11, expressed less favorable attitudes toward "A university education is more important for boys," toward "Men should have more right to a job," toward "Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office," and toward "Religious authorities" than before 9/11. At the same time, they grew more supportive of democracy and of the view that "Religious leaders should not influence the government" after 9/11 than before. In general, Moroccans, like Egyptians, thus developed more favorable attitudes toward democracy, gender equality, and secularism between the two samples. An examination of the R^2 values for Morocco shows that the model explained the most variations in attitudes toward democracy, "A university education is more important for boys," and "Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office," explaining 13%, 12.5%, and 7% of the total variations in these variables, respectively.

Age, Education, Gender, September 11, and Attitude Change

Table 7 also summarizes the moderating effects of age, education, and gender on attitude change in Egypt and Morocco between the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 samples. In Egypt, age had significant moderating effects on attitudes toward "Men make better political leaders," "A university education is more important for boys," "Religious authorities," and "Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office." In all these cases, it appears that the changes in attitudes were more dramatic for the older cohort than for the younger cohort. That is, from the period before 9/11 to the period after 9/11, there was a greater decline among respondents in the older cohort than among respondents in the younger cohort in positive attitudes toward "Men make better political leaders" and "A university education is more important for boys," "Religious authorities," and "Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office." These age effects for Egypt are presented graphically in Figures 1 through 4. These findings on age are contrary to the "impressionable years" hypothesis presented in the literature.

Table 7: Education, Gender, Age, September 11, and Value Change in Egypt and Morocco

	(1) September 11		(2) Age		(3) Education		(4) Gender		(5) Interaction of Age and 9/11		(6) Interaction of Education and 9/11		(7) Interaction of Gender and 9/11		(8) R ²	
	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco
Western cultural invasion	6.71*	—	5.36*	—	2.58	—	7.28**	—	<1	—	<1	—	<1	—	0.015	—
Men make better political leaders	53.61***	1.93	6.69*	<1	11.40***	4.75*	113.8***	26.64***	4.08*	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	0.107	0.070
University education is more important for boys	12.40***	10.85***	<1	<1	32.87***	9.78**	77.28***	8.02**	4.94*	<1	1.18	<1	1.34	<1	0.072	0.124
Men have more right to jobs	7.31**	8.19**	5.42*	<1	<1	14.34***	15.87***	22.36***	1.16	1.57	2.26	<1	6.85**	3.73*	0.024	0.091
Strong leader	70.31***	<1	1.93	<1	1.09	2.08	<1	<1	1.04	2.20	<1	1.57	<1	<1	0.038	0.020
Democracy	33.29***	8.76**	<1	<1	2.33	7.18**	2.87	<1	1.48	1.47	13.34***	10.63***	<1	<1	0.019	0.133
Satisfaction with religious author.	204.5***	7.54**	<1	<1	47.26***	10.10**	17.72***	1.32	10.20***	<1	42.4***	1.38	1.00	<1	0.131	0.041
Atheist politicians unfit for office	<1	7.10**	<1	<1	<1	1.99	<1	<1	1.12	3.48*	<1	<1	<1	<1	0.003	0.069
Religious people in public office	7.64**	1.78	<1	5.80**	26.12***	2.32	<1	<1	2.79*	<1	2.78*	<1	14.40***	<1	0.043	0.069
Religion leaders no influence pol.	—	14.33***	—	3.45*	—	<1	—	<1	—	1.82	—	<1	—	<1	—	0.041
Good government implements the Shari'a	16.04***	—	<1	—	23.96***	—	<1	—	<1	—	<1	—	4.80*	—	0.028	—
Economy saves big interest	9.94**	<1	<1	3.99*	15.88***	<1	<1	1.47	<1	1.00	<1	2.09	<1	1.55	0.014	0.022
—value	34.39***	5.80***	1.95*	1.32	13.62***	3.99***	19.70***	5.08***	2.27*	1.30	5.92***	1.79*	2.29**	0.80		
Degrees of freedom (hypothesis, error)	11,2502	10, 571	11,2502	10, 571	11,2502	10, 571	11,2502	10, 571	11,2502	10, 571	11,2502	10, 571	11,2502	10, 571		

Egypt: N = 1,592 (before 9/11), 931 (after 9/11), 1866 (low education), 657 (high education), 1,355 (male), 1,168 (female), 623 (age 16–25 years), 1899 (age 26+ years).
 Morocco: N = 349 (before 9/11), 241 (after 9/11), 489 (low education), 101 (high education), 392 (male), 198 (female), 182 (age 18–25 years), 408 (age 26+ years).
 p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Figure 1: Mean Differences in Support of the Statement “Men Make Better Political Leaders” Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Age Group for Egypt (1 = low support, 4 = high support)




