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Bridging the Gap Between Religion and Politics
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Religious Motivation vs. Traditional Religiousness: Bridging the Gap Between Religion and Politics and the Psychology of Religion

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Abstract

This article brings together two disparate literature bases pertaining to political tolerance: religion and politics (utilizing traditional religiousness) and the psychology of religion (utilizing religious motivation). Its purpose is twofold: to test whether the concepts of traditional religiousness and religious motivation are empirically as well as conceptually distinct and to test for the influence of religious motivation on political tolerance in a model that includes measures of traditional religiousness. While the religion and politics literature has historically demonstrated that increased religiousness leads to increased intolerance, the psychology of religion literature suggests that this link is illogical. This article tests that supposition. With the use of factor analysis, the concepts of traditional religiousness and religious motivation are shown to be empirically distinct from one another. Structural equation modeling shows that the religious motivation variables do not exhibit the influence predicted by the psychology of religion literature. In the same model, religious commitment behaves in a manner contrary to what previous research suggests, leading to increased and not decreased political tolerance. Given the complexity of the model used and the robust nature of structural equation analysis, this last finding warrants further investigation.

The general perception of the Christian Right is not a flattering one. This perception is buttressed by two trends. First, there is a long list of “anti’s” associated with the Christian Right. Its adherents are seen as *anti*: communist, civil rights, labor, East Coast establishment, and sex education views and actions (Martin 1996). Second, there have been more than a few studies that have, at worst, suggested a link between religiousness and intolerance and, at best, demonstrated a link between increased religiousness and conservative moral and social issue positions, with potential ramifications for public policy. The argument that an inherent *antidemocratic* orientation lies within religion is not unreasonable. Religion tends to deal in absolutes; compromise with something that one truly believes is evil or a lie can seem unthinkable.

Because they do not lend themselves so readily to compromise solutions, religious issues may challenge the normal system of governance. If you regard abortion as murder, and I see it as a neutral medical procedure, it will be hard to find a middle ground that either one of us will accept as a legitimate public policy. . . . The same kind of problem may arise in the context of debates over prayer in public schools, the rights of homosexuals, traditional sex roles, and other policy areas in which religious groups have been active. . . . As religious issues do not easily permit compromise solutions, so, too, religious values may produce rigidity, dogmatism, and contempt for alternative points of view. Such destructive traits, far from being accidental, may actually be the consequence of religious commitment (Wald 1997: 321).

This has been the argument and perception by traditional democratic theorists and why there is typically a vigorous defense of the separation of church and state in contemporary America.

Modern social science evidence would appear to support the link between religion and an antidemocratic orientation (e.g., intolerance). Beginning with Stouffer’s (1955), seminal study, research over four decades has added further support to the link between religion and intolerance (see, e.g., Beatty and Walter 1984; Corbett 1982; Erskine and Siegel 1975; Filsinger 1976; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Smidt and Penning 1982; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Wald (1997: 325) summarizes the evidence by stating, “[i]n the three decades since Stouffer’s findings were first published, they have been repeatedly confirmed by other researchers. In periodic national surveys about willingness to extend civil liberties to unpopular groups, major religious groups differ roughly the same way they did in 1954.”

Nevertheless, scholars in the field of the psychology of religion have argued that the link between increased religiousness and increased intolerance does not make logical sense; they argue that it is counterintuitive (Allport 1966; Allport and Ross 1967; Feagin 1964; Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999; Gorsuch 1994;

Hoge 1972; Hunt and King 1971; Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990; McConahay 1973; Meadow and Kahoe 1984; Wilson 1960). The thrust of the critique is as follows:

[T]hose who have viewed religious commitment as a source of antidemocratic sentiment have not always distinguished among different types of commitment. Most studies have simply examined the attitude differences between church members and nonaffiliates, or between different denominations, or, in a few cases, between churchgoers of varying frequency. These are poor approximations of what might well turn out to be the real source of variation in the linkage between religious commitment and tolerance—differences in the manner in which people absorb religious values (Wald 1997: 328).

These scholars have tried to unravel what might be “the real source of variation.”

In contrast to the literature that suggests that increased religiousness, typically defined by belief, belonging, and behavior (Leege and Kellstedt 1993), leads to increased levels of political intolerance, the religious orientation literature suggests that the type of religious orientation one has, extrinsic versus intrinsic, determines whether or not religious individuals will exhibit increased political intolerance; those with an intrinsic orientation are more likely to exhibit tolerance, while those with an extrinsic orientation are more likely to exhibit intolerance. Thus it is religious orientation that is related to political intolerance, not religiousness per se. Religious orientation is more appropriately called *religious motivation*, and that is how I will refer to it henceforth.

Does religious motivation account for the relationship between traditional religiousness and political tolerance? We do not know because these two competing literatures with their different conceptualizations of religiousness have not been evaluated in relation to each other in regard to political tolerance.¹ This article specifically addresses that question. In doing so, it bridges the gap between the religion and politics literature and the psychology of religion literature by bringing together religious motivation, traditional measures of religiousness, and political tolerance measures and predictors. The thrust of this article is not to argue that religious motivation is better than or preferable to the traditional measures of religiousness. Rather, it attempts to bring together two disparate literature bases that are addressing some of the same questions. Because religious

¹ Religious motivation has not been utilized within mainstream religion and politics research, in large part because national surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and National Election Studies do not include the items that would be needed to measure this construct. On the other hand, the religious motivation research has not incorporated many of the innovations that have been made within the religion and politics literature regarding measurement of traditional religiousness (belief, belonging, and behaving); nor has it incorporated the advances that have been made within the political tolerance literature regarding measurement of political tolerance as well as some of its most important predictors.

motivation is outside of mainstream religion and politics research, it is important to explain what it is, how it compares and contrasts with the traditional measures of religiousness, and the theoretical underpinning for why it is expected to influence political tolerance.

RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION VERSUS TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUSNESS

Religious Motivation

Religious motivation can be best understood as the driving force behind religious belief, religious behavior, and/or religious belonging (Allport and Ross 1967; Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999; Gorsuch 1994; Hoge 1972; Hunt and King 1971; Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990; McConahay 1973; Meadow and Kahoe 1984). Thus religious motivation is conceptually different from religious belief, religious behavior, and religious affiliation. Religious motivation is a psychological explanation for why an individual chooses to go to church (religious behavior), belong to or associate with a church (religious affiliation), and hold religious beliefs (doctrinal/theological belief). For psychologists, “[n]o approach to religiousness has had greater impact on the empirical psychology of religion” (Donahue 1985: 400) than the distinction, developed from axiology, between extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness (Donahue 1985). It has been called “the most empirically useful definitions of religion” (Gorsuch 1988: 210).

Hunt and King (1971: 340) concluded that the research of Allport (1966) and Allport and Ross (1967) showed a clear progression toward understanding extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness as “the motives associated with religious beliefs and practices.” According to Hoge (1972: 370), “It [extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness] is clearly a measure of motivation for religious behavior rather than the behavior itself. . . . The variable is one of motivation, not behavior, not cognitive style, or perception. Religious motivation cannot be inferred from theological positions or external behavior.” This is consistent with the work of Allport (1966) and Allport and Ross (1967).

Traditional Religiousness Variables Versus Religious Motivation

To fully understand religious motivation and how it is different from other measures of religiousness, it is helpful to compare and contrast religious motivation to the most often used measures of traditional religiousness. Within the traditional religion and politics literature, religiousness is conceptualized as having three distinct yet interrelated dimensions: religious belief, religious belonging, and religious behavior (Carwardine 1993; Jelen 1991; Kellstedt 1993; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman and Green 1998; Wuthnow 1988). These are

measured by doctrinal, sociological, and external behavior variables. Commonly used measures are church attendance, frequency of prayer, denominational affiliation, religious salience, doctrinal beliefs (doctrinal orthodoxy), religious self-identification, and religious experience (such as a born-again experience). Thus by knowing how often someone attends church and the person's level of religious salience, frequency of prayer, and/or adherence to doctrinal statements—all measures of external behavior—an individual's religiousness or religious commitment could theoretically be gauged. Typically, this is how religion and politics scholars have measured commitment.

Denominational affiliation and religious traditions are meant to operationalize the concept of belonging. In analyzing and exploring the relationship of religious belonging to the political landscape, some type of order needs to be placed on the staggering number of religious groups in the United States. Denominational affiliation and religious tradition are the most frequently used categories for imposing this necessary order. The term *denomination* refers to a specific organizational affiliation, such as Catholic, Baptist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, or Methodist. For example, someone who is formally associated with a local Episcopalian church in Munster, Indiana, belongs to a local congregation. However, that local congregation is also part of a larger denomination called the Episcopal Church, USA.

Religious tradition is distinctly different from, and conceptually broader than, denominational affiliation because it cuts across denomination. That same individual who is a member of a local Episcopalian congregation and part of the larger Episcopal Church, USA denomination can also be categorized with individuals from other denominations into what is called a *religious tradition*. Denominations that are categorized within the same religious tradition tend to share common histories; a particular belief set regarding theology, ritual, and eschatology; and even distinct racial or ethnic compositions (Greeley 1972; Kellstedt and Green 1993; Layman and Green 1998; Roof and McKinney 1987; Steensland et al. 2000).

Finally, the most common way of conceptualizing believing is through doctrinal orthodoxy. However, believing is also conceptualized by the relationship between the individual and the divine, as determined by asking questions about religious experiences. The most commonly used question asks whether or not an individual has had a “born-again” experience. Doctrinal orthodoxy is typically measured by asking questions about individual beliefs about the literalism and/or the inerrancy of the Bible, which are meant to capture the worldview and basic values of religious individuals (Layman and Green 1998; Legee and Kellstedt 1993; Wilcox 1986). In contrast, religious motivation is a measure of something uniquely different because it measures individuals'

motivation (reason or driving force) for holding their religiousness, which is distinct from their descriptive belief, belonging, and behavior.

Religious Motivation and Political Tolerance

What is the relationship that results in intrinsically religious people being more tolerant than extrinsically religious people are? Why does religiousness for purely extrinsic purposes lead to less political tolerance than intrinsic religiousness does?² Allport and Ross (1967: 434) describe extrinsic and intrinsic religious motivation in the following manner:

Perhaps the briefest way to characterize . . . subjective religion is to say that the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion. . . . The embraced creed [of the extrinsically motivated] is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs. In theological terms the extrinsic type turns to God, but without turning away from self.

People who have an extrinsic motivation “are disposed to use religion for their own ends,” while those with an intrinsic motivation “find their master motive in religion” (Allport and Ross 1967: 434).³ A person whose primary religious motivation is extrinsic uses religion in a utilitarian sense; religion is the means by which extrinsic values such as comfort, status, and/or security are acquired. In contrast, the intrinsically religious individual is motivated primarily by the desire to internalize his or her faith and to subordinate all other aspects of life to one’s religious commitment (Allport and Ross 1967: 441).

Therefore, the *type* of motivation (extrinsic or intrinsic) for religiousness is more significant as an explanatory variable than is the reporting of religiousness alone. According to Busch (1999), this distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religious motivation is more accurately described as the difference between a “false” (extrinsic) and a “genuine” (intrinsic) or “heartfelt” religiousness. The former is merely a means to an end, while the latter serves primarily as an end in itself. In expressive terms, Wald (1997: 328–329) illustrates this condition in living experience:

² In discussions of extrinsic versus intrinsic religious motivation, the reference is to two separate dimensions. It is not a reference to a single dimension with extrinsic motivation at one end and intrinsic motivation at the other. Any writing that seems to suggest that they are one-dimensional is unintentional.

³ While one may question what type of master motive one might find in religion (e.g., it could be that the master motive leads to intolerance), it is important to note that for Allport and Ross (1967), this master motive was about pursuing the nobler values of religiousness.

[S]ome attend church only out of a sense of duty to parental expectations or because it conforms to social practice in their community. They find in religion support for their way of life and sanctification of the social order—but nothing of a prophetic vision that might challenge them to change their behavior or act more sensitively to others. What is missing from such conventional or nominal religiosity is deeply rooted acceptance of the nobler values associated with major religious traditions—love, charity, compassion, and forgiveness. Some adherents do not hear these messages either because they do not attend often enough or, more likely because “while hearing they do not hear, nor do they understand” (Matt. 13:13). But other persons who take religion seriously—meaning that they embrace the ethical messages transmitted by a religious tradition—internalize that tradition and assign the highest priority to acting righteously. Before condemning individuals for falling short of biblical standards, they are likely to recall the admonition to hate the sin but love the sinner.

Intrinsically religious people have made religion the master motive of their life. The master motive of a religion is the universal sacrificial values that are at the core of all religions and justify their place as ennobling human beings. Whether religious identifiers always apply these nobler creeds is beside the point. It is the intrinsically motivated who have adopted the nobler creeds of their faith, such as forgiveness, the command to judge not, the command to love one’s neighbor, and the virtue of compassion. The nobler creeds of a religion are generally those for which there is nothing to be gained in this world. By their very nature, one cannot internalize them for extrinsic reasons, because by themselves, they cannot achieve any tangible return.

Intrinsically religious people identify with the devout personal absorption of the nobler values of their religious beliefs. In their religious motivation, they have moved beyond the singular interest in their own physical needs and self-gratification. Religiousness becomes an end in itself, and the value of religiousness is based on the internalized relationship the individual has with religion. For example, when the intrinsically motivated go to church, they do so to thank, praise, and/or worship God rather than for the pursuit of social goals.

In contrast, extrinsically religious individuals do not make religion’s master motive the focus of their life. Religion for them becomes an external value, as an instrumental or utilitarian good. Their religious focus has not extended beyond their own physical needs and self-gratification. When they go to church, it is not because they want to give to God (praise, worship, thanks) or even because they want to give to the church; they go to church to get something tangible—that is, nonspiritual—from their religiousness. Extrinsically religious individuals practice their religiousness for the utility it can bring them that is external to religiousness itself, such as business connections, legitimacy, respectability, or access (Allport 1950, 1954, 1966; Allport and Ross 1967).

Although this article focuses on the Judeo-Christian tradition, the idea of a nobler creed would apply in principle to most if not all religions. Although there is no universal agreement on a set of nobler creeds for all religions, there is arguably an amazing amount of overlap among all religions. The important point to be made about these creeds is that, by their nature, they do not promote extrinsic values.

The ability to internalize the nobler creeds of one's faith, or intrinsic religiousness, is characterized by what Allport describes as a mature motivation. A mature motivation includes complex, critical reflection, neither fanatic nor compulsive, and therefore enables these individuals to be more politically tolerant (e.g., willing to extend civil liberties to a group and their ideas to which one has a strong personal opposition). Intrinsically religious individuals are necessarily more concerned with their own behavior and not the behavior of others because they do not define or measure themselves against "the other" (owing to a mature motivation). This is important because political tolerance is the extension of civil liberties to groups and ideas—"the other"—with which one strongly disagrees. "As we have discovered in other connections, self-blame—intropunitiveness—leads to tolerance; it makes for humility and discourages arrogance" (Allport 1954: 455).

It may be asked whether all religions are prescribing tolerance and therefore true believers will be more tolerant. A more specific variation could be to ask whether it matters what an individual is substantively intrinsic about. The answer is actually no. It is important to remember that this is a theory of general religious motivation and therefore is not dependent on specific denominational beliefs. It is a theory of individual psychological motivation vis-à-vis religiousness. Furthermore, the many social and moral issues on which a religion might take a position do not directly translate into political tolerance. To say that it matters what a person is intrinsic about is to say that a particular issue position is what determines political tolerance. Not only is this a separate empirical question, which is not addressed here, but it could also be argued that the question is circular, since it defines tolerance by the very act it measures. Intrinsic religious motivation is intended to supplant these types of particular issue positions because intrinsics have absorbed (according to the intrinsic/extrinsic theory) the nobler creeds of religion (e.g., they will know you are Christians by your love) (Allport 1954, 1966; Allport and Ross 1967; Wald 1997).

Extrinsic religiousness "does not entail self-objectification, but remains unreflective, failing to provide a context of meaning in which the individual can locate himself, and with perspective judge the quality of his conduct" (Allport 1950: 54). The extrinsic individual's relationship to religion is an outward one. Whenever religion is used to pursue nonreligious ends (particularly wealth, self-interest, power, or prestige), then "abominations" (be they prejudice, political

intolerance, or possibly other, more violent acts) inevitably result. This is because these individuals lack the mature motivation exhibited by intrinsics and so they require external justification, which necessarily involves comparison with “the other.” Extrinsic individuals fail to value that “the essence of religion is not self-justification, self-support, but rather humility, self-negation and love of neighbor” (Allport 1954: 447). Theologians have explained this by suggesting that when people build religion around their own externalized self-interest,⁴ there is a potential for “evil.” Allport (1960: 33) describes the extrinsic (or immature) motivation as “dependent and basically infantile.”

According to Allport (1950: 54), “[m]ost of the criticism of religion is directed at its immature forms.” By extension, that statement applies to the extrinsic/intrinsic categorization and suggests that our frustration with religion is a reaction to words, thoughts, and deeds of individuals who wrap themselves in a banner of religiousness but who have not embraced religion’s “nobler” creeds. From a democratic theory perspective, mature motivation suggests secure individuals who are concerned with their behavior rather than a need to interpret their behavior through the approval of others. It suggests that maturely motivated people are more likely to be tolerant of the democratic process because they do not interpret democratic political decisions as being necessary for their extrinsic self-evaluation.⁵

⁴ It has been asked whether individuals will be tolerant if it serves their own selfish ends. In regard to the extrinsically motivated, frankly, one cannot answer this question without a context. That is, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which an individual would benefit from allowing a disliked group the freedom to exercise their civil liberties, although the individual really wants to deny that group their civil liberties, yet have it be a situation in which the individual is using his or her religion to reap nonreligious rewards. Generally speaking, when politicians, for example, are personifying external religiosity, they might very well be forced to act in a certain way to gain political advantage and look as though they are tolerant. They are not any more tolerant or intolerant than is the individual who is forced into gender-neutral hiring by federal decree. For externally motivated religious individuals, there must always be predominantly, if not singularly, an external value. That is why the question can be answered only contextually. The identification of someone as extrinsic or intrinsic is not environmentally conditional. It is a complete misunderstanding of religious belief to view the internalization of a religion’s nobler creed as an extrinsic act, that is, as being done for current value received. It becomes a reductive argument like economic/rational human conceptualization. Any act can be defined as rational because a human performed it. To paraphrase a famous quote: “There is no human action I have found that cannot be construed as self-interested and therefore rational.”