Figure 2: Mean Differences in Support of the Statement “Education Is More Important for Boys” Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Age Group for Egypt (1 = low support, 4 = high support)




Figure 3: Mean Differences in Satisfaction with Religious Authorities Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Age Group for Egypt (1 = not satisfied, 2 = satisfied)





Figure 4: Mean Differences in Support of People with Strong Religious Beliefs Holding Public Office Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Age Group for Egypt (1 = low support, 5 = high support)



For Egyptian samples, education has also significant moderating effects on attitudes toward democracy and “Religious authorities” and a marginal effect for “Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office.” These effects are presented graphically in Figures 5 through 7. According to Figures 5 and 6, Egyptians with higher education had more favorable attitudes toward democracy and felt less satisfied with religious authorities after 9/11 than did Egyptians with lower education. These changes are especially noteworthy considering that the differences in attitudes toward democracy and satisfaction with religious authorities between low-education and high-education groups were negligible before 9/11. However, on “Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office,” the less educated Egyptians changed their attitudes more dramatically than did the more educated (Figure 7). On this measure, people with low education became more secular after 9/11 than did those with more education.

Figure 5: Mean Differences in Support for Democracy Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Education Group for Egypt (1 = low support, 4 = high support)




Figure 6: Mean Differences in Satisfaction with Religious Authorities Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Education Group for Egypt (1 = not satisfied, 2 = satisfied)





Figure 7: Mean Differences in Support of People with Strong Religious Beliefs Holding Public Office Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Education Group for Egypt (1 = low support, 5 = high support)



Finally, gender has significant moderating effects on attitudes toward “Men should have more right to a job,” “Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office,” and “Implementation of the Shari’a as a characteristic of a good government” among Egyptians between the two samples. After the event of 9/11, Egyptian women’s favorable attitudes toward “Men have more rights to a job” increased and converged with those of Egyptian men, a result that is contrary to our expectation. However, there was a dramatic decline in Egyptian men’s favorable attitudes toward “Having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office” and “Good government implements the Shari’a” between the period before 9/11 and the period after 9/11. On those last two measures, men became more secular after 9/11 than women did in Egypt, as is shown in Figures 8 through 10.

Figure 8: Mean Differences in Support of the Statement “When Jobs Are Scarce, Men Should Have More Right to a Job Than Women” Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples for Men and Women in Egypt (1 = low support, 4 = high support)




Figure 9: Mean Differences in Support of People with Strong Religious Beliefs Holding Public Office Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples for Men and Women in Egypt (1 = low support, 1 = high support)





Figure 10: Mean Differences in Support for the Shari'a Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples for Men and Women in Egypt (1 = low support, 5 = high support)



For Morocco, there are only three significant moderating effects. These are the effects of age on attitudes toward “Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office,” of education on attitudes toward democracy, and of gender on attitudes toward “Men should have more right to a job” between pre and post 9/11 samples. According to Figure 11, after 9/11, there was a larger decline among the older cohort than among the younger cohort in attitudes favorable toward “Men should have more right to a job.” As was true in Egypt, the members of the older cohort seemed to be more amenable to change than were the members of the younger cohort.

As in Egypt, the moderating effects of education significantly enhanced attitudes toward democracy in Morocco. In Morocco, however, unlike Egypt, 9/11 appeared to have affected the attitudes in favor of democracy among low-education groups much more dramatically than it did among high-education groups, in which there was no change. As a result, in Morocco, there was a convergence of attitudes between these two groups toward democracy (Figure 12). Gender also had significant moderating effects on attitudes toward “Men should have more right to a job.” Women’s attitudes in favor of gender equality in the job market changed dramatically after 9/11, while men’s attitudes toward this issue remained about the same (Figure 13).

Figure 11: Mean Differences in Support of Statement “Politicians Who Don’t Believe in God Are Unfit for Public Office” Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples for Each Age Group in Morocco (1 = low support, 5 = high support)




Figure 12: Mean Differences in Support for Democracy Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples Within Each Education Group in Morocco (1 = low support, 4 = high support)





Figure 13: Mean Differences in Support of the Statement “When Jobs Are Scarce, Men Should Have More Right to a Job Than Women” Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Samples for Men and Women in Morocco (1 = low support, 4 = high support)