⁵ A word about the exclusion of the “quest” dimension as a means of explaining political tolerance is pertinent. The concept of religion as quest was first introduced by Batson (1976). It refers to valuing religious doubt and embracing existential questions that lead one to rethink one’s religious convictions. This variable is problematic for inclusion here because valuing religious doubt and rethinking one’s religious convictions are not part of intrinsic/extrinsic constructs.

THIS STUDY

To address whether religious motivation accounts for the relationship between traditional religiousness and political tolerance, I conduct three analyses. First, whether religious motivation is distinct empirically, not just conceptually, from the traditional measures of religiousness is tested via factor analysis. Second, the psychology of religion scholars have suggested that the relationship between religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance will differ depending on the level of religious motivation. This assumption is tested via a structural equation model that controls for level of religious motivation. Finally, the argument that religious motivation is the real source of variation between religiousness and political tolerance is tested in a structural equation model using the traditional measures of religiousness and religious motivation variables.

Data

The data for this article come from a telephone survey of 601 individuals in Lake County, Indiana. The Indiana University Public Opinion Laboratory, located on the campus of Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis, collected the telephone survey data, using random-digit dialing by randomly generating the last two digits of the telephone numbers.⁶ Although the data are from a single county in a single state and there are, without a doubt, questions about how we can generalize from these data, I believe there is a legitimate argument to be made that this sample is representative of “middle America”: It was conducted in a Midwestern area, and there is reason to conclude that religiousness and political tolerance in one Midwestern county is not expected to be radically different from religiousness and political tolerance in another Midwestern county.⁷


⁶ Interviews with Lake County residents were conducted between August 7 and August 25, 2003. All phone calls were made between 4:00 P.M. and 9:30 P.M. CST. The interviews lasted about 14 to 15 minutes. A respondent was chosen in each household by asking to speak to the person 18 years of age or older who had the most recent birthday. All those who broke off or refused the interview were recontacted at least once. The survey had a 58 percent maximum response rate calculated by using American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Standard Definitions. The AAPOR has a number of ways in which response rates can be calculated. The maximum response rate minimizes the denominator in that it does not include cases of unknown eligibility (such as no answers and busy signals).

⁷ In the 2000 census, the population of this county 18 years of age and older was 354,767 out of a total population of 484,564. The racial makeup (regardless of age) was 66.7 percent white, 25.3 percent black, 12.2 percent Latino/Hispanic, and 0.08 percent Asian. The gender makeup (regardless of age) was 51.8 percent female and 48.2 percent male. Of the 601 respondents in my dataset, 46.6 percent (280) were male, and 53.4 percent (321) were female; the racial makeup was 72.4 percent white (435), 15.1 percent black (91), 9.9 percent Latino/Hispanic (60), and 0.5 percent Asian (3). The rest did not answer, were biracial or multiracial, or were American Indian.

The Basic Model

Figure 1 shows the model I used to test whether there is an interaction effect in which the relationships between religious commitment and political tolerance and between doctrinal orthodoxy differ depending on level of religious motivation. It is also the model used to assess whether religious motivation might be the real source of variation in terms of how religiousness influences political tolerance. This model is derived primarily from the work of Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) and Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Wood (1995) for all the pertinent concepts except for the religiousness variables (both traditional and motivation).

Figure 1: Religious Motivation/Traditional Religiousness Model of Political Tolerance⁸



⁸ This model, which is a structural equation model, looks as if it could be called a path analysis. The difference is one of variable measurement. Path analyses use single indicator variables; structural equation modeling allows for latent variables measured by multiple observed indicators.

Previous research (Beatty and Walter 1984; Wilcox and Jelen 1990; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Smidt and Penning 1982; Stouffer 1955) suggests that religious commitment directly influences political tolerance, so as commitment increases, political tolerance decreases; the research also suggests that as doctrinal orthodoxy increases, so does political intolerance (Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Given this, both religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy are shown to have a direct influence on political tolerance. According to Wilcox and Jelen (1990), fundamentalism (which is referenced here as *doctrinal orthodoxy*) leads to increased levels of perceived threat. Also, in the words of Layman and Green (1998), “Believing is the central motivation for religious belonging and behaving, and is made up of cognitions about the nature of the divine and humankind’s relationship to it (Leege and Kellstedt 1993).” Drawing on these studies, I have modeled a path between doctrinal orthodoxy (belief) and religious commitment (behavior) as well as a path between doctrinal orthodoxy and threat perception.

In addition, it is generally accepted that religious commitment has the capability of influencing political attitudes and that this influence is most likely a conservative one (Beatty and Walter 1984; Green et al. 1994; Layman 1997; Layman and Green 1998; Smidt and Penning 1982; Wilcox 1987; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). From this work as well as political tolerance research, it can be concluded that religiousness contributes to attitudes or beliefs that are less likely to allow for acceptance of ideas with which one disagrees. Given this, I have modeled a path between religious commitment and a secure personality because one of the components of a secure personality is dogmatism (e.g., an open versus a closed mind).

Furthermore, religious motivation is posited as the reason for the driving force behind religious belief, belonging, and/or behavior (Allport and Ross 1967; Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999; Gorsuch 1994; Hoge 1972; Hunt and King 1971; Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990; McConahay 1973; Meadow and Kahoe 1984). Hunt and King (1971: 340) concluded that the research of Allport (1966) and Allport and Ross (1967) showed a clear progression toward understanding extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness as “the motives associated with religious beliefs and practices.” Therefore intrinsic motivation, extrinsic social motivation, and extrinsic personal motivation are all shown as directly influencing both religious commitment (behavior) and doctrinal orthodoxy (belief). All the religious motivation variables are modeled as directly influencing political tolerance as well. Because part of the purpose of this article is to assess whether or not religious motivation accounts for the relationship between religiousness and political tolerance demonstrated in previous research, these are necessary and logical paths to model.