CONCLUSIONS

Al-Qa'ida justified its violence against the United States on September 11, 2001, by framing it as punishment for the trauma that it believed "the Jewish-Crusade alliance" had inflicted on Muslim nations. The gruesome act was also intended to rally the Muslim publics behind al-Qa'ida's banner for the construction of an Islamic order. We assessed the impact of this event on the Egyptian and Moroccan publics to determine whether the tactic drove them toward the ideology of radical Islamism or misfired, having just the opposite effects. We argued that above and beyond Muslims' condemnation of the mass taking of innocent lives, for the event to have a broader impact in causing attitudinal change, it must be relevant in a meaningful way to the ongoing political conflict and cultural warfare in their society. Using this proposition, we first analyzed the state of radical Islamism in Egypt and Morocco, the only two countries where almost identical national values survey data were available for before 9/11 and after 9/11. We proposed that a record of extremist activities in both countries portrayed an image of Islamic fundamentalism that was far removed from the one that al-Qa'ida projected as the agent of "Muslim collectivity" to justify its discourse and action. For Islamic publics, a legacy of kidnappings, assassinations, and the harassment of secular intellectuals and women by radical Islamic groups appeared to have been a better representation of radical Islamism than al-Qa'ida's self-depicted portrayal of a religious avant-garde.¹⁸ The attitudinal changes among the Egyptian and Moroccan publics, although quite far away from the places where the terrorists wreaked the greatest havoc, supported our proposition. Contrary to what the terrorists intended, these publics turned away from the ideology of religious extremism and toward Western values of democracy, gender equality, and secularism.

Recent social-scientific studies of event-triggered changes have focused on topics such as nationalist feelings, foreign-policy opinion options, collective and flashbulb memories, and emotions (Converse 1987; Jennings 1987; Mueller 1973; Page and Shapiro 1992; Pennebaker, Paez, and Rimé 1997; Schuman and Reiger 1992; Schuman and Rodgers 2004). In this study, we focused on the impact of an event on people's attitudes toward significant issues. Issues are important because cultural change involves resolution of the issues being contested. In the contemporary Islamic countries, such issues as those related to the form of government, the relationship between religion and politics, the status of women, and Western culture have been the concerns of diverse intellectual leaders and political activists. Thus, understanding how the value orientations of ordinary

¹⁸ Our argument here is parallel to what Sniderman (1993: 221) defines as a "likeability" heuristic: ordinary citizens using "a rule of thumb that yields approximately accurate predictions of where politically salient groups stand on major issues."

people toward these issues are affected by an event provides insights into an important mechanism of change that may contribute to a larger cultural transformation and the emergence of a new cultural pattern.

Furthermore, the impact of events is not uniform for all members of society and can be moderated by age, education, and gender. In our analysis, however, these variables had significant moderating effects on only some of the 9/11-induced attitudinal changes, and these effects were not quite consistent with extant sociological generalizations. For example, for the attitudes that were significantly affected by age between the two samples, the older cohort displayed more dramatic attitudinal changes than did the younger cohort in both countries. This departure from the “impressionable years” hypothesis might be an outcome of the different political socializations experienced by the older and younger generations in the national and historical contexts of Egypt and Morocco. The older generations in both countries had come of age during the period characterized by the popularity of such secular ideologies as Arab nationalism or Arab socialism as well as state feminism, whereas the younger generations were socialized during the period of the decline of secularism and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. This is perhaps the reason why the older generation that was raised in a more secular cultural environment had a stronger predisposition to turn away from the ideology of radical Islamism than did the younger generation.

This interpretation is plausible because age had significant moderating effects on attitudes toward some of the religious or gender issues over which the Islamic fundamentalists and Arab nationalists were sharply divided. On such other issues as those related to the desirability of having a strong leader or to democracy, toward which the older and younger groups had in the past maintained similar attitudes (Gershoni and Jankowski 1995; Moaddel 2005), the age cohort had no significant moderation effects on the attitudinal impact of 9/11. Overall, on the measures for which age had significant moderating effects for both countries (Figures 1 through 4 and Figure 11), there was no significant cohort difference except in attitudes toward “Men make better political leaders”; members of the younger cohort were significantly less supportive of this view than were members of the older cohort in the Egyptian sample (Table 7, column 2). We may therefore argue that 9/11 had a convergence effect, narrowing the gap between the attitudes of the older and younger cohorts.

Education had inconsistent moderating effects across Egypt and Morocco. In Egypt, where the high-education group displayed more dramatic changes in favorable attitudes toward democracy and unfavorable attitudes toward religious authorities than did the low-education group (Figures 5 and 6), these effects are consistent with the view that education contributes to democratic and secular thought. In attitudes toward having people with strong religious beliefs hold public office, on the other hand, the less-educated Egyptians became less support-

ive of this attitude than did the more-educated Egyptians. Given that the more-educated Egyptians were less supportive of this view (Table 7, column 3), the interaction between 9/11 and education had a convergence effect, narrowing the gaps between the low-education and high-education groups (Figure 7). Likewise, in Morocco, the low-education group grew more supportive of democracy than did the high-education group after 9/11. Given that more-educated Moroccans were significantly more supportive of democracy than were less-educated Moroccans (Table 7, column 3), here again, 9/11 had a convergence effect (Figure 12).