Measurements

Extrinsic and intrinsic religious motivation will be measured by items from the I/E-Revised scale (Gorsuch and McPherson 1989). Intrinsic motivation will consist of five Intrinsic (I) items, and Extrinsic motivation will consist of four Extrinsic (E) items. The responses for all items are on a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). See Appendix A for a complete listing of all items. Extrinsic and intrinsic religious motivation is a two-dimensional construct, each clearly loading on separate factors. Although Allport (1966) had originally conceptualized the intrinsic-extrinsic measure as a bipolar continuum, early empirical research concluded such was not the case (Allport and Ross 1967; Carey 1974; Donahue 1985; Elifson 1976; Feagin 1964; Hood 1970; Patrick 1979; Vincenzo, Hendrick, and Murray 1976).

More recent research has argued for an extrinsic scale with two distinct components, one called “Es” and the other called “Ep.” The “Es” stands for “extrinsic social” and purports that these individuals use religion for social reasons; the “Ep” stands for “extrinsic personal” and suggests that these individuals use religion for personal benefits (Gorsuch and McPherson 1989; Kirkpatrick 1989; Leong and Zachar 1990). It is important to note that although separate analyses can be done by subdividing the extrinsic scale, Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) argue that the two subsets (Es and Ep) are needed together, as one scale, to measure total extrinsicness.

Religious commitment is measured by frequency of attendance at a religious institution, frequency of personal prayer, and religious salience (Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman and Green 1998). *Doctrinal orthodoxy* is measured by a single variable, biblical literalism, which in turn has three response categories ranging from most orthodox to least orthodox.⁹

In measuring *political tolerance*, this research has adopted the content-controlled or least-liked measurement approach developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982). In this approach, respondents identify their most disliked group from among a list of “extremist” groups that represent the right as well as the left in addition to groups that do not necessarily fall on the left-right continuum. If the respondent’s most disliked group is not on the list, the respondent is asked to name

⁹ The question asked to measure orthodoxy is as follows: “Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?” The high orthodoxy response is “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.” The medium orthodoxy response is “The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.” The low orthodoxy response is “The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men.”

that group.¹⁰ Respondents are then asked to respond to a series of five statements about “a range of peaceful activities in which members of that group might participate or about steps the government might take against that group” (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982: 61) to measure political tolerance (Davis 1995; Marcus et al. 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Each statement has a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5).¹¹

Secure personality is measured by two traits: dogmatism¹² and self-esteem¹³ (Davis 1995; Marcus et al. 1995; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).

Political conservatism is typically measured via a seven-point scale ranging from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7). For a phone survey, the format is slightly varied. Respondents are asked: “In politics today, do you think

¹⁰ Although there have been challenges to the “least-liked” measurement approach for tolerance (e.g., Gibson 1992; Mueller 1988), they have not been compelling enough to invalidate the use of this approach. For example, Mueller (1988) suggests that tolerance does not require a strong dislike. Furthermore, he suggests that there may be more than one type of intolerance. He argues that intolerance may be due to a strong dislike or opposition, or intolerance may be due to the perceived threat that a group represents. Similarly, Gibson (1992) argues that some respondents may name more “trivial” groups, while others will name groups that are more threatening. Thus the dislike of the threatening group will be more intense than the dislike of the “trivial” group. This line of reasoning is not compelling. Although it is true that threat perception is important for predicting tolerance, threat perception can be—and typically is—controlled for in tolerance scholarship by its inclusion as a predictor of political tolerance (Davis 1995; Marcus et al. 1995; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sullivan et al. 1993). Furthermore, the need to control for threat perception remains even in using other measures of tolerance, such as the standard and widely utilized GSS measures. It is important to note that Gibson, who was initially a critic of the least-liked tolerance measurement approach (e.g., Gibson 1986, 1989), has changed his position. Although he still voiced reservations about the least-liked method, he nonetheless became more amenable to the least-liked method over time and has embraced the strategy in his own research (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2000; Sullivan et al. 1993).

¹¹ Respondents were asked whether members of their least-liked group “should be banned from running for public office in the U.S.,” “should be allowed to teach in public schools,” “should be outlawed,” “should be allowed to make a public speech,” and “should be allowed to hold public rallies.”

¹² Dogmatism refers to rigidity of mind or rigidity of thought. A “closed mind” is unwilling to consider alternative views, in contrast to an “open mind,” which is willing to consider ideas that are different from one’s own (Rokeach 1960). Dogmatism is measured with two items (Davis 1995; Marcus et al. 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982): “There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth” and “Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren’t worth the paper they are printed on.” Each item has five response categories ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5).

¹³ Self-esteem refers to our self-attitudes, whether good or bad. It can be thought of as personal (un)worthiness (Sniderman 1975). Self-esteem is measured with three true (coded 1) or false (coded 5) response items (Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001): “I am certainly lacking in self-confidence,” “I doubt whether I would make a good leader,” and “It is hard for me to start a conversation with strangers.”

of yourself as a conservative [coded 1], as middle of the road [coded 2], as a liberal [coded 3], or don't you think of yourself in these terms [coded 4]?"

Norms of democracy is expressing support for abstract liberal-democratic principles. It can include support for general norms of a liberal democracy (e.g., free speech and legal rights) as well as procedural norms of a democracy (e.g., majority vote, release on bail, the right to not be forced to testify against oneself). This study specifically measures support for general norms of liberal democracy.¹⁴

Threat perception is intended to capture the perception of an objectionable group's strength, and therefore its potential to endanger important values or social/constitutional order, as perceived by the respondent. Respondents are asked to rate their "least-liked" group by one adjective pair: safe/dangerous. The possible responses range from very safe to very dangerous.

The remaining variables, *education*, *age*, and *income*, are standard demographic variables. Exact question wording for each of these items can be found in Appendix A.

IS RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION DISTINCT FROM TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUSNESS?

I specifically want to verify that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are distinct from religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy. This article is premised on the contention that traditional religiousness, here measured by religious commitment (religious behavior) and doctrinal orthodoxy (belief), and religious motivation (reason for religious behavior) are two distinct concepts. If religious motivation is not distinct and separate from traditional religiousness, if it does not measure anything different, then the rest of this article is unalterably hampered. By default, this verification will also demonstrate that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are two separate components and not two ends of a continuum and will assess the adequacy—or lack thereof—of the various items used to measure these intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.

¹⁴ Two items, with responses ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5), measure support for norms of democracy (Sullivan et al. 1993): "No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else" and "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be." Both of these items have little variability. The first has a standard deviation of .859 (94.5% of all respondents agree/strongly agree with this item). The second has a standard deviation of .744 (88.8% of all respondents agree/strongly agree with this item). The responses are skewed toward high support, which is not unusual or unexpected. Americans have consistently demonstrated considerable support of democratic norms when asked about them in the abstract (McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 1983; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).

Table 1, on the following page, presents the results of a principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation. All the items marked with an “I” or an “E” are expected to measure intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness, respectively. The “Ep” and “Es” stands for extrinsic personal and extrinsic social, respectively. The items marked “RC” are for religious commitment; also included in this factor analysis is the doctrinal orthodoxy concept (marked with a “DO”), which is measured by a single item: biblical literalism.¹⁵

All items load as expected. The intrinsic items all load most substantially on the first component. The most substantial loading is .741 for the item “I enjoy reading about my religion” with low or inconsequential loadings on the other three components. The three items “It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer,” “I have often had a strong sense of God’s presence,” and “I try hard to live my life according to my religious beliefs” load at .696, .738, and .614, respectively. However, the item “I try hard to live my life according to my religious beliefs” also loaded on another component at .356. The item that performed least well was “My whole approach to life is based on my religion,” with a primary loading of .590 and additional loadings of .330 and .312 on two other components. Overall, the five intrinsic items are reliable measures of the underlying concept of intrinsic motivation.

The two extrinsic social (Es) items load on a single component at .835 and .846 with inconsequential loadings on all other components. Likewise, the two extrinsic personal (Ep) items load on a single component at .732 and .837 with moderately low loadings across the other components. This analysis clearly demonstrates that there are two dimensions to extrinsic motivation: personal and social dimensions. This is as expected, and it is consistent with previous research (Genia 1993; Gorsuch and McPherson 1989; Kirkpatrick 1989; Leong and Zachar 1990). Nevertheless, Gorsuch and McPherson have argued that both extrinsic social (Es) and extrinsic personal (Ep) are needed together, as one concept, to measure total extrinsicness.

¹⁵ There is an important caveat to highlight regarding the religious motivation items used to construct the intrinsic and extrinsic scales. There were 601 total respondents in the survey data used here, and 108 of these respondents did not answer the religious motivation questions because they indicated that they were Jewish, had no religion (secular), or were of some other religion (Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc.). These 108 respondents were not asked the battery of questions regarding their religious motivation because either they could not reasonably be expected to render answers to these questions (they had already indicated that they had no religion, and it would have been unreasonable to expect such an individual to render answers to nine questions regarding their religiousness) or their particular religious faith excluded them from an expectation of answering religious motivation questions deemed appropriate for Christians.

**Table 1: Religious Motivation Versus Traditional Religiousness:
Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation**

	Component	Intrinsic Factor	Religious Commitment	Extrinsic Social	Extrinsic Personal	Orthodoxy
I	a. I enjoy reading about my religion	.741	.106	.090	-.026	
I	b. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.	.696	.248	-.052	.079	-.114
I	c. I have often had a strong sense of God's presence.	.738	.155	-.080	.061	.145
I	f. I try hard to live my life according to my religious beliefs.	.614	.356	-.169	.175	-.040
I	i. My whole approach to life is based on my religion.	.590	.330	.084	.043	.312
RC	Amount of guidance religion provides in day-to-day living.	.391	.601	.138	.061	.267
RC	How often do you attend religious services?	.225	.802	.034	.009	.121
RC	Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?	.305	.692	.034	.045	.091
Es	g. I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends.	-.066	-.114	.835	.056	-.016
Es	h. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.	.012	.100	.846	.072	-.050
Ep	d. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.	.121	.259	.141	.732	.330
Ep	e. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.	.060	.251	.043	.837	.136
DO	Biblical literalism	.104	.262	.087	.052	.872

Utilizing these four items constituting extrinsic social and extrinsic personal in a single comprehensive construct, however, is not appropriate. The following empirical analyses need to make use of the items in a fashion that is consistent with the structure of the data. Because this project employs structural equation modeling, it makes sense to do analyses that have extrinsic motivation as two different latent constructs. Theoretically, whether an individual uses religion as a means to a social or a personal end has no effect on the theory of religious motivation. (However, it is important to recognize that extrinsic personal motivation and extrinsic social motivation might relate differently to other variables.)

The doctrinal orthodoxy item (DO) also behaves as expected. It loads on its own component at .872 and loads extremely low on the remaining components. Finally, the religious commitment items (RC) load most substantially on a single component (the second component), with loadings of .601, .802, and .692. However, the religious guidance item, with a loading of .601, also loaded on two other components with scores of .391 (the intrinsic component) and .267 (the orthodoxy component). Overall, these results are adequate to let us conclude that the extrinsic social, extrinsic personal, and intrinsic motivations are separate and unique constructs.

DOES RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION INFLUENCE POLITICAL TOLERANCE?

This question will be assessed in two ways. First, I test for an interaction effect, and then I test for the influence of religious motivation within a comprehensive model of tolerance. Therefore the next task is to address the following questions: Does the influence of religious commitment on political tolerance differ depending on the value of extrinsic and/or intrinsic motivation? Does the influence of doctrinal orthodoxy on political tolerance differ depending on the value of extrinsic and/or intrinsic motivation? Whereas the early religious motivation scholars surmised that such relationships existed (Allport 1966; Allport and Ross 1967; Feagin 1964), we can specifically test this conjecture.

Interaction Effects

To assess whether or not the relationships between religious commitment and political tolerance and between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance are different depending on the level of extrinsic motivation and/or intrinsic motivation, I do a simultaneous analysis of two groups (high and low) for extrinsic motivation and for intrinsic motivation. That is, I conduct a simultaneous analysis in which I test for equivalence between respondents classified into the

low-motivation group versus the high-motivation group. This is done separately for intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Because there are two types of extrinsic motivation, personal and social, I do two separate simultaneous analyses of groups: one for extrinsic personal and one for extrinsic social.