Finally, the moderating effects of gender were also inconsistent across the two countries. In Egypt, women grew less supportive of gender equality than did men in the job market after 9/11 (Figure 8), while in Morocco, just the opposite occurred: A significantly higher number of women than men disagreed with “Men have more rights to a job” between the two samples (Figure 13). Although there were significant gender differences in both countries on issues related to women, feminist issues were much more intensely debated in Morocco than in Egypt. We may therefore speculate that the varying moderating effects of gender are related to the differences in the national-historical context between the two countries. In Egypt, by contrast, issues related to the relationship between religion and politics were much more intensely debated than in Morocco. This is probably why more Egyptian men than women showed a decline in their attitudes toward “Having people with strong religious view hold public office” and “A good government implements only the Shari’a” (Figures 9 and 10, respectively) after 9/11.

However, the specific categories of people who have displayed more manifestly event-induced attitudinal changes may naturally provide a stronger social support for changes in social institutions and structure than do other groups of people. Generally, the extent to which such changes cause rupture in social structure, generating a new cultural pattern, is contingent not only on the availability of social resources and the emergence of favorable political space that permits the rise of a new cultural movement, but also on people’s collective knowledge about their desires, attention span and focus on pertinent issues, and articulation of preferences into a program for action by political leaders and activists. Insofar as both the public at large and intellectual leaders focus on the devastation caused by a religiously inspired political violence, they tend not only to distance themselves from its perpetrators, but also to shy away from the discursive framework that shapes such religious movements.

At the same time, the reactions of the state or politically powerful groups to an event can also affect people’s attitudes and change their attention span. Far from promoting Western values, such other post-9/11 events as the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, sharpened rhetoric against Iraq and other Islamic countries, and stepped-up efforts at regime change might induce a different form of attitudinal changes, one that could potentially divert public attention away from the issues of

democracy, gender equality, and secularism. If we use concerns about Western culture as a proxy measure of the public attitudes toward the U.S. interventions in the Middle East and if we take our cue from the fact that Egyptians grew more concerned about Western cultural invasion after 9/11 than they were before, it would be hard to attribute changes in Egyptian attitudes in favor of democracy, gender equality, and secularism to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, stepped-up rhetoric, and efforts at regime change. It is a bit more convincing to argue that the changes in Egyptian (and Moroccan) attitudes toward modern values are consequences of 9/11 attacks and the massive anti-Islamic fundamentalist campaign that ensued. Should the U.S. military interventions in the Middle East remain unabated in the foreseeable future and should Muslim casualties as a consequence continue to increase, the public attention might be diverted from the issues of democracy, gender equality, and secularism and increasingly focus on the destruction caused by the high-handedness of the U.S. government, all giving rise to a representation of Muslim trauma that would in turn feed the ideology of radical Islamism.¹⁹ On the other hand, if the U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are successful in establishing security and promoting economic development, this might prompt the Islamic publics to focus on the domestic sources of their social problems and the extremist forces in their midst.

These considerations underscore that events matter in the process of attitude formation, as they affect people's attention span, change the balance of cultural forces, and introduce new factors into the social process that may significantly alter the existing cultural pattern. Events affect people's attitudes when the events provide additional information that is relevant to the cultural debates over significant issues. The role of events in this process can be explained and even predicted provided that the knowledge of the contending issues is available. If the event of 9/11 considerably altered Moroccan and Egyptian attitudes in favor of gender equality and democracy and lessened their satisfaction with religious authorities, it can be surmised that they were reacting to their authoritarian rulers,

¹⁹ If the violence of 9/11 contributed to attitudinal change toward Western values, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and failure to establish a stable democratic government (thus far) in these countries and the killing of innocent people in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of the U.S. military actions against the insurgents and terrorists groups have created a favorable context for religious activists to advance the view that the United States, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, intends to control and subjugate Muslim nations and undermine their religion. In fact, contributing to the insurgent movement in Iraq were such factors as aerial bombardments of the suspected rebel hideouts, which increased the number of civilian deaths; the U.S. ignorance of Iraqi/Islamic culture; mistreatment of Iraqi detainees; and the general failure of the government to improve the economic and security conditions in the country. The success of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in recent parliamentary elections and of other Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Persian Gulf countries may thus be partly attributed to the resurgence of anti-American feelings in Arab countries.

who have failed to improve their socioeconomic conditions and establish an inclusive transparent government, and to the dominant religious opposition groups whose extremism exacerbated social problems. For reflective Muslims who have seen the failure of Islamic government in Iran, the extremism of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the destruction of life and property caused by radical Islamic organizations, 9/11 perhaps became a moment of reckoning. If it can be said that the event forced them to choose, they chose democracy, gender equality, and less involvement of religion in politics more extensively after 9/11 than they did before.

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