Specifically, I want to know whether the paths between religious commitment and political tolerance and between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance (as depicted in Figure 1) are equivalent across different groups. Generally speaking, in full structural equation models, testing for equivalence among the structural paths is of primary concern (Byrne 2001). In this particular instance, the issues at hand are whether the path between religious commitment and political tolerance is equivalent for those with high motivation versus low motivation and whether the path between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance is equivalent for those with high motivation versus low motivation. To conduct this test, I utilize the structural equation model shown in Figure 1, but with an important caveat.

In testing for the interaction effect, religious motivation must be physically controlled. For example, in testing for whether or not there is an interaction effect due to intrinsic motivation, that variable is physically removed as a component within the model as presented in Figure 1. Instead, I must collapse each intrinsic motivation into two categories—high motivation and low motivation—and test the model on these two groups simultaneously. When I test for extrinsic social motivation and for extrinsic personal motivation, I utilize the same techniques. In each separate analysis, the particular motivation under investigation must be physically controlled and collapsed into high-motivation and low-motivation groups.¹⁶

Are the paths between religious commitment and political tolerance and between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance equivalent for those with high motivation and those with low motivation? To test for this, I must place a constraint making those structural paths equivalent for the high- and low-

¹⁶ The intrinsic motivation scale ranges from 5 to 25. The higher the number, the higher the level of intrinsic motivation. This scale has a midpoint of 15. I categorized scores 5–18 as low intrinsic and scores 19–25 as high intrinsic. Because the intrinsic motivation distribution is skewed toward high intrinsic, the low intrinsic category is broader. However, even with this unequal category width, the high intrinsic group is approximately 25% larger than the low intrinsic group. The extrinsic social motivation scale ranges from 2 to 10. The higher the number, the higher the level of extrinsic social motivation. This scale has a midpoint of 6; however, extrinsic social motivation is skewed toward low extrinsic social motivation. Therefore I categorized scores 2–4 as low extrinsic social motivation and 5–10 as high extrinsic social motivation. The extrinsic personal motivation scales ranges from 2 to 10 with a midpoint of 6. By categorizing scores 2–6 as low extrinsic personal motivation and scores 7–10 as high extrinsic personal motivation, I can create almost equal categories (46.7 percent versus 53.3 percent).

motivation groups.¹⁷ Then this constrained model (Model B) must be tested against an unconstrained model (Model A). That is, Model B (the model with the equality constraint for the paths between religious commitment and political tolerance and between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance for both the high-motivation group and the low-motivation group) must be tested against Model A (the exact same model without the equality constraints). The SEM software tests both models, across both the high- and low-motivation groups, simultaneously.

My results from just such a test for all three religious motivations are shown in Table 2. These results show that the structural paths from religious commitment to political tolerance and from doctrinal orthodoxy to political tolerance are equal or invariant across all three motivations. In short, there is no interaction between religious commitment and political tolerance and between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance based on the value of intrinsic motivation, extrinsic social motivation, or extrinsic personal motivation. The conclusion that no interaction effect is present is derived from the nested comparison of the unconstrained versus the constrained model.

**Table 2: Simultaneous Analysis of Groups:
High Motivation Versus Low Motivation**

			Chi-Square	Degrees of Freedom	p-Value
Intrinsic Motivation	Model A (unconstrained)		655.986	300	.000
	Model B (Constrained)		658.759	372	.000
	Nested comparison		2.773	2	.25
Extrinsic Social	Model A (unconstrained)		834.53	500	.000
	Model B (Constrained)		836.302	502	.000
	Nested comparison		1.772	2	.412
Extrinsic Personal	Model A (unconstrained)		799.048	500	.000
	Model B (Constrained)		802.835	502	.000
	Nested comparison		3.786	2	.151

¹⁷ “In structural equation modeling, testing for the invariance [equivalence] of parameters across groups is accomplished by placing constraints on particular parameters. That is to say, the parameters are specified as being invariant (i.e., equivalent) across groups” (Byrne 2001: 183).

The nested comparison tests the null hypothesis that the groups are equivalent.¹⁸ Rejection of the null hypothesis says that there is nonequivalence between the groups. If the null hypothesis that the groups are equivalent cannot be rejected, then the groups are considered to be equal. With *p*-values of .25, .41, and .15, respectively, the null hypothesis that the groups are equivalent cannot be rejected. Therefore I must accept Model B, which says that the high-motivation group and the low-motivation group have equivalent structural parameter estimates for the paths between religious commitment and political tolerance and between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance.

A Comprehensive Test

The next task is to test the model in Figure 1. Figure 2, on the following page, shows these results. All parameter estimates are the standardized results, and those in bold indicate significance of .05 or better. Of particular interest for this article are the effects, if any, of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on political tolerance. If the contentions of the scholars in the field of the psychology of religion are correct, then we should see that intrinsic motivation is related to increased political tolerance while extrinsic motivation is related to decreased political tolerance.


The results for the religious motivation variables are contrary to the psychology of religion literature. Both extrinsic personal motivation and extrinsic social motivation have an inconsequential and not statistically significant influence on political tolerance. That is, there is no relationship between extrinsic motivation (social or personal) and political tolerance. However, there is a relationship between intrinsic motivation and political tolerance. But it is not in the direction that the literature suggests; instead of increased intrinsic motivation resulting in higher levels of political tolerance, it results in lower levels of political tolerance, with a strong path coefficient of -0.58 .

Intrinsic motivation has a strong relationship to doctrinal orthodoxy, with increased motivation leading to increased doctrinal orthodoxy, with a path coefficient of .43. Its relationship to religious commitment is very strong, with a path coefficient of .84. Neither of these results is contrary to what one might expect. However, the relationship between religious commitment and political tolerance is contrary to expectations, in that increased religious commitment leads to increased—not decreased—political tolerance; and the path coefficient is a very strong .72. Once again, extrinsic social and extrinsic personal motivations

¹⁸ In Amos 5.0 SEM software, when testing for invariance between groups, the simultaneous analysis of groups' procedure assumes that the unconstrained model is correct (e.g., it tests the null hypothesis that the more constrained model is correct under the assumption that the less constrained model is correct). Thus the null hypothesis is that the groups are equivalent.

demonstrate no substantive or statistical relationship with either religious commitment or doctrinal orthodoxy.

Figure 2: Model Results



It is also interesting to note that increased doctrinal orthodoxy does lead to increased threat perception (path coefficient: .16); however, the influence of doctrinal orthodoxy on political tolerance is inconsequential both substantially and statistically (path coefficient: $-.08$, not significant). It is of further interest that doctrinal orthodoxy does not have a substantive or statistical relationship to political tolerance, given the strong relationship between intrinsic motivation and dogmatism. In addition, increased doctrinal orthodoxy does influence religious commitment in an upward direction; that is, increased orthodoxy leads to increased religious commitment. And while increased religious commitment does lead to a less secure personality, which is an important finding if for no other reason than that dogmatism is one of the component parts of a secure personality, the path between a secure personality and political tolerance is still a substantial and significant $.43$, so the evidence suggests that an increase in secure personality leads to increased political tolerance.

DISCUSSION

Given the purpose of this article in the broadest sense, which is to bridge the gap between the psychology of religion literature and the religion and political literature, this article has laid some important groundwork. This is the first empirical examination of traditional religiousness items and religious motivation, and this examination has demonstrated that these items are conceptually and empirically distinct. This is an important step if we are to assess the differing influences of traditional religiousness and religious motivation. This article has also demonstrated that there is no interaction effect in which the relationships between religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy to political tolerance are different depending on the level of religious motivation (intrinsic, extrinsic social, or extrinsic personal). Because this is a conjecture that is within the psychology of religion literature and because this is the first article to test this conjecture, our knowledge has been advanced.

From that point on, the results produce more questions than answers. Religious commitment behaves contrary to what previous research suggests. Not only does increased commitment lead to increased and not decreased political tolerance, but the influence is considerable. Doctrinal orthodoxy also behaves contrary to expectations insofar as it does not directly influence political tolerance at all. However, while religious commitment positively influences political tolerance, intrinsic motivation negatively influences political tolerance; that is, increased intrinsic motivation leads to less political tolerance. To paraphrase Gordon Allport (1954: 444), it appears that religion can both make and unmake political tolerance. How can this be explained?

There are two ways to tackle this question. The first is to address how this research differs from the research that preceded it. The second is to offer insight into why religiousness might exhibit contrary relationships with political tolerance. I will begin with the first explanation.

The new perspective of this study is derived from the complexity of incorporating a more sophisticated tolerance measure in conjunction with a more sophisticated model. In addition, this study incorporates psychological and political predictors of political tolerance that were not used in some of the most important religion and political tolerance research. The combination of these, it can be argued, is what accounts for the differences in results.

However, there are several insights that can help us to explain the results obtained here. For example, one reason for the divergence of the current results from those of previous studies on political tolerance might very well be the result of natural political maturation of different religious sectors. The data for previous studies were collected more than fifteen years ago (e.g., Jelen 1991; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). It was at this point, approximately fifteen years ago, that the reemergence of the Evangelical Protestants into the public arena became institutionalized with the end of the Reagan presidency. Because they were already politically involved, this trend would require within the U.S. political context for Catholics and mainline Protestants to either develop or learn tolerance as the *modus operandi* with this new political elephant. On the other hand, Evangelical Protestants found themselves as new actors on the political stage. With the increased involvement in modern politics of the various religious communities, along with Kraynak's (2001) argument that Christian communities believe in democratic governance, maybe we should not be all that surprised that the current findings are contrary to those of previous research.

Nevertheless, there is still the issue of making sense out of why religious commitment can increase political tolerance while simultaneously intrinsic motivation can decrease political tolerance. This is a difficult finding to assess. The best that one can do at this point is to offer educated conjecture. It might be that, statistically, once the paths between intrinsic motivation and doctrinal orthodoxy and religious commitment are modeled, given the substantial positive influence intrinsic motivation has on those two items, the only result left for the direct relationship with political tolerance is a negative one. One can argue for the removal of those paths, but theoretically, those paths make sense, and it is not appropriate to remove them just because the results obtained are not those that were theorized.

Conversely, the results might be related to the popular understanding of political tolerance. It might be that those with intrinsic motivation (remember that the model represents results for religious individuals only) are not thinking

through the implications of political tolerance insofar as they are failing to distinguish between tolerance and acceptance, a distinction that is well established in the literature. Because the model is solely of religious individuals, it might be that even though the political tolerance items are clearly about civil liberties, these individuals have trouble distinguishing between extending civil liberties without acceptance and extending them with acceptance. That is, it might be that many religious individuals equate extending civil liberties as acceptance of or acquiescence to what they consider morally wrong. Furthermore, that situation might be fueled by current political rhetoric over what are moral issues for religious individuals (e.g., abortion, homosexual rights) and secular issues for others. At any rate, these results generate enough questions to fuel further research.

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Appendix A: Measurement Information

Religious Orientation: Items from I/E-Revised Scale (Gorsuch and McPherson 1989)

- | | |
|----|--|
| I | 1. I enjoy reading about my religion. |
| I | 2. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer. |
| I | 3. I have often had a strong sense of God's presence. |
| Ep | 4. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection. |
| I | 5. I try hard to live my life according to my religious beliefs. |
| Ep | 6. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow. |
| Es | 7. I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends. |
| I | 8. My whole approach to life is based on my religion. |
| Es | 9. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. |

I is for an item that measures intrinsic orientation.

E is for an item that measures extrinsic orientation. (Ep is extrinsic personal, and Es is extrinsic social.)

Excluded Items:

- | | |
|----|---|
| I | It doesn't much matter what I believe so long as I am good. (reversed) |
| I | Although I am religious I don't let it affect my life. (reversed) |
| I | Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in my life. (reversed). |
| Es | I go to church because it helps me make friends. |
| Ep | Prayer is for peace and happiness. |

Education

1. Less than high school graduate
2. High school graduate/GED
3. Technical/Junior college
4. Some undergraduate college
5. College degree/Four-year degree
6. Professional or graduate school
98. Don't know
99. No answer/Refuse

Income

1. Less than \$20,000
2. \$20,001 – \$40,000
3. \$40,001 – \$60,000
4. \$60,001 – \$80,000
5. \$80,001 – \$100,000
6. \$100,001 – \$120,000
7. More than \$120,000
8. Don't know
9. No answer/Refuse

Age

In what year were you born?